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ARTICLES

IS THE ACPA A SAFE HAVEN FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGERS? — RETHINKING THE UNILATERAL APPLICATION OF THE LANHAM ACT

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I. INTRODUCTION

As a response to international disputes over Internet domain names, the U.S. Congress enacted the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA")\(^1\) in 1999. According to § 1125(d)(2) of the ACPA, a trademark owner may file an in rem action over a domain name itself in cases where a U.S. trademark owner is unable to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a non-U.S. cybersquatter. The legislative history and the plain language of the in rem provision make clear that Congress thought that such in rem jurisdiction is appropriate in instances where a non-U.S. resident cybersquats on a domain name that infringes upon a U.S. trademark.\(^2\)

The main purpose of the ACPA was to regulate cybersquatting or cyberpiracy, because from Congress's point of view, courts had not been successfully protecting American businesses in cases "where a cyberpirate has either registered the domain name and done nothing more, or where the cyberpirate uses a significant variation on the trademark."\(^3\) However, in rem jurisdiction of the ACPA does not end there. A trademark owner can invoke in rem jurisdiction over an alleged foreign

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3. Id. at 5.
infringer—more precisely over a domain name registered by the foreign infringer—"provided that mark owner can show that the domain name itself violates substantive Federal trademark law (i.e., that the domain name violates the rights of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or section 43(a) or (c) of the Trademark Act.)."

Accordingly, at least regarding international trademark disputes involving domain names registered with a U.S. registrar or .com, .net, or .org domain names of which current registries are all U.S. entities, the in rem provision of the ACPA made all the debates on personal jurisdiction useless. At the same time, the question of personal jurisdiction—the hurdle which U.S. trademark owners must have overcome first and which, indeed, would have struck a balance between the United States and other foreign countries in all international trademark disputes—just disappeared all of a sudden, subjecting all foreign generic top-level domain name ("gTLD") registrants to U.S. courts as long as U.S. trademark owners are involved. Presumably, no matter how elaborately personal jurisdiction theory in the context of the Internet might have been established, the scope of personal jurisdiction would not have reached as far as in rem jurisdiction does.

In rem jurisdiction is, however, not the end of disputes at all. The enactment of the ACPA is not only a matter of jurisdiction. What the enactment of the ACPA really means is the limitless extraterritorial application of U.S. trademark law insofar as the Internet is involved. Assume that a foreign registrant has registered a ".com" domain name which is confusingly similar to a U.S. trademark with a foreign registrar and done nothing more. The domain name is just a placeholder. The foreign registrant, of course, does not reside in the United States, does not use that domain name in commerce either in the United States or in other countries, and does not have any contacts at all with the United States either offline or online, except a mere fact that the registry of the domain name is located in the United States. However, the registrant is subject to U.S. courts pursuant to the in rem provision of the ACPA and that registrant's act has to be judged by U.S. law regardless of whether that act is really a violation of U.S. law or not. It seems almost obvious that Congress was fully aware of, and expected, this kind of application while enacting the ACPA.

4. Id. at 14.

5. See id. at 6. The House Report noted that "[t]he law is less settled, however, where a cyberpirate has either registered the domain name and done nothing more, or where the cyberpirate uses a significant variation on the trademark." Id. at 6. This statement, coupled with in rem jurisdiction, anticipates the extraterritorial application of the ACPA to the above hypothetical case.
Once the obstacle of personal jurisdiction has disappeared, the expansive application of substantive U.S. laws is almost inevitable in the Internet context. What makes things worse is that Congress, while enacting the ACPA, intended the extraterritorial application of U.S. trademark law to conduct occurring outside the United States by foreign infringers on the one hand, but traditionally U.S. trademark law has given protection only to the marks registered in the U.S. or used in commerce in the U.S. on the other hand. Furthermore, all gTLDs are under U.S. control at present.

In sum, with respect to international Internet domain name disputes, the ACPA appears to give full protection to U.S. trademark holders against foreign infringers in terms of jurisdiction and applicable law, regardless of where their conduct occurred and whether their conduct is unlawful under law other than U.S. law, while giving no protection at all to foreign trademark owners against U.S. infringers. This approach will unavoidably bring about tension and conflict with other countries.

This paper analyzes court decisions regarding domain name disputes after the enactment of the ACPA and suggests possible ways to minimize conflicts with other countries. In particular, it focuses on recent court cases involving reverse domain name hijacking, and it is limited only to international, trademark-related, and gTLD disputes.

II. COURT DECISIONS REGARDING THE ACPA

Despite some commentators' criticisms, courts have thus far not been hesitant at all to apply the ACPA's in rem provisions. Indeed, courts have in some senses come a long way in establishing a reasonable standard of application and interpretation of the ACPA in the short period since its enactment in 1999.

First, courts have confirmed that given the plain language of the ACPA, in rem and in personam jurisdiction are mutually exclusive in the ACPA and that in rem jurisdiction against a domain name itself is allowed only in those circumstances where in personam jurisdiction is not available. The owner of a mark must convince the court that in personam jurisdiction over a person is unavailable before an ACPA in rem action may proceed. In other words, the mark owner must bear the burden of demonstrating the absence of in personam jurisdiction over an alleged

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infringer. Therefore, the mark owner may not file an *in rem* cause of action and an *in personam* claim simultaneously in the hope that one of them will survive the court’s jurisdictional inquiry.\(^8\)

Second, with regard to the question of which district court can exercise *in rem* jurisdiction, § 1125(d)(2)(A) appears to contradict § 1125(d)(2)(C). § 1125(d)(2)(A) simply provides that “[t]he owner of a mark may file an *in rem* civil action against a domain name in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located . . . ,” whereas § 1125(d)(2)(C) locates the situs of a domain name in an *in rem* action under § 1125(d)(2) either where the domain name authority is located or in any judicial district in which “documents sufficient to establish control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the domain name are deposited with the court.”\(^9\)

Courts have held that *in rem* jurisdiction lies only in the judicial district where the registrar, registry, or other authority is located as specified in § 1125(d)(2)(A).\(^10\) According to the court in the *FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v. fleetbostonfinancial.com* case,\(^11\) the procedure described in § 1125(d)(2)(D)\(^12\) by which the situs of the domain name is established as provided in § 1125(d)(2)(C)(ii) can only be commenced after a complaint has been filed in the court in the judicial district designated under § 1125(d)(2)(A). And § 1125(d)(2)(C) exists to facilitate the continuation of litigation in one of the districts provided in § 1125(d)(2)(A).\(^13\)

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9. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(C) provides:

   In an *in rem* action under this paragraph, a domain name shall be deemed to have its situs in the judicial district in which —
   (i) the domain name registrar, registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located; or
   (ii) documents sufficient to establish control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the domain name are deposited with the court.


12. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i) provides in relevant part:

   Upon receipt of written notification of a filed, stamped copy of a complaint filed by the owner of a mark in a United States district court under this paragraph, the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority shall —
   (I) expeditiously deposit with the court documents sufficient to establish the court’s control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the domain name to the court . . .

in the legislative history of the ACPA suggests that Congress intended to give in rem jurisdiction to a court other than those courts originally drafted in § 1125(d)(2)(A).\textsuperscript{14} Although one commentator\textsuperscript{15} noted that some other courts\textsuperscript{16} have exercised in rem jurisdiction in districts other than those provided in § 1125(d)(2)(A), and thus there is a division of authority, the FleetBoston court's analysis is quite convincing. The Standing Stone Media, Inc. v. Indiancountrytoday.com\textsuperscript{17} court added that in addition to dictating the situs of the domain name during the pendency of an action, § 1125(d)(2) may be useful "in the event that the registrar of a domain name moves out of the judicial district where the action was commenced, goes out of business, or sells its interests to another company in the time period between the filing of the complaint and the deposit of the required certificates of registration."\textsuperscript{17} The Second Circuit in Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com\textsuperscript{18} clearly upheld the FleetBoston court's interpretation.

Third, even though the structure of the in rem provisions of the ACPA expresses Congress's preference for in personam jurisdiction, the statute does not require that in personam jurisdiction over a person be unavailable throughout the litigation. Once the owner of a mark files an in rem action against a domain name and then the court's finding that that the owner is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction is made,\textsuperscript{19} in rem jurisdiction is ordinarily established. If in rem jurisdiction is lost even long after the court has made that finding no matter how late in personam jurisdiction arose, the holder of the domain name may choose to wait and see how the trial goes and then submit to personal jurisdiction to avoid an adverse judgment. Courts do not permit such manipulation.\textsuperscript{20}

Fourth, regarding the question of whether the scope of the in rem provision of the ACPA is limited to claims under § 1125(d)(1) for bad faith registration of a domain name with the intent to profit, the Fourth Circuit in Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names\textsuperscript{21} concluded that the in rem provision also covers infringement claims under § 1114 and § 1125(a) and dilution claims under § 1125(c) as well as § 1125(d)(1), reversing the district court ruling. Before Harrods, most district courts dealing with this issue had agreed with the assertion that § 1125(d)(2)

\begin{itemize}
\item 14. Id. at 126-28.
\item 15. Sherry, supra n. 6, at 343.
\item 17. Standing Stone Media, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
\item 18. 310 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2002).
\item 20. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248, 254-59 (4th Cir. 2002).
\item 21. 302 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002).
\end{itemize}
applies only to § 1125(d)(1). According to the Harrods court, the plain language of § 1125(d)(2)(A) itself protects not only rights under § 1125(d)(1) but also rights under § 1125(a) against trademark infringement, and rights under § 1125(c) against trademark dilution. If Congress had intended to provide in rem jurisdiction only for § 1125(d)(1) claims, it could easily have stated that in rem action is available if "the domain name violates subsection (d)(1)." The court went on to say that the phrase of § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii) "a person who would have been a defendant in a civil action under [§ 1125(d)(1)]" was simply used as a shorthand reference to the current registrant of the domain name holder and thus should not be understood as limiting in rem jurisdiction to § 1125(d)(1) bad faith claims. This Fourth Circuit's ruling was confirmed in another Fourth Circuit case, Cable News Network LP v. CNNews.com.

