“A or B” is inconsistent with “A not B.” This describes why the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101 by the U.S. Supreme Court is inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution, and thus unconstitutional. This article tracks the legislative history of patent eligibility from 1790 to 2011, and the parallel but inconsistent U.S. Supreme Court case law during this period. In following its own case law, the Court has shown extraordinary judicial activism, has penciled out two words of the federal statute (“or discovers”), and has penciled a word out of the U.S. Constitution (“discoveries”).
SUPREME COURT

SHERRY KNOWLES AND DR. ANTHONY PROSSER

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SHERRY KNOWLES AND DR. ANTHONY PROSSER *

I. INTRODUCTION

“A or B” is inconsistent with “A not B.” This describes why the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101 by the U.S. Supreme Court is inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution, and thus unconstitutional.

The U.S. Constitution is among the most brilliant documents ever crafted. It is the supreme law of our land and alone creates the carefully balanced tripartite framework for the federal government. As well said by James Madison, “In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men you must first enable the government to control the governed, and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”

Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the sole power to “promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Thus, the U.S. Constitution does two things: it grants the power to create the laws that promote the progress of science solely to Congress, and it associates inventors with discoveries. The U.S. Constitution does not use the word “patent,” and it does not tell Congress what kind of advances should be promoted to progress science.

Congress has used its exclusive power under Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 8 to declare how the country will promote the progress of science, by defining the scope of subject matter that the country will motivate through the use of a temporary government-granted monopoly. This is often referred to as the patent eligibility statute. The current version of the statute is 35 U.S.C. § 101, which states:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

And here we come to “A or B,” which is “invents or discovers.” Section § 101 unambiguously refers to “invents” and “discovers” in the disjunctive. Thus, according to its plain meaning, Congress has used its exclusive grant of power from the U.S. Constitution in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 to promote the progress of science by a grant securing for a limited time the exclusive right to either an invention or a discovery. Both

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2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
words “inventors” and “discoveries” are used in the U.S. Constitution.\(^4\) And, both inventions and discoveries have resulted in important fundamental advancements of society.\(^5\) It is not out of the pale to conclude that it is in the country’s best interest to promote the progress of science by motivating and temporarily rewarding both of them.

Where the U.S. Constitution grants sole authority to Congress to create law in an area, the U.S. Supreme Court is limited to statutory construction.\(^6\) The Supreme Court as recently as 2000 has stated that “when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”\(^7\) The court has stated “time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”\(^8\) This assumption is “elementary” to judicial analysis of statutes.\(^9\) The Supreme Court even respects the grammatical structure of sentences.\(^10\) Thus, sometimes statutory interpretation can turn on the very punctuation used by Congress.\(^11\)

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\(^4\) U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

\(^5\) Invention, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1961). The term “invention” is commonly defined in dictionaries either in circular fashion as the act of inventing or alternatively, according to the patentability requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, adequate description, and enablement. It has also been referred to as an act of ingenuity or genius and not of ordinary skill. In contrast, discovery has been used to refer to learning how something works. Congress has clarified its intent that these terms are limited to things made by man, which is not necessary for definition of invention but affirms Congress’ intent that its use of the term discovery in the statute refers to applied discoveries, in other words, an application made by man of what something is or does; see H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, 2d Sess., 6 (1952). Examples of marketed pharmaceutical drugs (or drug combinations) that are synthetic and fall into the category of invention include Crestor, Lipitor, Advair, Symbicort, Januvia, Atripla, Viagra, Cialis, Ritalin, and Revlimid. Examples of marketed drugs that have been discovered in nature and then isolated and used in a non-naturally occurring form with important therapeutic uses include penicillin, tetracycline, epogen, adriamycin, insulin, vincristine, vinblastine, streptomycin, and Vitamin B12.

Clearly, both categories have improved health, promoted the progress of science, improved our standard of living, and saved countless lives.


\(^7\) Hartford, 530 U.S. at 6.

\(^8\) Connecticut, 530 U.S. at 253-254 (citing several cases in support and going further to state that “When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last” and the “judicial inquiry is complete”).

\(^9\) Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485 (“It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the Act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the lawmaking body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”).

\(^10\) See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598 (2008) (affirming the Court of Appeals’ opinion that in part relied on the placement of a comma in the Second Amendment); see also Lockhart v. U.S., 136 S. Ct. 958, 962 (2016) (quoting a book on statutory construction by Scalia regarding the interpretation of limiting clauses and phrases which “should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows”).

Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was recently asked on The Colbert Report TV show whether a hot dog is a sandwich. She replied, “You tell me what a sandwich is and then I’ll tell you if a hot dog is a sandwich.” This is an example of strict statutory construction—the Court must read the literal words of the statute and apply them to the facts. Under the Constitution, as illustrated by Justice Ginsburg, it is the requirement and limitation of the Supreme Court to construe the literal meaning of every word of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and apply it to the facts at hand. This is the case whether the court agrees with the wording of the statute or not.

Notwithstanding its legal prohibition, the U.S. Supreme Court has created its own parallel law in the area of patent eligibility. The Supreme Court case law on this subject, which has taken on the nature of common law, is directly inconsistent with the wording of 35 U.S.C. § 101. It runs roughshod over the U.S. Constitution. In following its own case law, it has penciled out two words of the federal statute (“or discovers”) and penciled a word out of the U.S. Constitution (“Discoveries”).

The pinnacle of the U.S. Supreme Court’s unconstitutional treatment of patent eligibility is found in the Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad decision, where Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that: “Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” In this passage, Justice Thomas reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s view that a “discovery” is not patent eligible under § 101. In other words, according to the Supreme Court, “A not B” (an invention but not a discovery is patent eligible). This is despite the clear disjunctive wording of the statute that states that “whoever invents or discovers . . . may obtain a patent therefor” under Congress’ sole authority to promote the progress of science. Myriad is exemplary of the Supreme Court line of cases holding “A not B,” and thus B is not patent eligible.

The legislative history of 35 U.S.C. § 101 below confirms that Congress repeatedly amended the patent eligibility statute from its time of enactment in 1790 to the most recent codification in 2011, and has maintained and reaffirmed its delegation of exclusive power to reward both inventions and discoveries. In contrast, the history of applying § 101 by the Supreme Court in its opinions goes from little or no statutory construction or discussion of legislative intent to the creation of “judicial exceptions” to the federal statute to full boar direct contradiction of it.

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13 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It is our task, as I see it, not to enter the minds of the Members of Congress—who need have nothing in mind in order for their votes to be both lawful and effective—but rather to give fair and reasonable meaning to the text of the United States Code, adopted by various Congresses at various times.”).


15 *Id.* at 577.

II. CONGRESS’ LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ON PATENT ELIGIBILITY

Congress has historically shown a keen interest in the wording of the codified patent law, including on patent eligible subject matter. On numerous occasions prior to the Patent Act of 1952 Congress passed amendments and entirely new Patent Acts that contained small changes in word choice regarding patent eligibility.\textsuperscript{17} Despite these various amendments and acts, detailed further below, Congress has consistently included both inventions and discoveries as patent eligible subject matter. The language on patent eligibility and the definition of invention in the Patent Act of 1952 remains intact today and was not amended by the recent America Invents Act.\textsuperscript{18}

The Patent Act of 1790\textsuperscript{19} is the first time Congress used its constitutional power to codify what can be patented. The Act stated that "he, she, or they, hath or have \textit{invented or discovered} any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement thereon not before known or used" is entitled to a patent.\textsuperscript{20} The first Patent Act, like the Patent Act we practice under today, goes further to define rules for patentability of patent eligible subject matter. The Act required that inventions had to be useful and could only be enforced if they were novel.\textsuperscript{21} The Act also required a majority vote between the Secretary of State, Secretary for the Department of War, and the Attorney General to conclude that the “invention or discovery” was “sufficiently useful and important.”\textsuperscript{22}

The Patent Act of 1793\textsuperscript{23} repealed the prior Patent Act and made small changes to the definition of patent eligible subject matter. The Act states that if “they have invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine manufacture or composition of matter” then they are entitled to patent protection.\textsuperscript{24} While the word “discovered” was removed from the patent eligibility paragraph, it appears that this may have just been an oversight, as “discovery,” “discovered,” and “discoverer,” are used throughout the remainder of the statute.\textsuperscript{25} The addition of “new” as a limitation to patent eligible subject matter can be traced to our modern day novelty requirement under 35 U.S.C. 102.\textsuperscript{26} The Patent Act of 1793 also removed the requirement for a vote that the invention is “sufficiently useful and important.”\textsuperscript{27} These changes, made

\textsuperscript{19} Pub. L. No. 1-34, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (current enacted version at 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2012)).
\textsuperscript{20} Id. at 110 (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{21} Id. at 111. Section 5 of the Patent Act provided instruction for when a court could repeal a patent, including if “the patentee was not the first and true inventor or discoverer.”
\textsuperscript{22} Id. at 110.
\textsuperscript{24} Id. at 310.
\textsuperscript{25} Id. at 321-323.
\textsuperscript{26} 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
\textsuperscript{27} Pub. L. No. 2-53, 2 Stat. 318 (1793).
so quickly after the first Patent Act, clearly show that Congress was active and
thoughtful in defining what could be patented.

The Patent Act of 1794\(^\text{28}\) was passed to amend the prior Patent Act to reinstate
court proceedings that had been dismissed as a consequence of repealing the Patent
Act of 1790. The Act did not amend patent eligibility. The Patent Act of 1800\(^\text{29}\)
similarly left patent eligibility untouched but handled several technical matters
including: (1) modifying the oath requirement;\(^\text{30}\) (2) providing that resident aliens can
apply for patents subject to some restrictions;\(^\text{31}\) and (3) changing the infringement
damage calculation from\(^\text{at least}\) three times license fee to three times the actual
damages.\(^\text{32}\) The first Patent Act of 1832\(^\text{33}\) provided that any patents that had been
invalidated as a result of an inventor’s unintentional failure to comply with the best
mode or oath requirement could have their patent reinstated by the Secretary of
State.\(^\text{34}\) The second Patent Act of 1832\(^\text{35}\) expanded patent rights to aliens who
intended to become U.S. citizens (effectively removing the two-year residency
requirement). While these acts do not change any patentability definitions, they do,
again, refer to “discovery” or “discoveries” in their text, and demonstrate the keen
interest Congress had in the details of patent law.

The Patent Act of 1836,\(^\text{36}\) repealed all prior Patent Acts and reintroduced the
disjunctive discovered or invented language at the beginning of the statute,
reaffirming that both are patent eligible. In fact, Congress placed the word
discovered before invented.\(^\text{37}\) In relevant part, the Act said “That any person or
persons having discovered or invented any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any
art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” is entitled to a patent.\(^\text{38}\) Restoring the “discoveries” language in the patent eligibility section purposefully
clarified that discoveries are eligible for patent protection. The Act also established
the Patent Office and the Commissioner of Patents position.\(^\text{39}\)

Within four months of the Patent Office fire of 1836, Congress passed the
Patent Act of 1837\(^\text{40}\) to address the problems arising from the destruction of most of
the Patent Office’s records and models. The Act maintained the disjunctive
“discovered or invented” patent eligibility scope. The Act also allowed recording of

\(^{28}\) Pub. L. No. 3-58, 2 Stat. 393 (1794).
\(^{29}\) Pub. L. No. 6-25, 3 Stat. 37 (1800).
\(^{30}\) Id. at 38 (“Provided always, [t]hat every person petitioning for a patent for any invention, art
or discovery, pursuant to this act, shall make oath or affirmation . . . that such invention, art or
discovery hath not to the best of his or her knowledge or belief, been known or used either in this or
any foreign country.”) (emphasis added).
\(^{31}\) Id. “[T]he rights and privileges given, intended or provided to citizens of the United States,
respecting patents for new inventions, discoveries, and improvements, . . . are extended and given to
all aliens who at the time of the petitioning . . . shall have resided for two years within the United
States.” (emphasis added).
\(^{32}\) Id. “[A] sum equal to three times the actual damage sustained by such patentee.”
\(^{33}\) Pub. L. No. 22-162, 4 Stat. 559 (1832).
\(^{34}\) Id. at 559.
\(^{35}\) Pub. L. No. 22-203, 4 Stat. 577 (1832).
\(^{37}\) Id. at 119.
\(^{38}\) Id.
\(^{39}\) Id. at 118-119.
previously destroyed Patent Office records and raised the number of Examining Clerks from one to two.\footnote{41 Id. at 191-192.}

The Patent Act of 1839 also maintained the “discovered or invented” eligibility language.\footnote{42 Pub. L. No. 25-292, 5 Stat. 353 (1839).} In addition, it provided for more Examiners and codified that inventors who had first filed their patent applications overseas could also apply for a U.S. patent.\footnote{43 Id. at 353.} The speed at which Congress reacted to the Patent Office’s needs in this time period is notable.