Fifth, with respect to the constitutionality of the in rem provision of the ACPA, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net that in rem jurisdiction authorized by the ACPA is not a violation of the due process clause, succinctly holding that in a case that directly concerns possession of the domain names, "due process is satisfied by assigning jurisdiction based on the location of the property," and "the registrant's other personal contacts with the forum are constitutionally irrelevant to the assertion of in rem jurisdiction over the domain names."

III. THE PROBLEMS OF IN REM JURISDICTION OF THE ACPA

A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE IN REM PROVISION OF THE ACPA

With regard to in rem jurisdiction, Senate Bill 1255, an earlier ver-

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23. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(2)(d)(A) provides in relevant part:
   The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain name . . . if—
   (i) the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or protected under subsection (a) [infringement] or (c) [dilution]; and
   (ii) the court finds the owner—
      (I) is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who would have been a defendant in a civil action under [§ 1125(d)(1)]; or
      (II) through due diligence was not able to find a person who would have been a defendant in a civil action under [§ 1125(d)(1)] . . .

25. 302 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2002).
sion of the ACPA introduced on June 21, 1999, provided for *in rem* jurisdiction, which allowed a mark owner to file an action against the domain name itself, only in cases where the mark owner, after due diligence, was unable to locate the domain name registrant. According to the Senate Report, a significant problem faced by trademark owners fighting against cybersquatting is the fact that cybersquatters register domain names under aliases or give false information to their registrars in order to avoid identification and service of process, and the *in rem* provision is drafted to alleviate this difficulty by allowing a mark owner to seek injunction against the domain name itself in those cases where the mark owner has exercised due diligence to find the holder of the domain name but is unable to do so. In this bill there is no *in rem* provision at all directly targeting foreign domain name registrants.

However, House Bill 3028 (Trademark Cyberpiracy Prevention Act) expanded the scope of *in rem* jurisdiction to foreign domain name registrants by inserting the paragraph that the owner of a trademark may file a civil action against a domain name in cases where “personal jurisdiction cannot be established over” the registrant of the domain name as Section 43(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II). With respect to the *in rem* provision

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28. The relevant part of the bill provided:
Section 43. [15 U.S.C. § 1125]
(d) (2) (A) The owner of a mark may file an *in rem* action against a domain name if—
(i) the domain name violates any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or section 43 (a) or (c) [of the Lanham Act]; and
(ii) the court finds that the owner has demonstrated due diligence and was not able to find a person who would have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1).
31. The relevant part of the bill provided:
Sec. 43.
(d) (2) (A) The owner of a mark may file an *in rem* civil action against a domain name in the judicial district in which suit may be brought against the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name if—
(i) the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or under subsection (a) or (c) of this section, or is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section 706 of title 18, United States Code, or section 220506 of title 36, United States Code; and
(ii) the court finds that—
(I) the owner has demonstrated due diligence and was not able to find or was not able to serve a person who would have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1); or
(II) personal jurisdiction cannot be established over any person who would have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1).
in cases where personal jurisdiction is not available, the House Report merely added to the explanation described above that "such in rem jurisdiction is also appropriate in instances where personal jurisdiction cannot be established over the domain name registrant. This situation occurs when a non-U.S. resident cybersquats on a domain name that infringes upon a U.S. trademark."32

Is in rem jurisdiction justified because a domain name is property, or is a domain name treated as though it were property "for the purpose of in rem jurisdiction"? Why should the basic principle of international jurisdiction in U.S. law jurisprudence established in International Shoe be applied so differently only in the context of trademark law involving the Internet domain name? As a practical matter, except for situations involving anonymous registrants as codified in § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II), is there any reason we must treat domain names so differently despite the possible conflicts with other countries that the exercise of in rem jurisdiction could possibly bring about?

Before the enactment of the ACPA, even in cases where the allegedly infringing Web site was just a placeholder containing just an "under construction" notice, courts successfully exercised in personam jurisdiction.33 Indeed, as one commentator noted, "[a]lthough plaintiffs have successfully used the in rem provisions [since the enactment of the ACPA] against foreign registrants, in many cases the same result could have been reached under the developing doctrines of personal jurisdiction in cybersquatter cases."34 In cases where courts have held an in rem action under the ACPA appropriate because of a lack of personal jurisdiction, "it is probable that in the absence of the ACPA, the courts would have examined the precedent more carefully and found the requisite personal jurisdiction over the defendants."35 Furthermore, as some commentators have noted,36 a recent court decision involving copyright and trademark infringement claims confirmed that if there is no personal jurisdiction over a foreign registrant in any given state court, and the registrant's contacts with the United States as a whole are sufficient to

32. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).

33. See Sherry, supra n. 6, at 337. See also e.g. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir. 1998); Cello Holdings v. Lawrence-Dahl Cos., 89 F. Supp. 2d 464, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 107 (D. Mass. 2000), aff'd, 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001).

34. Sherry, supra n. 6, at 339.


permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this matter without violat-
ing due process, a district court may exercise personal jurisdiction under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).\footnote{Graduate Mgmt. Admission Council v. RVR Narasimha Raju, 241 F. Supp. 2d 589, 600 (E.D. Va. 2003).} Probably, most cases in which
courts might have trouble finding the elements that constitute minimum
contacts to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction were it not for the
\textit{in rem} provisions of the ACPA, would be dismissed on the merits for
want of bad faith in cases where a cause of action is §1125(d)(1)\footnote{See Cable News Network LP v. CNNews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 492-93 (E.D. Va. 2001) (noting that “no court has held that a showing of bad faith is or could be a jurisdic-
tional requirement”).} or for other reasons under the \textit{in rem} provisions of the ACPA.

In sum, except for a relatively limited number of cases involving
anonymous defendants, the \textit{in rem} jurisdiction of the ACPA is almost
redundant and only causes unnecessary conflicts with other nations.

\textbf{B. Conflicts with Foreign Courts in the Context of
International Jurisdiction}

The aggressive U.S.-centric approach of the ACPA will be almost
useless, unless supported by effective enforcement mechanisms. The first
challenge to the practicability of the ACPA came in a somewhat unex-
pected way. Indeed, this “legal drama,”\footnote{Michael Geist, Cyberlaw 2.0, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 323, 342 (2003).} \textit{GlobalSantaFe Corp v. Global-
santafe.com},\footnote{250 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D.Va. 2003).} might have frustrated the basic premise upon which the
ACPA, more specifically \textit{in rem} jurisdiction, was predicated, if it had
been held otherwise.

There, the plaintiff, a U.S. corporation, first filed an \textit{in rem} suit
under the ACPA against the domain name “globalsantafe.com” which
had been registered with a foreign registrar by a foreign registrant for
cybersquatting and obtained a judgment order directing transfer of the
domain name to the plaintiff from the federal court. Shortly after that,
however, the registrant filed suit against the registrar in a foreign court
in whose jurisdiction both the registrant and registrar were located,
seeking an injunction prohibiting its domestic registrar from transferring
the domain name to the plaintiff. The foreign court provisionally
granted that injunction\textsuperscript{41} on the grounds that the U.S. court likely lacked personal jurisdiction over the dispute, refusing to recognize the U.S. court's \textit{in rem} jurisdiction based solely on the location of the registry under the ACPA.\textsuperscript{42} In response to the registrant's successful—at least with regard to the registrar—attempt to block the U.S. court order, the plaintiff sought an amendment of the judgment order directing the registry, VeriSign, to unilaterally cancel the domain name in the U.S. court.