The Patent Act of 1842\footnote{44 Pub. L. No. 27-288, 5 Stat. 543 (1842).} increased the scope of patent eligible subject matter. The Act again maintained the “discovered or invented” disjunctive patent eligibility scope and added subject matter that can now be traced to modern day design patents.\footnote{45 Id. at 543-544.}

There were over a dozen\footnote{46 The Patent Act of 1870 references a number of prior patents acts that were consolidated including: The Act of August 6, 1846, chapter 90, volume 9, page 59; May 27, 1848, chapter 47, volume 9, page 231; March 8, 1849, chapter 108, volume 9, page 895; March 8, 1851, chapter. 82, volume 9, page 617; August 8, 1852, chapter 107, volume 10, page 75; August 8, 1852, chapter 108, volume 10, page 76; March 8, 1858, chapter 97, volume 10, page 209; April 22, 1854, chapter 52, volume 10, page 276; March 8, 1855, chapter 175, volume 10, page 648; August 18, 1856, chapter 129, volume II, page 81; March 8, 1859, chapter 80, volume 11, page 410; February 18,1861, chapter 87, volume 12, page 180; March 2, 1861, chapter 88, volume 12, page 246; March 8,1863, chapter 102, volume 12, page 796; June 25, 1864, chapter 158, volume 18, page 194; March 8, 1865, chapter 112, volume 18, page 588; June 27, 1866, chapter 148, volume 14, page 76; March 29, 1867, chapter 17, volume 15, page 10; July 20, 1868, chapter 177, volume 15, page 119; July 28, 1868, chapter 227, volume 15, page 168; and March 8, 1869, chapter 121, volume 15, page 298.} The speed at which Congress reacted to the Patent Office’s needs in this time period is notable.

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Any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof, or who has invented or discovered and asexually
reproduced any distinct and new variety of plant, other than tuber-
propagated plant.\footnote{Id. at 376.}

Finally, after the rich history of expanding and refining (but not limiting) patent
eligibility described above, Congress passed the modern day eligibility criteria in The

Whoever \textit{invents or discovers} any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.\footnote{Id. at 797 (emphasis added); \textit{see also} Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA)). The America Invents Act maintains the same language for patent eligibility.}

The 1952 Act also added a definition for the term “invention.” The Act states
that: “The term ‘invention’ means invention or discovery.”\footnote{35 U.S.C. \textsection 100 (2012); \textit{see also} Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA)). The America Invents Act keeps the same definition of “invention.”} While this circular
definition of invention is not helpful in defining what an invention is or is not, it does
emphasize Congress’ insistence that discoveries are patent eligible.

The Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the
House of Representatives pertaining to the 1952 Act are enlightening. The
congressional record shows the intent to maintain “discoveries” was purposeful. For
example, The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) gave testimony to Congress (Mr. Bryson
presiding), with a range of comments on various proposed sections of the Act.\footnote{H.R. Rep. No. 82-3760, 1st Sess., 93 (1951).} With
respect to patent eligibility, the DOJ requested removal of “discoveries” from the
definition of invention with the assertion that it was inconsistent with the decisions
of the Supreme Court.\footnote{H.R. Rep. No. 80-4061, 2d Sess., 82 (1951). The Justice Department objected to the addition of discoveries to the definition of invention on at least two occasions. First, they stated that they “recommend that no hasty action be taken toward the enactment of a statutory definition of “invention.” And then they went as far as to say, “under existing law discoveries, as such, are not patentable.”} Specifically, Mr. Brown for the DOJ said that:

Section 100 of the bill, “definitions,” defines “invention” to include
discoveries. While the term “discovery” is used in the patent law as
synonymous with invention and it has been recognized that the act of
discovery is an essential part of the invention, under existing law
discoveries, as such are not patentable. . . The section might have the effect
of creating doubt as to existing law on the subject of discovery and might
result in opening the door to a huge new area of patents, and permit the
creation of monopolies in some of the fundamental and far-reaching
discoveries in the fields of chemistry, physics, medicine, mathematics, et
cetera. . . The Department would be opposed to the creation of any new area
of monopoly which would be exempt from the operation of the anti-trust
laws in the absence of clear evidence that such extension is necessary to provide adequate incentive for scientific effort. There would appear to be no such necessity with respect to the broad field of “discoveries.”

After Mr. Brown’s testimony was read into the record, the sole response to the DOJ comments was a short “Thank you, Mr. Brown” from Mr. Bryson for Congress without comment, and a request to call the next speaker. And as clear from the codified law, the DOJ’s suggestion was not accepted, even after the testimony that it would be inconsistent with Supreme Court cases.

Congress also heard from Mr. Fellner, the manager of the patent department of the Salsbury’s Laboratories in Iowa. Mr. Fellner made comments without a prepared statement on proposed sections 101 and 103. Mr. Fellner wanted to include language that had been omitted from the old bill H.R. 9133 in the new version H.R. 3760. H.R. 9133 stated, “An invention in the nature of a discovery as embodied in a new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or new and useful improvement thereof may be patented.” Mr. Fellner raised the issue of the highly controversial 1948 Supreme Court, Funk Bros. decision, holding that the discovery of a new mixture of bacteria that had commercial application to the inoculation of various agricultural species was not patent eligible. Fellner testified that the Funk Bros. product solved a great problem by providing a new compatible mixture of bacteria for crop development, and he implied that the decision to reject the patent was very problematic to industry.

Congressman Willis asked, “As I understand it, from the point of view of the industry you represent, their requirements would have been met by the adoption of section 101 of the old bill, H.R. 9133, particularly using the second paragraph beginning with “an invention in the nature of a discovery?” Mr. Fellner agreed. To that, Congressman Willis made the important observation:

You do not consider that the new bill, section 101 of H.R. 3760 with the definition, accomplishes what you have in mind? In other words, is it not simply a question of some condition? Does not the definition preceding section 101, embodied in section 100, carry all the implications you used in the second paragraph of section 101 of H.R. 9133? You see, in H.R. 9133, you did not have the definition contained in section 100 of the new bill. Now with these definitions, would not they supply the purpose of the second paragraph in the old bill? What it was intended to cover?

This Congressional statement urges the conclusion that the subcommittee thought that taking the extra step to add “discoveries” into the definition of invention in

58 Id. at 98.
59 Id. at 116-124.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 117.
62 Funk Bros. Seed Co. vs. Kalo Inoculant Co. 333 U.S. 127 (1948). This case is discussed in detail in Section II. below.
63 H.R. Rep. No. 82-3760 at 120.
64 Id.
section 100 reaffirmed its intent that discoveries are considered part of the subject matter Congress wants to motivate via the patent system.

Later on in Mr. Fellner's testimony, he was questioned by Congressman Crumpacker:

Mr. CRUMPACKER. Does not the language of the pending bill say "whoever discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" may obtain a patent covering it? I would think that would specifically cover the case you referred to. And, if the Supreme Court has interpreted the words as you indicate, I do not see how including that language in the paragraph would cause them to make a different interpretation.

Mr. FELLNER. I believe that the Supreme Court in that particular case did not interpret it in the way the bill here originally contemplated.\[65\]

After finishing his comments on Funk, Mr. Fellner was asked to go on to the next paragraph.\[66\] The overall Congressional discussion at the Hearing indicates Congress considered that by taking the step to add the discoveries to the new definition of invention in section 100 before section 101, it was affirming its intent that promoting discoveries will progress science, which should be enough. It was not.

In summary, between 1790 and 2011, Congress defined the scope of patent eligibility in the broad disjunctive “invention or discovery.” It did remove the word “discovered” for a short period of time (1793-1836 (and even then referred to discoveries, multiple times, later in the text of the code)), and then purposefully restored the disjunctive “invention or discovery” eligibility scope which it maintained through at least two dozen Patent Act amendments and is maintained today. The early enactments of Congress solidified and confirmed the statutory scope of patent eligibility.\[67\] The Supreme Court acknowledges that:

Early congressional enactments “provide ‘contemporaneous and weighty evidence’ of the Constitution’s meaning,” Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723–724, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 3186, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 3335, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983)). Indeed, such “contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution ..., acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be given its provisions.” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175, 47 S.Ct. 21, 45, 71 L.Ed. 160 (1926) (citing numerous cases).\[68\]

\[65\] Id. at 122.
\[66\] Id. at 123.
\[68\] Id. at 905.
III. HISTORY OF U.S. SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF PATENT ELIGIBILITY

The earliest U.S. Supreme Court opinion sometimes referred to by the Court in the march of patent eligibility cases is the 1852 case of *Le Roy v. Tatham*. A patent was issued to John and Charles Hanson on August 31st, 1837, on a combination of machine parts to make wrought lead pipes, which was later assigned to Tatham. The Patent Act of 1836, which codified the requirement for patent claims to be presented in a patent specification, had just been enacted and, thus, there was very little experience by patentees or the judiciary with patent claims at the time. The patentee stated that while the individual pieces of the equipment were known, their new combination allowed them to succeed in making perfect strong lead pipes. The Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York had charged the jury that the originality of the machinery did not consist in its novelty, but instead, in bringing a newly discovered principle into practical application, by which a useful article of manufacture is produced and wrought pipe made as distinguished from cast pipe. The Supreme Court determined that “The question whether the newly developed property of lead, used in the formation of pipes, might have been patented, if claimed as developed, without the invention of machinery, was not in the case.” It held that there was error in the Circuit Court’s instruction, “that the novelty of the combination of the machinery, specifically claimed by the patentees as their invention, was not a material fact for the jury, and that on that ground, the judgment must be reversed.”

The Court said in dicta, referring to the decision of the Circuit Court:

The word principle is used by elementary writers on patent subjects, and sometimes in adjudications of courts, with such a want of precision in its application, as to mislead. It is admitted, that a principle is not patentable. A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right. Nor can an exclusive right exist to a new power, should one be discovered in addition to those already known. Through the agency of machinery a new steam power may be said to have been generated. But no one can appropriate this power exclusively to himself, under the patent laws. The same may be said of electricity, and of any other power in nature,

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70 Id. at 171. The claim was “the combination of the following parts, above described, to wit, the core and bridge, or guide-piece, the chamber, and the die, when used to for pipes of metal, under heat and pressure, in the manner set forth, or in any other manner substantially the same.”
72 *Le Roy v. Tatham*, 55 U.S. 156 (1853); EDMUND BURKE, LIST OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS AND DESIGNS ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES FROM 1790 TO 1847 WITH THE PATENT LAWS AND DECISIONS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SAME PERIOD (J. & G.S. Gideon, 1st ed. 1847). To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the Tatham patent was never given a patent number and was only cataloged in the previously-cited book issued by Edmund Burke, the Commissioner of Patents, and is not readily available for review.
73 55 U.S. 156 at 171.
74 Id.
75 *Le Roy*, 55 U.S. at 177.
76 Id.
which is alike open to all, and may be applied to useful purposes by the use of machinery . . . A new property discovered in matter, when practically applied, in the construction of a useful article of commerce or manufacture, is patentable; but the process through which the new property is developed and applied, must be stated, with such precision as to enable an ordinary mechanic to construct and apply the necessary process.  

Thus, the Le Roy case was remanded on novelty grounds, not patent eligibility, and even the early Le Roy Court affirmed that the practical application of a property discovered in nature is patent eligible. The later case of O'Reilly v. Morse, faithfulness quoted Le Roy for support that while Tatham was not entitled to a patent on what happens when hot lead cools, it was entitled to a process for making lead pipe using that principle.  

The first Supreme Court case on the course of deviating law from the wording of the federal statute on patent eligibility was the controversial 1948 case of Funk Bros. Seed Co. vs. Kalo Inoculant Co. The case involved a product that included several strains of root-nodule bacteria that can be used as a mixed culture to inoculate a range of plants. The previously sold products included only single strains, on the belief that the strains inhibit each other so they could not be mixed. Bond discovered that there are strains of root-nodule bacteria that do not inhibit each other, and so multi-strain bacterial products are possible. The Court held:

The application of this newly-discovered natural principle to the problem of packaging of inoculants may well have been an important commercial advance. But once nature's secret of the non-inhibitive quality of certain strains of the species of Rhizobium was discovered, the state of the art made the production of a mixed inoculant a simple step. Even though it may have been the product of skill, it certainly was not the product of invention. There is no way in which we could call it such unless we borrowed invention from the discovery of the natural principle itself. That is to say, there is no invention here unless the discovery that certain strains of the several species of these bacteria are non-inhibitive and may thus be safely mixed is invention. But we cannot so hold without allowing a patent to issue on one of the ancient secrets of nature now disclosed. All that remains, therefore, are advantages of the mixed inoculants themselves. They are not enough. Since we conclude that the product claims do not disclose an invention or

77 Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 174-75.  
78 O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854).  
79 O'Reilly, 56 U.S. at 117 (stating that in this case, “the patentee had discovered that lead, recently set, would under heat and pressure in a close vessel reunite perfectly after a separation of its parts so as to make a wrought instead of cast pipe. And the court held that he was not entitled to a patent for this newly discovered principle or quality in lead, and that such a discovery was not patentable. But that he was entitled to a patent for the new process or method in the art of making lead pipe, which this discovery enabled him to invent and employ.”).  
80 Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).  
81 Id. at 129-131.  
82 Id. at 130.  
83 Id.
discovery within the meaning of the patent statutes, we do not consider whether the other statutory requirements contained in 35 U.S.C. § 31, 35 U.S.C.A. § 31, R.S. § 4886 are satisfied.84

In the italicized language, Justice Douglas stated that a commercial product based on the application of a discovery about how nature works to produce a new and useful scientific advance cannot form the basis for a patent unless it is also an invention.85 This statement not only directly contradicts the earlier Le Roy opinion, it also directly contradicts the statutory determination by Congress that any composition of matter “invention or discovery” is patent eligible. This faulty analysis formed the initial threads for the Supreme Court’s parallel case law on patent eligibility, and is repeatedly cited by the Court as its authority.

Under Le Roy, the Funk multi-strain product would have been patent eligible, as it stated “A new property discovered in matter, when practically applied, in the construction of a useful article of commerce or manufacture, is patentable.”86 The Funk case is also one of the first in the line of Supreme Court cases on patent eligibility that uses false examples to support its opinion. The Court stated:

The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.87

Here, even though the Court gave lip service in the last sentence to applications of laws of nature, it rejected the Funk invention which was exactly that. Patents are used to protect commercial endeavors that have an element made by man, and thus they attempt to cover products, processes, and manufactures with commercial uses, which are almost always based on how nature works because that is the world we live in. Even if one creates a new scientific pathway, it is fundamentally based on a discovery of how nature works.