At the time Congress enacted the ACPA, a U.S. corporation called Network Solution, Inc., ("NSI") served as both registrar and registry for all .com, .net, and .org domain names. But right after the enactment of the ACPA, numerous entities outside the United States began to operate as registrars authorized by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") to grant registration of gTLDs to registrants. Currently, there are over eighty .com and .net registrars in twenty-three countries (Australia, Austria, Bermuda, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Monaco, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.), and approximately seventy .org registrars in twenty-one countries (Australia, Austria, Barbados, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Monaco, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.) outside of the United States.\textsuperscript{43}

Thus, if U.S. courts fail to have a court order for forfeiture, cancellation, or transfer of the domain name enforced effectively at a registry level, the practicability of the ACPA will be significantly limited only to the occasions involving U.S. registrars. This limitation occurs mainly because according to the contracts\textsuperscript{44} regulating the relationship between the registry and the registrars, transfer or cancellation of a domain name

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Jong Ha Park v. Han Kang System, Inc., District Court of Seoul, No. 50 Civil Court (Sept. 17, 2002).
\item The Korean court's basic understanding appears to be that unilateral exercise of \textit{in rem} jurisdiction under the ACPA is unjust in terms of international jurisdiction and thus the U.S. judgment cannot be recognized and enforced in Korea. Consequently, according to the Korean court, it can constitute a breach of the registration contract with the registrant for the registrar to comply with the court order which was decided in an incompetent jurisdiction and thus has no possibility of recognition and enforcement in the registrant's or the registrar's country.
\item These contracts can be found on the ICANN Web site, ICAAN, .com Registration Agreement, http://www.icann.org/tlds/agreements/verisign/com-index.htm (last updated May 28, 2001); ICAAN, Registrar Accreditation Agreement, http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement-17may01.htm (last updated May 15, 2003).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
 normally requires the approval or initiative of the current registrar, and the registry is generally barred from changing the information in the Registry Database on its own initiative by contractual restrictions, playing an almost entirely passive role just to process the registrar’s orders, and thus cancellation or transfer of the domain name by normal procedures may not be effective in situations where the registrar has declined to cooperate and is beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.

The GlobalSantaFe court’s answer to this question seems to be inevitable on the one hand, and as aggressive as the in rem provision itself on the other hand. According to the court, the first alternative in the circumstances where cancellation through the usual channels is unavailable does not require the approval or initiative of the current registrar. “Although [the registry] is not contractually authorized to delete a domain name registration on its own initiative, it may nonetheless unilaterally disable a domain name. . . by placing the domain name in REGISTRY-HOLD status.” However, according to the court, “in order to vindicate the purposes of the ACPA, disabling alone in many cases may not be sufficient, for it does not oust the cybersquatter from his perch, but rather allows him to remain in possession of the name in violation of the trademark holder’s rights.” The second alternative involves a court order directing the registry “to act unilaterally to cancel the domain name by deleting the registration information in the Registry Database and removing the domain name from the TLD zone file, without regard to the current registrar’s lack of cooperation and the normal contractual procedures for cancellation.” According to the court, “nothing in the record indicates canceling a domain name without the current registrar’s consent is beyond [the registry]’s physical and technical capabilities.”

Despite the registry’s opposition on the grounds that an order directing the registry unilaterally to transfer or cancel a domain name would require the registry to violate its contracts with the registrar and with ICANN and to interfere with the registrar-registrant contract, the court held that:

a court is not limited merely to the disabling procedure envisioned by the registry’s contractual agreements, but may also order the registry to carry out the cancellation remedy authorized under the ACPA by deleting completely a domain name registration pursuant to the court’s or-

46. GlobalSantaFe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
47. Id. at 621.
48. Id. (citing .com Registry Agreement, supra n. 44, App. C. § 6(1)).
49. Id. at 623.
50. Id. at 622.
51. Id.
der, just as the registry would in response to a registrar’s request.52

Less than three months following GlobalSantaFe, the court held in the America Online, Inc. v. AOL.org case53 involving a .org54 domain name, that “Congress deliberately and sensibly provided for jurisdiction where the registry is located so there would be no doubt that courts had the power to direct the registry to carry out the authorized ACPA remedies of transfer and cancellation.”55 The court went on to say:

[T]here does not appear to be any relevant practical difference between an order directing the registry to cancel a domain name and one directing the registry to transfer it. Nor do there appear to be any technical obstacles presented by ordering transfer instead of cancellation. . . . Domain name transfer by the registry is only marginally more complicated than domain name cancellation in that it requires cooperation by the acquiring registrar and the acquiring registrant to supply the appropriate information to be entered into the Registry Database. Yet, this cooperation should typically be no obstacle as the trademark owner is the acquiring registrant and it can choose the acquiring registrar and supply the pertinent information for entry in the Registry Database.56

In so holding, U.S. courts have been going their own way, leaving one of the fundamental issues raised by a foreign court unsolved: whether in rem jurisdiction of the ACPA can be justified at an international level, or in the context of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.57 Particularly, the outcome of GlobalSantaFe has significant

52. Id. at 623.
54. On Jan. 1, 2003, the Public Interest Registry, which is located in Virginia, became a new official, exclusive registry for all “.org” domain names. See Public Interest Registry, About .ORG, http://www.pir.org/about_org (last updated July 10, 2003). Regarding all registries for gTLDs, see ICAAN, Registry Listing, http://www.icann.org/registries/listing.html (last updated May 7, 2004).
55. America Online, 259 F.3d at 454.
56. Id. at 455. The court added that:
[b]y choosing to register a domain name in the popular “.org” top-level domain, these foreign registrants deliberately chose to use a top-level domain controlled by a United States registry. They chose, in effect, to play Internet ball in American cyberspace. Had they wished to avoid an American ACPA suit and transfer order and American jurisdiction altogether, they might have chosen to register the infringing domain name in top-level domains with solely foreign registries and registrars, such as “.kr.” By the same token, registrants choosing the “.org” top-level domain must know, or reasonably should have known, that the controlling registry for that domain is a United States entity located in Virginia and that, under the ACPA, a federal court in Virginia would ultimately have jurisdiction over any name registered in the “.org” top-level domain.

Id. at 457.
57. To this question, the GlobalSantaFe court just said that “[t]he Korean court’s conclusion . . . is flatly contrary to the ACPA.” GlobalSantaFe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 625 n.42. See also Id. at 617, n.16.
implications for the overarching U.S. dominance in the conflict involving a foreign judgment and an inconsistent U.S. judgment.

In my opinion, this kind of trouble can be avoided in most cases, if U.S. courts would base their jurisdiction on *in personam* jurisdiction rather than on *in rem* jurisdiction while yielding the same results. According to § 217 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Korea, a final and binding foreign judgment is valid if: (1) the foreign court had jurisdiction under the principles of international jurisdiction pursuant to the Acts of Korea or pursuant to the treaties; (2) the defendant was served with the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document, and notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend; or the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceedings without being served; (3) such recognition of the foreign judgment is not contrary to the public policy of Korea; and (4) there is reciprocity.

*GlobalSantaFe* might be one of the marginal cases in which U.S. courts have trouble finding personal jurisdiction. By the same token, it must have been a tough case for the Korean court to declare that the U.S. court apparently lacked personal jurisdiction. As a practical matter, if the *GlobalSantaFe* court had exercised personal jurisdiction in one way or another and if service of process on the registrant had been made in accordance with the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, would the Korean court have issued the injunction prohibiting the Korean registrar from transferring the domain name? Public policy must not have been a decisive factor in this case. It should be applied in a very restricted way. Moreover, even to the Korean court, the domain name registrant in *GlobalSantaFe* presumably was not the kind of innocent domain name holder who must be protected.

Thus, if the Korean court had thought that the U.S. court order of transfer could be declared valid pursuant to the Korean Code of Civil Procedure, when its recognition is sought in a Korean court by the U.S. company in the future, the Korean court would not have issued that injunction. But the U.S. judgment merely based on *in rem* jurisdiction in this case somewhat ironically declared itself that "the U.S. court lacked personal jurisdiction over the foreign registrant." That must have made the Korean court conclude almost inevitably that the U.S. court order could not be recognized under the general principles of international jurisdiction.

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In this way, careless exercise of in rem jurisdiction sometimes can cause almost unnecessary conflict. If the first GlobalSantaFe order had been based on more carefully found personal jurisdiction—in most cases, personal jurisdiction exercised by U.S. courts under such theories as the Zippo test, the targeting test, etc., may be regarded to be compelling and understandable in foreign courts—and thus the application for an injunction had been dismissed in the Korean court, the Korean registrar certainly would have obeyed the order of the U.S. court, and the U.S. plaintiff in GlobalSantaFe would not have had to seek an amendment of the order in the U.S. court.

In sum, I believe, regardless of whether a domain name is property or not, in personam jurisdiction is still useful and should be more developed in the context of the ACPA. A quick jump to in rem jurisdiction is not always a good solution. It is entirely clear in the in rem provisions of the ACPA itself that the more frequently in personam jurisdiction can be exercised, the less in rem jurisdiction will be applied. This kind of approach may diminish the possibility of conflicts with foreign courts from a practical point of view. In addition, this approach may make the debate on constitutionality of the in rem provisions of the ACPA far less necessary.