84 Id. at 132 (emphasis added).
85 Id. There was, in fact, a fatal flaw in the patent claims selected for litigation of U.S. Patent No. 2,200,532 to Kalo, however, it was not patent eligibility. The claims failed the written description and enablement requirements contained in the Patent Act of 1870 – 15 Stat. at 201, because they did not name the mutually non-inhibiting bacteria to be used in the product. The Patent also included claims that were limited to the identified useful strains of bacteria, but those were not litigated. Immeasurable damage and confusion was caused by using patent eligibility as the rationale for invalidating the patent instead of patentability. 86 Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 174-175 (1853); see Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 129 (1948) (emphasizing that “We do not have presented the question whether the methods of selecting and testing the non-inhibitive strains are patentable. We have here only product claims. Bond does not create state of inhibition or of non-inhibition in the bacteria. Their qualities are the work of nature. Those qualities are of course not patentable. For patents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature.”).
87 Funk Brothers, 333 U.S. at 129.
Was it outside the pale that Congress would authorize the protection of a new product that is a combination of several strains of root-nodule bacteria that can be used as a mixed culture to inoculate a range of plants and advance agriculture? Of course not. Even the Supreme Court admitted this was a useful new commercial product. Would it help farmers? Yes. Did it promote the progress of science? Yes. Was it a useful application of a discovery? Yes. Was the Funk decision inconsistent with Le Roy? Yes.

The 1948 Funk decision was issued a few years before the codification of the 1952 Act. As indicated in the above legislative history leading to the 1952 Act, the addition of the definition of invention (to include discoveries) in section 100 and inclusion of "invents or discovers" in section 101 confirm Congress’ intent on the issue.

The next case in this series and the first after the passage of the 1952 Act was Gottschalk v. Benson. In Gottschalk, Justice Douglas writing for the Supreme Court held that programming a computer with a mathematical formula that converts binary coded decimal numbers into pure binary numerals is not patent eligible, because it is the use of an idea:

The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself. It may be that the patent laws should be extended to cover these programs, a policy matter to which we are not competent to speak.

The Court was concerned with affirming such a broad scope of monopoly, but that was not their decision to make, which should be limited to strict statutory construction. The decision was heavily dependent on its own prior holding in Funk Brothers, also written by Justice Douglas without any statutory construction or legislative intent analysis, as well as Le Roy v. Thathan and O’Reilly v. Morse. In

88 Id. at 135-138. The dissent of Justice Burton and Justice Jackson desired affirming the appellate court decision and upholding the patent, because in their opinion the claims satisfied the patent eligibility requirements. See also id. at 443-444. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion opined that the invention was patent eligible but failed other patentability requirements. Frankfurter states:

Multi-purpose tools, multivalent vaccines, vitamin complex composites, are examples of complexes whose sole new property is the conjunction of the properties of their components. Surely the Court does not mean unwittingly to pass on the patentability of such products by formulating criteria by which future issues of patentability may be prejudged. In finding Bond’s patent invalid I have tried to avoid a formulation which . . . would lay the basis for denying patentability to a large area within existing legislation.


90 Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).

91 Le Roy v. Thathan, 55 U.S. 156 (1853) (holding that a claim to “the use of motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances, being a new application of that power of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer” was not patent eligible as an abstract idea). However, the patent claim could have been stricken with more fidelity to the statute with a
fact, the only reference to the wording of 35 USC § 101 in Gottschalk is in a footnote.\textsuperscript{93} The Gottschalk opinion also commented from the “Report of the President’s Commission on the Patent System,” referring to problems involved in examining computer software programs and recommending that they not be patent eligible.\textsuperscript{94} Thus the Court relied on its own earlier case law, and an un-adopted recommendation from a Committee to the President in the Executive Branch, instead of carrying out strict statutory construction or reviewing legislative intent of the only branch of government delegated the responsibility to create the law. Regardless whether one is of the belief the right decision was made in this case, the Supreme Court did not carry out the required disciplined legal process of statutory construction, and it laid the groundwork for the further deviation from the required statutory interpretation.

In the Court’s opinion in Parker v. Flook,\textsuperscript{95} it admitted that the decision in Gottschalk could not have been decided based on a literal reading of 35 U.S.C. § 101.\textsuperscript{96} The Court focused its treatment of what is patent eligible on what constitutes a process:

This case turns entirely on the proper construction of § 101 of the Patent Act, which describes the subject matter that is eligible for patent protection. It does not involve the familiar issues of novelty and obviousness that routinely arise under §§ 102 and 103 when the validity of a patent is challenged. For the purpose of our analysis, we assume that respondent’s formula is novel and useful and that he discovered it. We also assume, since respondent does not challenge the examiner’s finding, that the formula is the only novel feature of respondent’s method. The question is whether the discovery of this feature makes an otherwise conventional method eligible for patent protection.

The plain language of § 101 does not answer the question. It is true, as respondent argues, that his method is a “process” in the ordinary sense of the word.\textsuperscript{9} But that was also true of the algorithm, which described a method for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals, that was involved in Gottschalk v. Benson. The holding that the discovery of that method could not be patented as a “process” forecloses a purely literal reading of § 101. Reasoning that an algorithm, or

\textsuperscript{92} O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 136 (1853).
\textsuperscript{93} Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 64-65 (reciting 35 U.S.C. § 101).
\textsuperscript{94} Id. at 70-71.
\textsuperscript{95} Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 587 (1978).
\textsuperscript{96} Id. at 585. In Parker, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, addressed the patent eligibility of patent application that described a method of updating alarm limits that included three steps: an initial step measuring the present value of the process variable (e. g., the temperature); an intermediate step which uses an algorithm to calculate an updated alarm-limit value; and a final step in which the actual alarm limit is adjusted to the updated value. The only difference between the conventional methods of changing alarm limits and that described in patent application was in step two.
mathematical formula, is like a law of nature, Benson applied the established rule that a law of nature cannot be the subject of a patent.\textsuperscript{97}

There was a sharp dissent from Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Burger:

The Court today says it does not turn its back on these well-settled precedents, \textit{ante}, at 2527–2528, but it strikes what seems to me an equally damaging blow at basic principles of patent law by importing into its inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of novelty and inventiveness. Section 101 is concerned only with subject-matter patentability. Whether a patent will actually issue depends upon the criteria of §§ 102 and 103, which include novelty and inventiveness, among many others. It may well be that under the criteria of §§ 102 and 103 no patent should issue on the process claimed in this case, because of anticipation, abandonment, obviousness, or for some other reason. But in my view the claimed process clearly meets the standards of subject-matter patentability of § 101.\textsuperscript{98}

The next in the series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions on patent eligibility was \textit{Diamond v. Chakrabarty}\textsuperscript{99} in 1980, where the Court addressed the meaning of manufacture under § 101 and whether genetically engineered bacteria are patent eligible. Justice Burger, for a 5-4 Court (dissenting: Brennan, White, Marshall and Powell), confirmed that the term manufacture is intentionally broad.\textsuperscript{100} Importantly, \textit{Chakrabarty} is one of the few\textsuperscript{101} of this line of cases in which the Supreme Court actually uses the words “statutory interpretation” and refers to legislative history; however it construes the terms “manufacture” and “composition of matter” not “discovers.”