IV. REVERSE DOMAIN NAME HIJACKING

A. What Is Reverse Domain Name Hijacking?

§ 1114(2)(D)(v) of the ACPA provides:
A domain name registrant whose domain name has been suspended, disabled, or transferred under a policy described under clause (ii)(II)
may, upon notice to the mark owner, file a civil action to establish that

59. See generally Geist, supra n. 35.
60. The GlobalSantaFe court introduced the warning of a law review article against broader exercise of in rem jurisdiction, summarizing that:
an aggressive assertion of in rem jurisdiction and control over the domain name system based on the essentially arbitrary physical geography may have the unintended consequence of causing a segmentation of the domain name system as other countries seek to assert their own control over the Internet by establishing competing and conflicting systems physically located outside of the United States. GlobalSantaFe, F. Supp. 2d at 623-24 (citing Struve & Wagner, supra n. 6, 1019-41). Who can be sure that this segmentation will not happen?
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(ii) provides:
An action referred to under clause (ii)(I) is any action of refusing to register, removing from registration, transferring, temporarily disabling, or permanently canceling a domain name—
(I) in compliance with a court order under section 1125(d) of this title; or
(II) in the implementation of a reasonable policy by such registrar, registry, or authority prohibiting the registration of a domain name that is identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of another’s mark (emphasis added).
15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(ii)(I) also provides:
the registration or use of the domain name by such registrant is not unlawful under this chapter. The court may grant injunctive relief to the domain name registrant, including the reactivation of the domain name or transfer of the domain name to the domain name registrant.

§ 1114(2)(D) was provided "in order to protect the rights of domain name registrants against 'overreaching trademark owners.'" This provision authorizes a domain name registrant to file an action against overreaching trademark owners for "reverse domain name hijacking." This term means that, if a domain name registrant cybersquats in violation of the ACPA, that registrant "hijacks" the domain name from a trademark owner. By the same token, if a trademark owner overreaches in exercising trademark rights and takes the domain name away from a legitimate registrant, the trademark owner "reverse hijacks" the domain name from the registrant. Thus, § 1114(2)(D)(v) may be referred to as the "reverse domain name hijacking" provision.

As made clear in the language of the provision, reverse domain name hijacking actions under § 1114(2)(D)(v) are ordinarily brought by a registrant who has lost a Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP") administrative proceeding. However, the UDRP, which is

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A domain name registrar, a domain name registry, or other domain name registration authority that takes any action described under clause [§1114(2)(D)(ii)] affecting a domain name shall not be liable for monetary relief or, except as provided in subclause [§1114(2)(D)(i)(II)], for injunctive relief, to any person for such action, regardless of whether the domain name is finally determined to infringe or dilute the mark.

66. Paragraph 4(k) of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy [hereinafter UDRP] provides in relevant part:

If an Administrative Panel decides that your domain name registration should be canceled or transferred, we will wait ten (10) business days (as observed in the location of our principal office) after we are informed by the applicable Provider of the Administrative Panel's decision before implementing that decision. We will then implement the decision unless we have received from you during that ten (10) business day period official documentation (such as a copy of a complaint, filed-stamped by the clerk of the court) that you have commenced a lawsuit against the complainant in a jurisdiction to which the complainant has submitted under Paragraph 3(b)(xiii) of the Rules of Procedure. (In general, that jurisdiction is either the location of our principal office or of your address as shown in our Whois database. See Paragraphs 1 and 3(b)(xiii) of the Rules of Procedure for details.) If we receive such documentation within the ten (10) business day period, we will not implement the Administrative Panel's decision, and we will take no further action, until
incorporated in the Registration Agreement between the registrar and
the registrant, allows trademark owners to file an administrative pro-
ceeding under the UDRP only in limited circumstances where the trade-
mark owner asserts: (i) the disputed domain name is identical or
confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the com-
plainant has rights; (ii) the registrant has no rights or legitimate inter-
ests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) the domain name has been
registered and is being used in bad faith.67

Moreover, the UDRP does not prevent a trademark owner from sub-
mitting the dispute set forth above to a court of competent jurisdiction
for independent resolution before the UDRP administrative proceeding
is commenced or after such proceeding is concluded,68 nor can the UDRP
prevent a trademark owner from filing actions that are not brought pur-
suant to the mandatory administrative proceeding provisions of the
UDRP in court.69 Accordingly, paragraph 3 of the UDRP provides that
the registrar will cancel or transfer the domain name in cases where the
registrar receives a decision of an administrative panel requiring such
action in any administrative proceeding to which the registrant was a
party and which was conducted under the UDRP, or the registrar re-
ceives an order from a court or arbitral tribunal, in each case of compe-
tent jurisdiction, requiring such action.70 Thus, in some circumstances,
reverse domain name hijacking actions can be brought against foreign
judgments involving trademark law disputes between U.S. infringers
and foreign trademark owners.71

B. FROM BAD TO WORSE—FROM IN REM TO REVERSE DOMAIN
NAME HIJACKING?

At first glance, the plain language of § 1114(2)(D)(v) clearly suggests
that the issue of whether a domain name registrant has infringed on a
trademark owner’s rights should be decided under the Lanham Act. In
the traditional trademark context, U.S. courts have been reluctant to
hear foreign trademark infringement claims. Thus, in U.S. federal

we receive (i) evidence satisfactory to us of a resolution between the parties; (ii)
evidence satisfactory to us that your lawsuit has been dismissed or withdrawn; or
(iii) a copy of an order from such court dismissing your lawsuit or ordering that
you do not have the right to continue to use your domain name.

UDRP, http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm. In the above provision, “we” refers to
the registrar and “you” and “your” refer to the domain name holder. Id. at n. 3. Regarding
challenges to UDRP rulings in courts, see UDPRLaw.net, The UDRP-Court Challenge

67. UDRP, supra n. 66, at ¶ 4(a).
68. Id. at ¶ 4(k).
69. Id. at ¶ 5.
70. Id. at ¶ 3.
71. See infra Part IV.C.3.
IS THE ACPA A SAFE HAVEN?

courts, the lack of U.S. trademark rights invariably leads to dismissal of the case even where foreign trademark law should apply. This traditional approach, however, may result in unexpected consequences when it applies to reverse domain name hijacking without certain limits. That is, in reverse hijacking cases involving foreign trademark owners, the first and most important issue will be whether the foreign trademark owner also possesses U.S. trademark rights (as long as the U.S. court dealing with the case has jurisdiction to adjudicate the case). If not, grant of relief for the domain name registrant is inevitable. This is so because, if the foreign trademark owner lacks U.S. trademark rights under the Lanham Act, logically there are no rights to infringe on and thus the domain name registrant’s registration or use cannot be unlawful under the Lanham Act.

The plain and unambiguous text of §1114(2)(D)(v) does not appear to allow any possibilities of different interpretation. The conclusion seems to be quite simple and apparently consistent with the statute. Does the analysis just end there? Does this interpretation warrant fair and just results?

Assume that Y, a citizen from country X establishes a U.S. corporation and registers a “.com” domain name in the U.S. corporation’s name. The domain name is exactly the same as the trademark of ABC corporation in country X. ABC’s trademark is very famous in country X, and ABC’s goods sell expensively in country X. However, ABC’s trademark is not registered in the U.S., and ABC does not do business in the U.S. at all. Y’s Web site is operated in the language of country X. Y’s U.S. corporation takes orders from consumers from country X on the Web site and ships counterfeit goods containing ABC’s trademark to country X. These goods are much cheaper than the goods of ABC and they are poorly made. Although U.S. consumers also may access the Web site, Y’s U.S. corporation does not sell these goods in the U.S. at all. In fact, Y intends to sell counterfeit goods bearing ABC’s trademark only to country X’s market from the beginning, and Y does not manufacture these fake goods in the United States. They are manufactured in a third country and shipped there directly to country X. Neither Y nor the U.S. corporation registers any trademarks in the United States. ABC files an administrative proceeding against the U.S. corporation under the UDRP. The panel of the proceeding finally rules in favor of ABC and orders the U.S. corporation to transfer the domain name to ABC. Then, the U.S. corporation brings a reverse domain name hijacking action under §1114(2)(D)(v) in a U.S. court, asserting that ABC has no U.S. trademark rights and thus the registration or use of the domain name is not unlawful under the Lanham Act.

How should the court decide? In this hypothetical case, do you agree that Y’s corporation infringed on ABC’s trademark by the registration
and use of the domain name? If so, what country's law did Y's corpora-
tion violate? Probably, under whatever choice of law theory, no one can
deny that country X's trademark law should be applied to this case.

In this regard, I believe that there may be some instances in which a
superficially logical, apparent and unambiguous interpretation of
§ 1114(2)(D)(v) should not be allowed in reverse domain name hijacking
claims. However, the courts which have dealt with § 1114(2)(D)(v) claims
involving foreign trademark owners do not appear to think so.

I also believe that the reverse domain name hijacking provision can
be much more harmful than the in rem provision. In rem jurisdiction
may deny alleged foreign infringers their procedural rights; however, the
reverse domain name hijacking provision may deny foreign trademark
owners their substantive rights.

C. COURT DECISIONS REGARDING REVERSE DOMAIN NAME HIJACKING

1. Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona

In this case, barcelona.com, Inc., a U.S. corporation, filed an
§ 1114(2)(D)(v) action against the City Council of Barcelona, Spain, seek-
ing a declaratory judgment that the plaintiff corporation’s registration
and use of the domain name “barcelona.com” were not unlawful under
the Lanham Act. In 1996, Nogueras, a Spanish citizen, registered the
domain name with NSI in the name of his wife. On this Web site barce-
lona.com, he provided information about the city of Barcelona and some
other commercial services. In early 1999, Nogueras offered the City
Council a chance to negotiate for its acquisition of the domain name bar-
celona.com, but he received no response. In late 1999, Nogueras incorpo-
rated the plaintiff corporation to own barcelona.com and to run a tourist
portal for the city of Barcelona.

In early 2000, after meeting with Nogueras, the City Council de-
manded the transfer of the domain name to the City Council. Following
this demand, Nogueras had the domain name transferred from his wife’s
name to the plaintiff corporation. The plaintiff corporation, however, had
no employees, had no bank accounts in the United States, and did not
own or lease office space in the United States. Nogueras and his wife
were the sole shareholders of the corporation, and its computer server
was in Spain.

Upon the plaintiff corporation’s refusal to transfer the domain name
to the City Council, the City Council filed a complaint with the World

72. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectual Prop-
erty System, 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 993, 1008-09, n.81 (2002) (noting that more all-encom-
passing U.S. regulation of the domain name space may occur through the operation of the
reverse domain name hijacking provision).

73. 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003).
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") under the UDRP. The City Council asserted that under Spanish law the corporation had no rights to the domain name, while the City Council had about 150 Spanish trademarks that contained the word “Barcelona,” such as “Theatre Barcelona,” “Barcelona Informacio I Grafic,” and “Barcelona Informacio 010 El Tlefon Que Ho Contesta Tot.” As part of its complaint, the City Council agreed to be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Virginia (United States) with respect to any challenge that may be made by the corporation to a panel's decision in favor of the City Council.

In August 2000, a WIPO panelist ruled in favor of the City Council and ordered the transfer of the domain name barcelona.com to the City Council. Subsequently, the plaintiff corporation commenced this reverse domain hijacking claim under § 1114(2)(D)(v) of the ACPA, asserting that its use of the name barcelona.com did not infringe on any trademark of the City Council. The City Council filed no counterclaim to assert its trademark rights.

Somewhat surprisingly, in terms of the conclusion, the district court upheld the decision of the WIPO panel. A threshold question in this case is, as the district court correctly stated, “whether either party in this case possesses a valid trademark for the name [‘] Barcelona. [‘]” In this case, the City Council had neither a U.S. trademark for the name “Barcelona” nor a Spanish trademark for the name “Barcelona” alone. Indeed, the term “Barcelona” alone is a purely geographic mark.

However, the district court ruled that under Spanish law, the term “Barcelona,” which was included in the City Council’s numerous Spanish trademarks, is clearly the dominant word which characterizes the mark, and the dominant word must be given decisive relevance. In this regard, the plaintiff corporation’s domain name barcelona.com is confusingly similar to the dominant word “Barcelona” for which the City Council has a legally valid Spanish trademark. The court added that considering the fact that an Internet user would normally expect the services and information provided by the barcelona.com Web site to be offered by some official body of Barcelona, the plaintiff corporation took advantage of the normal confusion of an Internet user. The district court also found bad faith in the attempts by Nogueras to sell the domain name to the City Council.

The district court went on to say, dealing with the City Council’s counterclaim under § 1125(d)(1)(A) of the ACPA, which indeed had never

76. Id. at 371.
77. Id. at 372-73.
been filed, that "[i]n the text of [§ 1125(d)(1)(A) of the ACPA] Congress makes no distinction between United States or foreign marks, even though trademark law has historically been governed and regulated on a national level." According to the district court's understanding as to the legislative purpose of the ACPA, "[i]t is untenable to suppose that Congress, aware of the fact that the Internet is so international in nature, only intended for U.S. trademarks to be protected under the Anticybersquatting statute." Holding that the Spanish trademark "Barcelona" is valid for purposes of the ACPA, the district court denied the plaintiff's request for a declaratory judgment and ordered the transfer of the domain name barcelona.com to the City Council.

In this ruling, the district court abandoned the traditional notion of territoriality in the context of international trademark law and declared that foreign trademarks would be entitled to protection at least under the ACPA. This ruling, however, was short-lived, as the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling.

On appeal, the plaintiff corporation contended that when it sought protection under § 1114 (2)(D)(v), it was entitled to have its conduct judged by U.S. trademark law, not Spanish trademark law. The City Council countered this assertion by saying that "[t]he [WIPO] administrative transfer proceeding itself gives the district court both subject matter and personal jurisdiction; jurisdiction is not dependent upon allegations of U.S. trademark rights." The City Council went on to say quite compellingly that "[t]o hold otherwise would be to strip a trademark owner of its foreign rights whenever it is haled into court by a U.S. domain name owner who has lost a UDRP administrative proceeding. Without the ability to assert their rights [in U.S. courts], foreign trademark owners would automatically lose such proceedings, creating an unintended and unjust result."

However, the Fourth Circuit does not appear to have been affected by the City Council's argument. The Fourth Circuit ruled first that a § 1114(2)(D)(v) claim has four elements. To seek protection against an overreaching trademark owner under the reverse domain name hijacking provision,

a plaintiff must establish (1) that it is a domain name registrant; (2) that its domain name was suspended, disabled, or transferred under a policy implemented by a registrar as described in 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(ii)(II); (3) that the owner of the mark that prompted the domain name to be suspended, disabled, or transferred has notice of the action by service or otherwise; and (4) that the plaintiff's registration or

78. Id. at 373.
79. Id.
80. Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 622.
81. Id. at 623.
use of the domain name is not unlawful under the Lanham Act, as amended.\textsuperscript{82}

Then, with regard to the last element that raised the principal issue in the present case, the Fourth Circuit ruled that:

[the text of the ACPA explicitly requires application of the Lanham Act, not foreign law, to resolve an action brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v). Specifically, it authorizes an aggrieved domain name registrant to “file a civil action to establish that the registration or use of the domain name by such registrant is not unlawful under this chapter.” 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v). It is thus readily apparent that the cause of action created by Congress in this portion of the ACPA requires the court adjudicating such an action to determine whether the registration or use of the domain name violates the Lanham Act. Because the statutory language has a plain and unambiguous meaning that is consistent with the statutory context and application of this language in accordance with its plain meaning provides a component of a coherent statutory scheme, our statutory analysis need proceed no further.]

By requiring application of United States trademark law to this action brought in a United States court by a United States corporation involving a domain name administered by a United States registrar, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) is consistent with the fundamental doctrine of territoriality upon which our trademark law is presently based.

It follows from incorporation of the doctrine of territoriality into United States law through Section 44 of the Lanham Act that United States courts do not entertain actions seeking to enforce trademark rights that exist only under foreign law. See Person’s Co., Ltd. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The concept of territoriality is basic to trademark law; trademark rights exist in each country solely according to that country’s statutory scheme”). Yet the district court’s application of foreign law in this declaratory judgment action did precisely this and thereby neglected to apply United States law as required by the statute.

When we apply the Lanham Act, not Spanish law, in determining whether [the plaintiff corporation]’s registration and use of barcelona.com is unlawful, the ineluctable conclusion follows that [the plaintiff corporation]’s registration and use of the name “Barcelona” is not unlawful.\textsuperscript{83}

One interesting point in this case is that the Fourth Circuit did not rule directly that the City Council had no U.S. trademarks registered in the U.S. or used in U.S. commerce. Rather, the court ruled that “under the Lanham Act, and apparently even under Spanish law, the City Council could not obtain a trademark interest in a purely descriptive geo-

\textsuperscript{82} Id. at 626.

\textsuperscript{83} Id. at 627-29 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
Before I analyze the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, I must note several things. First, I agree that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction insofar as the plaintiff corporation based this claim on § 1114(2)(D)(v) regardless of whether the Lanham Act ultimately could be applied to the claim or not, and whether the claim finally would be decided in favor of the plaintiff or not. Second, I agree with the Fourth Circuit's understanding that under Spanish law, the City Council could not seek trademark protection against the registration of a domain name that used purely a geographically descriptive part of the City Council's Spanish trademarks that refers only to the city of Barcelona. Third, I agree with the Fourth Circuit's ruling that basically U.S. trademark law is based on the fundamental doctrine of territoriality, which is also recognized in the Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property, in the sense that a trademark exists only under the laws of each sovereign nation. Thus, I admit that the counterclaim would have been dismissed under the principle of territoriality, had the City Council filed a counterclaim under § 1125(d)(1)(A) of the ACPA in this case. Fourth, and most importantly, I agree with the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the plaintiff corporation should be granted a declaratory judgment under § 1114(2)(D)(v) of the ACPA. However, I believe that the declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiff should be granted not because the City Council lacks U.S. trademark rights under the Lanham Act but because the plaintiff corporation's registration and use of the domain name are not unlawful under Spanish law.