The question before us in this case is a narrow one of statutory interpretation requiring us to construe 35 U.S.C. § 101, which provides: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”

Specifically, we must determine whether respondent’s micro-organism constitutes a “manufacture” or “composition of matter” within the meaning of the statute.\textsuperscript{5}

The relevant legislative history also supports a broad construction. The Patent Act of 1793, authored by Thomas Jefferson, defined statutory subject matter as “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of

\textsuperscript{97} Parker, 437 U.S. at 586.
\textsuperscript{98} Parker, 437 U.S. at 598-599.
\textsuperscript{100} Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 317.

However, the Supreme Court goes further and starts to name and institutionalize the Supreme Court’s parallel interpretation of what should be patent eligible, and then rules in the positive.

This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 98 S.Ct. 2522, 57 L.Ed.2d 451 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 93 S.Ct. 253, 255, 34 L.Ed.2d 273 (1972); Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130, 68 S.Ct. 440, 441, 92 L.Ed. 588 (1948); O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 112–121, 14 L.Ed. 601 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175, 14 L.Ed. 367 (1853). Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that $E=mc^2$; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are “manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” Funk, supra, 333 U.S., at 130, 68 S.Ct., at 441.\(^3\)

Here we see the Court defining judicial exceptions to a federal statute. The Court states that “laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract ideas” are not patent eligible. None of these exceptions are listed in 35 U.S.C. § 101. Instead, the Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act indicates that Congress intended statutory subject matter to “include anything under the sun that is made by man.”\(^4\) The Court itself, in later cases, repeatedly refers to these “carve-outs” of the statute as judicial exceptions not examples.

We also again see exaggerated and false examples of “discovery” to discredit the term. Pure unapplied mathematical relationships, such as $E=mc^2$ and the law of

\(^1\) Chakrabaty, 447 U.S. at 307-310.

\(^2\) Chakrabaty, 447 U.S. at 303-304.

\(^3\) 447 U.S. at 309-310 (citing S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952)); H.R. Rep. No.1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952). It is worth noting that the inventions “include anything under the sun that is made by man” quote was made by the Commissioner of Patents when summarizing the Patent Office’s understanding of the bill. This quote was then used in the report to the Senate presented by Congressman Wiley, essentially adopting the Patent Office’s interpretation as correct.
gravity \( F = G \frac{m_1 m_2}{r^2} \) are not made by man.\(^{105}\) Congress has already given clear legislative intent that such are not patent eligible. The Court needed to go no further than statutory construction and legislative intent to reach a patent eligibility decision. It did not need to create exceptions to what Congress codified. Even if one were to go to the absurd to say these mathematical principals were intended by Congress to be patent eligible as discoveries of processes of nature falling under 35 U.S.C. § 101, they would certainly be caught by the novelty standard (35 U.S.C. 102), as these laws have been in existence since the big bang, around 13.7 billion years ago. The Court should stop using senseless examples of unapplied mathematics.

In *Diamond v. Diehr*,\(^{106}\) Justice Rehnquist for the Court affirmed the patent eligibility of a process for making rubber, focusing on the subject of what is the scope of "process" added to 101 in the 1952 Act.\(^{107}\)

As in *Chakrabarty*, we must here construe 35 U.S.C. § 101 which provides: “Whoever, invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” In cases of statutory construction, we begin with the language of the statute. *Unless otherwise defined, “words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,”* Perrin *v.* United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 314, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979), and, in dealing with the patent laws, we have more than once cautioned that "courts 'should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed.' " *Diamond v. Chakrabarty*, supra, at 308, 100 S.Ct., at 2207 quoting *United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.*, 289 U.S. 178, 199, 53 S.Ct. 554, 561, 77 L.Ed. 1114 (1933).

The Patent Act of 1793 defined statutory subject matter as “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement [thereof].” Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat.

\(^{105}\) *Id.* Albert Einstein was a highly skilled Patent Examiner at the Swiss Patent Office in 1905 when he published four groundbreaking articles in Annalen der Physik (the photoelectric effect, special relativity, Brownian motion and mass/energy interconversion). It is the last that propounded the formula \( E = mc^2 \). If Einstein had thought he was working on patent eligible subject matter, he was in the perfect position at the Swiss Patent Office, and with his superior intellect and not much money in his pocket, the incentive, to file a patent application on it. He did not. The reference to \( E = mc^2 \) is an example used in a number of S. Ct. decisions relating to § 101 for distracting dramatic effect.


\(^{107}\) *Id.* at 177-181. The claimed process used a mold for precisely shaping uncured rubber under heat and pressure and then curing it in the mold so that the product would retain its shape and be functionally operative after the molding is completed, ensuring the production of molded articles which are properly cured. *Id.* The patentee asserted the industry has not been able to obtain uniformly accurate cures because the temperature of the molding press could not be precisely measured, thus making it difficult to do the necessary computations to determine cure time and said their contribution to the art to resided in the process of constantly measuring the actual temperature inside the mold. *Id.* at 190-193. The continuous measuring of the temperatures inside the mold cavity, the feeding of this information to a digital computer which constantly recalculates the cure time, and the signaling by the computer to open the press, created a new process.
318. Not until the patent laws were recodified in 1952 did Congress replace the word “art” with the word “process.” It is that latter word which we confront today, and in order to determine its meaning we may not be unmindful of the Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act which inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to “include anything under the sun that is made by man.” S.Rep.No.1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R.Rep.No.1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1952, pp. 2394, 2399. Although the term “process” was not added to 35 U.S.C. § 101 until 1952 a process has historically enjoyed patent protection because it was considered a form of “art” as that term was used in the 1793 Act.108

In Bilski v. Kappos,109 the Supreme Court finally admitted that its judicial exceptions to the federal statute are not required by the statutory text, although it asserted that the exceptions are “consistent with” it.110 The Court also, for the first time, rationalized its judicial exceptions to the federal statute as “statutory stare decisis.”111 The Court thus acknowledged that it was acting outside of the bounds of the statutory language, and suggests its position that if the Court has created and used its own patent law for a long enough time, it should be able to continue. However, as discussed above, Congress has also repeatedly reaffirmed the “invention or discovery” standard from 1790 through 2011. And, since Congress is solely authorized to create patent law, these repeated recodifications prevail. The Court’s quote below also conflates the consideration of the general categories of patent eligibility (inventions or discoveries) with the separate patentable subject matter requirements of novelty and obviousness. Later court cases took this conflation in a more draconian direction.112