What if in this case the plaintiff corporation (or Nogueras) had registered and used exactly the same domain name as one of the City Council's Spanish trademarks? If U.S. courts followed the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Barcelona.com without exception, a foreign trademark owner who sought protection under the UDRP against an alleged U.S. infringer would inevitably face an adverse ruling whenever a U.S. registrant brought a case before a U.S. court under § 1114 of the ACPA as long as the foreign trademark was not registered in the U.S. or not used in commerce within the meaning of the Lanham Act. More importantly,

84. Id. at 629.


86. With regard to jurisdiction, at the time of filing a UDRP complaint a foreign trademark holder must agree to submit to jurisdiction of a court either at location of the domain name holder or where the registrar is located in order for a losing domain name registrant to challenge an adverse UDRP decision in court. Thus, U.S. courts will usually be able to exercise personal jurisdiction when a U.S. domain name registrant is involved. See infra Part IV.D.1.
U.S. court decisions will be final de facto given the fact that all gTLD registries are currently under U.S. control, thereby leaving foreign trademark owners bereft of eventual protection.

To avoid such extremely biased results, in some instances it is desirable for U.S. courts to apply foreign trademark law to the case even though determining when and how to apply foreign law is not a simple question in the international trademark law context, especially in light of the fact that the Internet is accessible simultaneously all over the world. However, once the U.S. voluntarily has taken the responsibility to police all cybersquatting and trademark infringement relating to gTLDs by the enactment of the ACPA, U.S. courts are required to give the same amount of protection to foreign trademark owners who suffered infringement by U.S. infringers as that given to the U.S. trademark holders who suffered infringement by foreign infringers. It is not justifiable to deny foreign trademark owners protection on the only basis that they are not trademark holders under U.S. trademark law.

2. International Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco

In this regard, another Fourth Circuit case, International Bancorp, can be understood as the court’s effort to avoid harsh results for foreign trademark owners. This case, however, approached the problem in a totally different way. In other words, the Fourth Circuit adopted an approach to broaden the scope of the trademark rights that can be protected under the Lanham Act rather than apply a foreign trademark law. This approach is possible because the U.S. basically has adopted a use-based trademark system as opposed to a registration-based trademark system. International Bancorp dealt with the issue of what the exact meaning of “use in commerce” is under the Lanham Act and how broadly it can be construed to protect foreign trademark owners.

In this case, the defendant, a Monaco corporation called Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco (“SBM”), operated historic properties, including a casino in Monte Carlo, Monaco. The casino had operated since 1863 under the “Casino de Monte Carlo” trademark registered in Monaco but not in the United States. SBM had promoted this casino around the world along with its other properties within the U.S. from its New York office, with $1 million annually for eighteen years. The plaintiff companies, which were formed and con-

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88. In this case, one of the defendants is a U.S. company and the other defendants are U.K. companies. See Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco v. I. Bancorp Europe, No. D2000-1323 (WIPO Jan. 8, 2001) (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1323.html); Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des
trolled by a French national, operated numerous online gambling Web sites whose domain names included some portion of SBM's trademark, such as “casinodemontecarlo.com,” “casinodemontecarlo.net,” “casinomontecarlo.com,” and “casinomontecarlo.net.” All these domain names were registered with NSI.89

These Web sites exhibited pictures of the Casino de Monte Carlo's exterior and interior as if they offered online gambling as an alternative to their Monaco-based casino, though they had no such facility. Upon learning of these Web sites, SBM filed a complaint with WIPO under the UDRP. A WIPO panelist ruled in favor of SBM and ordered the transfer of the fifty-three domain names to SBM. To escape this ruling, the plaintiff companies commenced this suit in U.S. federal court90 against SBM, seeking a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).91 Subsequently, SBM counterclaimed under the Lanham Act for, among other things, trademark infringement and cybersquatting.

The plaintiff companies, as expected, first raised the issue on whether SBM's trademark could be protected in the United States. Under U.S. law, the holder of an unregistered mark must satisfy the “use in commerce” requirement in order to be entitled to trademark protection. According to the Lanham Act, “[a] mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce... on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services rendered in commerce.”92 It is undis-

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89. Id.

90. The basis for exercise of jurisdiction is not entirely clear. The Fourth Circuit simply noted that “[b]oth [the plaintiff companies] and SBM submitted to the federal court’s exercise of in personam jurisdiction over them.” Intl. Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 369, n.6.

91. The plaintiff companies based their claim on 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) of the Declaratory Judgment Act, rather than on the reverse domain name hijacking provision under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v). However, this does not appear to have substantial effects on analyzing this case.

92. 15 U.S. C. § 1127 provides in relevant part:

The term “use in commerce” means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce—

(1) on goods when—

(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and
puted that SBM's mark falls within "service mark" under the Lanham Act. Thus, the "use in commerce" requirement consists of two essential elements: (1) advertising the mark, and (2) the rendering of services in commerce. Neither alone is insufficient to establish the protectability of a service mark. In this case, SBM satisfied the first element of the use in commerce requirement because SBM advertised and promoted its gambling services in the U.S. to U.S. citizens, employing the Casino de Monte Carlo mark. The question is whether the second element of the use in commerce requirement was met within the meaning of the Lanham Act, because SBM had never rendered its gambling services in the United States. The record showed only that some U.S. citizens went to and gambled at SBM's casino in Monte Carlo, Monaco.

The majority of the court began with term "commerce" as defined in the Lanham Act. According to the court, the clear definition of "commerce" under the Lanham Act is "coterminous with that commerce that Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution." The majority went on to hold that:

[the plaintiff companies'] concession [that some U.S. citizens gambled at SBM's casino], when taken together with [ ] the fact that the Casino de Monte Carlo is a subject of a foreign nation, make unavoidable the legal conclusion that foreign trade was present here, and that as such, so also was "commerce" under the Lanham Act.

The majority summarized its logic holding that:

[b]ecause SBM used its mark in the sale and advertising of its gambling services to United States citizens; because its rendering of gambling services to United States citizens constitutes foreign trade; because foreign trade is commerce Congress may lawfully regulate; and because commerce under the Lanham Act comprises all commerce that Congress may lawfully regulate, the services SBM renders under "Casino de Monte Carlo" mark to citizens of the United States are services rendered in commerce, and the "use in commerce" requirement that the Lanham Act sets forth for the mark's [protectability] is satisfied.

The majority then held that numerous court opinions and Trade-
mark Trial and Appellate Board decisions cited by the dissent and the plaintiff companies are distinguishable, inapposite, or unpersuasive, and rejected the dissent's interpretation of "use in commerce" that both elements must take place in the United States. Finally, the majority ruled that the district court did not err in finding that SBM's mark had acquired secondary meaning and affirmed the district court ruling in favor of SBM.

With regard to policy concern, the majority admitted that policy was not its forte, but the majority advocated its position by saying that "since avoidance of consumer confusion is the ultimate end of all trademark law, this case presents a paradigmatic situation in which we may see our laws working, as intended, to reduce consumer confusion." The majority added that "we do not know that this is 'reverse imperialism,' . . . but we do know that the law requires that we permit mark owners like SBM to petition our courts for protection." To me, this remark seems to be the real reason that led the majority to its conclusion no matter what logical framework they established.

The dissent resisted the majority, noting that all of the existing authorities and every court to address this issue had concluded that both elements of the "use in commerce" must occur in the United States. The dissent criticized that the majority reached an unprecedented conclusion. The dissent noted:

Before concluding, I must note the potential consequences of adoption of the majority's rule. The rule announced by the majority today would mean that any entity that uses a foreign mark to advertise and sell its goods or services to United States citizens in a foreign country would be eligible for trademark protection under United States law. Such a rule threatens to wreak havoc over this country's trademark law and would have a stifling effect on United States commercial interests generally. Before investing in a mark, firms and individuals would be forced to scour the globe to determine when and where American citizens had purchased goods or services from foreign subjects to determine whether there were trademarks involved that might be used against them in a priority contest or in an infringement action in the United States. On the other hand, SBM and companies like it would, under the majority's

ingside Group Ltd. v. Morningside Capital Group, LLC, 182 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 1999); CBS, Inc. v. Logical Games, 719 F.2d 1237 (4th Cir. 1983).