The Court’s precedents provide three specific exceptions to § 101’s broad patent-eligibility principles: “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Chakrabarty, supra, at 309, 100 S.Ct. 2204. While these exceptions are not required by the statutory text, they are consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be “new and useful.” And, in any case, these exceptions have defined the reach of the statute as a matter of

108 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 180-182 (emphasis added).
109 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). The Bilski patent application concerned methods to hedge (de-risk) investments in energy. Id. The method provided a technique by which an energy company can sell energy at one price to consumers based on historical averages and to another set of consumers with a different price calculation that will decrease its losses if the underlying energy cost changes unexpectedly. Id. The Primary Patent Examiner, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, Federal Circuit Court, and finally U.S. Supreme Court all rejected the claims based on patent eligibility. Id. The Courts could also have easily rejected the claims based on 35 U.S.C. § 102 or 35 § U.S.C. 103, as basic hedging strategies has been known for centuries.
110 Id. at 593-94.
111 Id. Of course, even statutory stare decisis, to the extent it is consistent with the Constitution, does not allow the removal of words from a federal statute.
112 See e.g. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that method to measure fetal DNA in the blood of a pregnant woman which avoided the previous need to invasively harvest blood from the fetus was not patent eligible); cert. denied, Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016).
statutory stare decisis going back 150 years. See Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 174–175, 14 L.Ed. 367 (1853). The concepts covered by these exceptions are “part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men ... free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130, 68 S.Ct. 440, 92 L.Ed. 588 (1948).113

The Court continued with its acknowledgement that it is acting outside of the bounds of the statute, and it can only go so far:

Any suggestion in this Court’s case law that the Patent Act’s terms deviate from their ordinary meaning has only been an explanation for the exceptions for laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588–589, 98 S.Ct. 2522, 57 L.Ed.2d 451 (1978). This Court has not indicated that the existence of these well-established exceptions gives the Judiciary carte blanche to impose other limitations that are inconsistent with the text and the statute’s purpose and design. Concerns about attempts to call any form of human activity a “process” can be met by making sure the claim meets the requirements of § 101.114

This quote also reflects the Court’s predilection to cite to its own earlier cases instead of the wording of the statute in what should be a strict statutory construction case. This is a theme running throughout these cases and the basis for the deviation from the required application of the literal terms of the law as passed by Congress.

In Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc.,115 the Court addressed whether a claim to optimizing the therapeutic efficacy of a treatment using 6-thiopurine for a gastrointestinal disorder with a discovered metabolic algorithm is patent eligible under § 101. Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, mentions § 101 at the beginning of the opinion, solely to introduce the Supreme Court’s judicially created exceptions to it.116 There is no further discussion of the statute or legislative history or intent. The whole of the opinion refers back to earlier Supreme Court precedent and the evolution of the Court’s evolving common law on the subject, based on its own view of what should be patent eligible.

Section 101 of the Patent Act defines patentable subject matter. It says: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Court has long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception. “[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, ——, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3233–3234, 177

113 Ariosa Diagnostics, 788 F.3d at 3225 (emphasis added).
114 Ariosa Diagnostics, 788 F.3d at 3225.
116 Id. at 70–71.
The Court then admits that it cannot take its own judicially created exceptions too far or else they will destroy Congress' patent law in toto:

_The Court has recognized, however, that too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law._ For all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas. . . Still, as the Court has also made clear, to transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law, one must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the words “apply it.” See, e.g., _Benson, supra_, at 71–72, 93 S.Ct. 253.118

From here, the Court digresses into economic analysis and the balance between patent protection and third party freedom to operate.

_These statements reflect the fact that, even though rewarding with patents those who discover new laws of nature and the like might well encourage their discovery, those laws and principles, considered generally, are “the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”_ Benson, supra, at 67, 93 S.Ct. 253. _And so there is a danger that the grant of patents that tie up their use will inhibit future innovation premised upon them, a danger that becomes acute when a patented process amounts to no more than an instruction to “apply the natural law,” or otherwise forecloses more future invention than the underlying discovery could reasonably justify._119

The Constitution has not granted any authority to the Supreme Court to carry out economic analysis of what should be patent eligible, nor is it equipped to do so. The Supreme Court does not have the power to commission white papers, take testimony, review independent evidence, have one-on-one meetings with stakeholders or to take depositions, which are necessary to create public policy. Amicus briefs, while useful, do not take the place of these tools. The Supreme Court is arguably the worst equipped of the three branches of the government to evaluate patent policy. For this reason, our founding fathers did not give the Supreme Court the authority to set policy, although, as illustrated by the _Mayo_ case, the Court has crossed that line. Creating a careful balance between the scope of incentive to promote the progress of science and impeding ancillary research is the sole domain of Congress.

117 _Id._
118 _Mayo_, 566 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added).
119 _Id._ at 86 (emphasis added).
Further, the Court makes the surprising admission that since it is not equipped
to determine which applied laws of nature should be patent eligible, it will simply
reject all of them:

Courts and judges are not institutionally well suited to making the kinds of
judgments needed to distinguish among different laws of nature. And so the
cases have endorsed a bright-line prohibition against patenting laws of
nature, mathematical formulas and the like, which serves as a somewhat
more easily administered proxy for the underlying “building-block”
concern.\textsuperscript{120}

The Executive Branch of the United States filed an \textit{Amicus Curiae} in this case,
urging that the Supreme Court more closely align its decision with the wording of the
statute, which throws a wide net for patent eligibility and then a finer net using the
requirements for patentability using § 102 for novelty and § 103 for obviousness.\textsuperscript{121}
The Court responded:

The Government argues that virtually any step beyond a statement of a law
of nature itself should transform an unpatentable law of nature into a
potentially patentable application sufficient to satisfy § 101’s demands.
Brief for United States as \textit{Amicus Curiae}. The Government does not
necessarily believe that claims that (like the claims before us) extend just
minimally beyond a law of nature should receive patents. But in its view,
other statutory provisions—those that insist that a claimed process be
novel, 35 U.S.C. § 102, that it not be “obvious in light of prior art,” § 103,
and that it be “full[y], clear[ly], concise[ly], and exact[ly]” described, § 112—
can perform this screening function. In particular, it argues that these
claims likely fail for lack of novelty under § 102.\textsuperscript{122}

And, after admitting it cannot take its own judicially created exceptions too far or it
will destroy patent law, the court defends the scope of its exceptions on the basis that
if the court applies the words of § 101 literally, it will destroy its own parallel judicial
exceptions to the code which would be inconsistent with the Court’s case law.