98. Intl. Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 381.

99. Id. at 382.
rule, suddenly acquire a windfall of potential United States trademark rights for all of the goods and services advertised to and purchased by United States citizens while traveling in their countries. Like some sort of foreign influenza, these new entitlements would accompany American travelers on their return home, creating a vast array of new duties for individuals in the United States seeking to use the same or similar marks on goods or services sold in the United States.100

Even though the majority distinguished this case from Person's Co. v. Christman,101 the dissent’s criticism looks quite compelling. In Person’s, the defendant, a U.S. citizen had visited Japan and purchased several articles of clothing bearing the plaintiff's Japanese trademark. After returning with the clothing to the U.S., the defendant began manufacturing and selling clothing bearing an identical mark and registered the mark with the PTO. However, the Federal Circuit denied relief to the Japanese manufacturer. According to the majority in International Bancorp, because the Japanese trademark holder had never used or displayed its mark to advertise or sell its products in the U.S. to U.S. consumers and thus there had been only foreign advertising to foreign consumers, Person’s could be distinguished from International Bancorp.102 The dissent, however, criticized that, because Person’s involved a mark for goods, not services, and because no advertising element is required as to goods under the Lanham Act, the Federal Circuit in Person’s must have grounded its conclusion on the fact that the plaintiff's goods had not been sold in the United States. Thus, according to the dissent, the majority’s logic, were it applied to Person’s directly, would lead to a conclusion exactly the opposite of that reached by the Federal Circuit, because under the majority’s theory the purchase of clothing in Japan by a U.S. customer in Person’s would constitute foreign commerce of the U.S. that Congress may lawfully regulate.103 To me, this criticism appears to correctly point out the weakness or inconsistency of the majority’s logic because the majority itself made clear that it would not apply its interpretation to a case involving goods.104

From a slightly different point of view, at least one commentator predicted earlier that the Internet might increase an opportunity for foreign trademark owners to reach U.S. infringers.105 Indeed, in the era of

100. Id. at 388-89 (footnotes omitted).
101. 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
103. Id. at 390.
104. Id. at 375, n.8.
global commerce and networks, foreign trademark owners are more likely to reach the U.S. market advertising their goods and services via the Internet, making the matter of consumer confusion more problematic. Thus, the question of whether goods or services must be sold or rendered in the U.S. for foreign trademark owners to be protected under the Lanham Act may be raised more frequently in the near future. It is still doubtful whether the majority opinion in *International Bancorp* could be upheld by other courts.

3. Hawes v. Network Solutions, Inc.\(^{106}\)

Shortly after *International Bancorp* and *Barcelona.com*, another Fourth Circuit ruling regarding reverse domain name hijacking followed. Interestingly, this case did not involve a UDRP administrative proceeding. In *Hawes v. Network Solutions, Inc.*, Hawes registered a domain name "lorealcomplaints.com" with NSI allegedly to develop a forum in which to communicate with L'Oreal, a French corporation, concerning problems with its products. L'Oreal filed an action against Hawes in a French court, alleging infringement of L'Oreal's French trademark. Upon learning of this French litigation, NSI transmitted a "Registrar Certificate" for the domain name to L'Oreal's counsel in Paris, tendering control and authority over the registration of the domain name to the French court in accordance with NSI's service agreement with its registrants and the dispute policy. The French court, on Hawes's failure to appear before the court, entered the judgment and ordered transfer of the domain name to L'Oreal. Hawes appealed. But NSI transferred the domain name to L'Oreal. Then, Hawes filed this reverse domain name hijacking action in a U.S. district court seeking transfer of the domain name back to him. L'Oreal filed a counterclaim for trademark infringement and trademark dilution. After the dismissal of Hawes's claim, L'Oreal voluntarily dismissed its counterclaim.\(^{107}\)

The district court dismissed Hawes's reverse domain name hijacking claim for several reasons. The court held, among other reasons, that Hawes's claim lacked one element of a § 1114 (2)(D)(v) claim because L'Oreal's receipt of the domain name was pursuant to a court order, and not pursuant to the implementation of NSI's reasonable policy.\(^{108}\)

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court ruling. The Fourth Circuit held that Hawes's complaint alleged that the transfer of the domain name occurred pursuant to NSI's Domain Name Dispute Policy incorporated in the Domain Name Registration Agreement, and it was because of that policy that the Registrar Certificate was filed with the

106. 337 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2003).
107. Id. at 379-80.
108. Id. at 384-86.
French court and that the domain name was ultimately transferred. The Fourth Circuit ruled that because the transfer of the domain name was based on NSI's interpretation of the scope of its "Domain Name Dispute Policy," the requirement that "the transfer be pursuant to a policy implemented by a registrar" would appear to have been adequately alleged.\footnote{109}

The Fourth Circuit added, citing International Bancorp, that adjudication of a § 1114 (2)(D)(v) claim involves neither appellate-like review of, nor deference to, any simultaneously pending foreign litigation and a § 1114 (2)(D)(v) cause of action requires application of only U.S. law, but that the foreign trademark owner can seek protection by filing a counter-claim, asserting any rights that it may have under U.S. law.\footnote{110}

This case appears to have involved pending foreign litigation. But if courts would apply this ruling equally to all cases involving foreign litigation regardless of whether the litigation is still pending or not and whether the domain name was registered with a foreign registrar or a U.S. registrar, this ruling would likely bring about another type of international conflict with foreign nations. And as I have noted analyzing GlobalSantaFe, the fact that all gTLDs are, practically, under the technical control of the United States would bring about eventual dominance of U.S. judgments.

D. Analysis

1. International Jurisdiction: In Rem or In Personam?

Before analyzing the question of whether the Lanham Act always governs § 1114(2)(D)(v) claims, I will address the matter of international jurisdiction in § 1114(2)(D)(v) claims.\footnote{111} As to reverse domain name hijacking, can U.S. registrants who have lost UDRP administrative proceedings (or foreign suits) always bring § 1114(2)(D)(v) claims in U.S. courts?

With regard to § 1114(2)(D)(v) claims directly brought as an appeal-like action from the adverse UDRP administrative proceedings, U.S. courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign trademark owner by consent. The UDRP Rules, which govern administrative proceedings for the resolution of disputes under the UDRP, provide that a trademark owner who files an administrative proceeding must agree to "submit, with respect to any challenges to a decision in the administrative proceeding canceling or transferring the domain name, to the jurisdiction of

\footnotesize{109. Id.  
110. Id. at 386-87.  
111. No courts thus far have addressed the personal jurisdiction issue seriously in dealing with reverse domain name hijacking cases involving a foreign trademark owner and a U.S. registrant.}
the courts in at least one specified Mutual Jurisdiction."112 Paragraph 1 of the UDRP Rules also provides:

Mutual Jurisdiction means a court jurisdiction at the location of either (a) the principal office of the Registrar (provided the domain-name holder has submitted in its Registration Agreement to that jurisdiction for court adjudication of disputes concerning or arising from the use of the domain name) or (b) the domain-name holder's address as shown for the registration of the domain name in Registrar's Who is database at the time the complaint is submitted to the Provider.113

Thus, in most § 1114(2)(D)(v) cases in which a U.S. domain name registrant brings a § 1114(2)(D)(v) claim as the losing party in a UDRP administrative proceeding, U.S. courts will have personal jurisdiction over a foreign trademark owner. However, it is not entirely clear whether U.S. courts can always exercise personal jurisdiction in cases where a UDRP administrative proceeding is not involved, as shown in International Bancorp. The question of whether the in rem provisions of the ACPA can be applied to § 1114(2)(D)(v) claims may be raised theoretically. Unlike § 1125(d)(2), § 1114(2)(D)(v) does not appear to provide for in rem jurisdiction. Some may argue that, since the primary—in fact, the only—rationale that justifies exercise of in rem jurisdiction in § 1125(d)(2) is that the domain name is property which has its situs where a U.S. registry or registrar is located, logically courts also may exercise in rem jurisdiction in § 1114(2)(D)(v) claims over a foreign trademark owner.114

112. See UDRP Rules, supra 65, ¶ 3(b)(xiii).
113. Id. ¶ 1.
114. There are no comments about in rem jurisdiction regarding § 1114(2)(D)(v) in the legislative history of the ACPA. Interestingly, according to the legislative history, § 1114 (2)(D)(ii)(II), which is cited in § 1114 (2)(D)(v), was originally in the implementation of reasonable policy by such registrar, registry, or authority prohibiting the registration of a domain name that is identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of another's mark registered on the Principal Register of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, or of a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section 706 of title 18 United States Code, or section 220506 of title 36, United States Code. H.R. Rep. No. 106-412, at 3-4 (emphasis added). Compare this with current § 1114 (2)(D)(ii)(II) "in the implementation of a reasonable policy by such registrar, registry, or authority prohibiting the registration of a domain name that is identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of another's mark." In enacting § 1114 (2)(D), the ACPA is said to have anticipated "a reasonable policy against cyberpiracy will apply only to marks registered on the Principal Register of the Patent and Trademark Office in order to promote objective criteria and predictability in the dispute resolution process." See id. at 15. The House Report also noted that "NSI has maintained a domain name policy since 1995[,] . . . Only owners of trademark that are registered with the U.S. Trademark Office's Principle Register and are identical to the disputed domain name can invoke the dispute policy." See id. at 6. The reason the original draft of § 1114 (2)(D)(ii)(II) was changed is not clear; however, this legislative history may provide some clues as to why there was no in rem jurisdiction provision with regard to reverse domain name hijacking.
However, I do not agree with that interpretation. The *in rem* provision of the ACPA has been criticized by a number of commentators for offending due process since its enactment. Hence, it is my view that the *in rem* provision of the ACPA should be applied as restrictively as possible, rather than expansively. More importantly, if *in rem* jurisdiction is allowed in § 1114(2)(D)(v) claims, there are no reasonable grounds to limit its application only to the § 1114(2)(D)(v) claims brought by U.S. citizens. Therefore, under that broad interpretation, the conclusion is inevitable that all foreign domain name registrants who have lost UDRP proceedings or court litigation can always bring § 1114(2)(D)(v) actions against foreign trademark owners before U.S. courts merely because the registry of gTLD is located in the United States, even though a foreign registrant and a foreign trademark owner have no other contacts with the United States. This conclusion appears to be somewhat unreasonable and unacceptable to both U.S. courts and foreign trademark owners. Inconsistency between § 1114(2)(D)(v) and § 1125(d)(2) with regard to *in rem* jurisdiction only evidences the precariousness of *in rem* jurisdiction in § 1125(d)(2).