This approach, however, would make the “law of nature” exception to § 101
patentability a dead letter. The approach is therefore not consistent with
prior law. The relevant cases rest their holdings upon section 101, not later
sections. \textit{Bilski}, 561 130 S. Ct. 3218, 177 L.Ed.2d 792; \textit{Diehr, supra}; \textit{Flook, supra}; \textit{Benson}, 409 U.S. 63, 93 S. Ct. 253, 34
L.Ed.2d 273,\textsuperscript{123,124}

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\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Id}. at 89. \\
\textsuperscript{121} Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 2011 WL 4040414 (U.S.), 11 (2011). \\
\textsuperscript{122} Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 89 (2012). \\
\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Id}. \\
\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Id}. at 89-90 (emphasis added). The Court also quoted to H.R. Rep. No.1923, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess., 6 (1952) (“A person may have ‘invented’ a machine or a manufacture, which may include
anything under the sun that is made by man, \textit{but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101}}
The Supreme Court ultimately refused to apply the literal terms of § 101 in light of its “better established” deviating common law analysis. It stated that “These considerations lead us to decline the Government’s invitation to substitute §§ 102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the “better established” inquiry under § 101.” The Court’s “better established” inquiry is its own case law. Compliance with the Constitution and the associated federal statute, however, is not an invitation.

The unconstitutional application of § 101 by the Supreme Court reached its apex in the 2013 case of AMP v. Myriad Genetics, where it eliminated any shadows of “consistency” with the statutory language and instead head-on disobeyed it.

In Myriad, the Supreme Court considered the patent eligibility of certain isolated gene sequences which encode the BRACA1 and BRACA2 genes, the presence of which are highly predictive of the potential to get breast cancer. The Court held the claims patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Thomas focused not on the statutory language of 101 or legislative intent, but again instead, the judicially created exceptions to the statute and the economic policy reason for them, neither of which are empowered to the Court by the Constitution.

We have “long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception[:] Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Mayo, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1293 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Rather, “they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work” that lie beyond the domain of patent protection. Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1293. As the Court has explained, without this exception, there would be considerable danger that the grant of patents would “tie up” the use of such tools and thereby “inhibit future innovation premised upon them.” Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1301. This would be at odds with the very point of patents, which exist to promote creation. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 100 S.Ct. 2204, 65 L.Ed.2d 144 (1980) (Products of nature are not created, and “manifestations ... of nature [are] free to all men and reserved exclusively to none” )....As we have recognized before, patent protection strikes a delicate balance between creating “incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery” and “impeding the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention.” Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1305. We must apply this well-established standard to determine whether Myriad’s patents claim any “new and useful ... composition of matter,” § 101, or instead claim naturally occurring phenomena.

unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled”). However, this Congressional statement actually supports the United States Amicus brief that the other sections of 35 U.S.C. (102, 103, and 112) should be determinative as long as the patent claims refers to something made by man.

125 Id. at 90.
126 Id. at 91-92.
128 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 576.
129 Id. at 594.
130 Id. at 589.
In a stroke of extraordinary judicial activism, the Supreme Court stated:

groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry. See Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 68 S.Ct. 440, 92 L.Ed. 588.\(^{131}\)

It is hard to imagine a more unconstitutional statement than the Supreme Court ruling that discoveries cannot be patented when the statute it is applying states that any invention or discovery can be patented. In other words, the Court says “A not B” while the statute says “A or B.” And, while the Myriad statement that a discovery is not an invention is inconsistent with 101, it is all the more inconsistent with the definition of invention added in 1952 in section 100 that an invention is a discovery. The Supreme Court, citing to its own judicially created exceptions to the statute and its associated common law precedent back to Funk, now refuses to grant a patent on the commercial application of a manmade discovery, even if it meets all of the requirements of § 101. In addition, it requires all lower courts to obey the Supreme Court instead of Congress.\(^{132}\)

IV. CONCLUSION

How should the Supreme Court handle patent eligibility issues? Literally apply the statute and legislative history! It works quite well. Review the proposed claimed patent subject matter on the basis of whether it describes anything made by man and whether it is an invention or applied discovery. If so, proceed to the analysis of whether it is new and useful, and described in a manner that allows one of ordinary skill in that field to carry it out. Do not stray into economic analysis or the virtues of, or exceptions to, statutory patent eligibility or how Congress decided to exercise its discretion to promote the progress of science through a limited term monopoly versus third party freedom to operate, or the size of the created monopoly—the Court was not given that authority nor is it equipped to address it. If the decision, faithfully applying the statute, causes damage to an industry or subgroup, it is up to Congress to decide whether to fix it.

In law school, we learn that there is no right without a remedy. In the case of Marbury v. Madison, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it can review the

\(^{131}\) Id. at 576.

\(^{132}\) Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013). It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court was way out of its technical depth in addressing the Myriad genetic technology and made statements that sound odd to those in the field of genetics. For example, the Court held that cDNA is patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring, but isolated mRNA is not patent eligible because it is naturally occurring. However, cDNA is the simple hybrid of mRNA and is generated by using mRNA as the template, similar to a mold. Viruses, in fact, make cDNA through the use of reverse transcriptase of mRNA. The Government’s Amicus Brief, which disagreed with 15 years of the well-established issuance of patents on isolated gene products by the U.S. Patent Office – yes, pitting two federal agencies of the Executive Branch (Center for Disease Control and National Institutes of Health) against the federal agency authorized to grant patents, the U.S. Patent Office – on useful isolated genes for diagnostics and therapeutics proposed this non-scientific distinction to give the Court an illusion of splitting the baby.
constituency of federal statutes. However, who oversees the constitutionality of U.S. Supreme Court decisions? There is no private right of action in the U.S. for this. The sole remedy is to urge Congress to pass a law reversing the Supreme Court position. However, why should Congress have to pass a new law when the current law is clear on its face, just to say, we meant what we said the first time?

And when we say that there is no right without a remedy, does the term remedy mean any remedy or an effective, timely remedy? It took Congress 5-10 years to pass the America Invents Act. Does this mean the United States might have to wait another 5-10 years to force the Supreme Court to limit its patent opinions to strict statutory construction and legislative intent? And what if the law takes longer due to the preoccupation of Congress with other issues of national urgency? How many industries will be destroyed and applied discoveries not advanced for the promotion of science in the meantime? This takes us to a dark conclusion that there may be no short-term action available to force the Supreme Court to faithfully obey the Constitution.

The IPO, AIPLA, and ABA have all proposed changes to the § 101 statute to address the issues described in this article. The IPO and AIPLA approaches are similar, which is not surprising given that many of the same people belong to both organizations. The ABA position is substantially different. The authors are strongly against the ABA position, which would codify, and thus retroactively justify, the Supreme Court’s judicially created exceptions to § 101. Not only are these exceptions not necessary, but it would give the Court the impression that it can ignore the wording of a statute, create parallel and contradicting common law which is then retroactively accepted. How far would this go and into which unrelated areas?

We end where we start, with the quote from James Madison “In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men you must first enable the government to control the governed, and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”

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133 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
136 Re: Request for Comments Related to Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, ABA (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/intellectual_property_law/advocacy/advocacy-20170328-comments.authcheckdam.pdf. The proposed 101 section by the ABA provides that subject matter is not patent eligible if the “scope of the exclusive rights under such a claim would preempt the use by others of all practical applications of a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea.”