2. *Does the Lanham Act Always Govern All Reverse Domain Name Hijacking Claims?*

Although I believe that the Fourth Circuit decided rightly in both *International Bancorp* and *Barcelona.com*, I do not agree with their reasoning. Traditionally, U.S. courts have been reluctant to hear claims based on foreign trademark laws, while expressing much willingness to apply U.S. trademark law extraterritorially. Thus, in order to prevail in U.S. federal courts, trademark owners must assert they have trademark rights under the U.S. trademark law first under this theory. If a foreign trademark owner fails to assert U.S. trademark rights, the claim will be dismissed even in cases where the foreign plaintiff has trademark rights under a foreign law and the foreign law should be applied to the case.

With regard to claims based on § 1114(2)(D)(v), courts appear to take the position that as long as (1) the court has personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant, and (2) the registrant's domain name was suspended, disabled, or transferred under the UDRP, the question of whether the registrant infringes on foreign trademark rights should be decided by the Lanham Act. Under this interpretation, the only decisive factor is invariably whether or not the foreign trademark owner has U.S. trademark rights.

If other countries adopted the Fourth Circuit's approach in *Barcelona.com* in instances where a trademark owner and a domain name registrant were from different countries, the results would be disastrous in terms of the smooth operation of the UDRP. If a foreign court (i.e., the
domain name registrant’s home country court) before which a reverse
domain name hijacking claim is brought by a trademark holder’s submis-
sion to the foreign court’s jurisdiction in accordance with the UDRP and
the Rules for UDRP looked only to its own trademark law, all UDRP
decisions in favor of the trademark owner would be reversed as long as
the trademark owner does not have trademark rights in the registrant’s
home country. These results would make the UDRP almost meaningless.

I do not think that the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation is a fair read-
ing of § 1114(2)(D)(v). The legislative purpose of § 1114(2)(D)(v) is to pro-
tect the rights of domain name registrants against “overreaching”
trademark owners, not against “foreign trademark” owners. Why is it
always “overreaching” for foreign trademark owners to assert their for-
eign trademark rights against U.S. registrants in UDRP administrative
proceedings? Is there no possibility at all for U.S. registrants to infringe
on foreign trademark rights? Do the U.S. courts really agree that foreign
trademarks cannot be protected from U.S. registrants at all in UDRP
proceedings? If not, what makes the status of foreign trademark owners
so different in the U.S. courts? Just as foreign registrants may infringe
on U.S. trademark rights, U.S. registrants sometimes may infringe on
foreign trademark rights.

The Fourth Circuit in the Barcelona.com case ruled that:
[b]y requiring application of United States trademark law to this action
brought in a United States court by a United States corporation involv-
ing a domain name administered by a United States registrar, 15
U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) is consistent with the fundamental doctrine of ter-
ritoriality upon which our trademark law is presently based.115

Again, I do not agree with this ruling. The fundamental doctrine of
territoriality does not always warrant immunity from foreign trademark
law violation. The doctrine of territoriality simply means that U.S.
courts do not adjudicate foreign trademark claims. In cases where for-
eign trademark owners seek protection under foreign trademark laws in
U.S. courts, and courts conclude that foreign trademark laws should ap-
ply, courts do not hear their claims. However, the dismissal of the
case does not mean at all that the defendant did not infringe on foreign
trademark rights.

Indeed, as Person’s noted, “[t]he concept of territoriality is basic to
trademark law; trademark rights exist in each country solely according
to that country’s statutory scheme.” No matter how broadly U.S.

(4th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
117. Vanity Fair Mills v. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1956); Alcar Group v. Corpo-
courts have, since Steele, applied the Lanham Act extraterritorially, there have been and must be some limits. If a certain case crosses that border, the Lanham Act does not apply any more. Neither U.S. courts nor Congress can regulate all sales of goods and services bearing foreign marks and carried out by foreigners in foreign nations. Where the only question has become whether a person violated foreign trademark law or not, the U.S. courts’ answer that it is not a violation because the foreign trademark owner has no U.S. trademark rights does not make sense at all. Rather, it is a meaningless answer. Again, what if, in Barcelona.com, the Spanish citizen had registered exactly the same domain name as one of the City Council’s registered Spanish trademarks which obtained a secondary meaning without any doubt? How would the Fourth Circuit have decided? Remember that in Barcelona.com the City Council had not filed a counterclaim.

In § 1114(2)(D)(v) cases, foreign trademark owners are not claiming their foreign trademark rights. They are just subjected to U.S. courts as defendants by U.S. domain name registrants. Regardless of the nationality and physical situs of U.S. domain name registrants, some of their conduct might occur or be considered to occur in foreign countries or have effects on foreign countries. In those cases, foreign trademark laws may be applied justifiably just as U.S. courts apply U.S. trademark law to foreign infringers, declaring that the conduct of such foreign infringers occurred in the United States in some cases or holding that U.S. trademark law may apply extraterritorially in other cases.

Thus, I argue that in § 1114(2)(D)(v) claims the Lanham Act does not always apply. In other words, there may be some instances in which foreign trademark laws could and should be applied to the conduct of U.S. registrants even in the cases brought under § 1114(2)(D)(v) before U.S. courts.

In most cases where foreign trademark owners assert that U.S. domain name registrants are infringing on their rights in UDRP proceedings or in their own countries’ courts, these foreign trademark owners are alleging that U.S. domain name registrants are violating foreign trademark laws. Therefore, courts adjudicating § 1114(2)(D)(v) claims brought by U.S. domain name registrants first have to address the question of what law should govern the disputed infringement rather than whether the foreign trademark owner has U.S. trademark rights.

If a court concludes that foreign trademark law should govern a case and a U.S. domain name registrant has infringed on the rights of a foreign trademark owner, just as U.S. courts apply the Lanham Act to protect U.S. trademark owners against foreign infringers, the court should dismiss the U.S. domain name registrant’s § 1114(2)(D)(v) claim. This dismissal should occur because the cause of action is that the domain name registrant is not unlawful under the Lanham Act, but it has proven
that the case is not under the Lanham Act. My view is that the language of § 1114(2)(D)(v) does not always require that the decision about whether a U.S. domain name registrant infringes on foreign trademark rights or not be made by looking at whether the foreign trademark owner also has U.S. trademark rights or not. Whether a U.S. domain name registrant may bring a § 1114(2)(D)(v) claim asserting that the Lanham Act should apply to a given case is one thing; whether the domain name registrant's claim really falls within the scope of § 1114(2)(D)(v), where the Lanham Act should apply, is quite another.

I argue that my approach is not inconsistent with the fundamental doctrine of territoriality upon which U.S. trademark law is presently based. If a foreign trademark owner files a counterclaim in a § 1114(2)(D)(v) case as instructed by the Hawes court, the counterclaim will be dismissed as long as the foreign mark owner fails to assert and prove his or her trademark rights under U.S. trademark law. This is the very application of the fundamental doctrine of territoriality upon which U.S. trademark law is based. In my approach, indeed, the foreign trademark owners do not have to file counterclaims in U.S. courts at all because foreign trademark owners who win UDRP proceedings (or foreign suits) may request that the registrar comply with UDRP resolutions or foreign judgments.

Some may argue that whether the Lanham Act or foreign trademark laws should govern a case is not an easy question to decide. Some may also argue that finding and applying foreign law is not so easy. Nevertheless, these problems are not unique only in § 1114(2)(D)(v) claims; rather they reflect typical choice of law questions. U.S. courts have well-established trademark law jurisprudence involving U.S. trademark owners and foreign domain name registrants. Is there any reason not to apply the same standard to cases involving U.S. domain name registrants and foreign trademark owners in deciding whether U.S. domain name registrants violate foreign trademark laws? Does the application of foreign law appear to be so difficult in International Bancorp and Barcelona.com? In this sense, the above-suggested approach may be

120. Paragraph 4(k) of the UDRP provides in relevant part:

If we [the registrar] receive such documentation within the ten (10) business day period, we will not implement the Administrative Panel's decision, and we will take no further action, until we receive (i) evidence satisfactory to us of a resolution between the parties; (ii) evidence satisfactory to us that your lawsuit has been dismissed or withdrawn; or (iii) a copy of an order from such court dismissing your lawsuit or ordering that you do not have the right to continue to use your domain name.

UDRP, supra n. 66, ¶ 4(k).
121. Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit in Barcelona.com added that "apparently even under Spanish law, the City Council could not obtain a trademark interest in a purely
IS THE ACPA A SAFE HAVEN?

roughly referred to as a (restricted) reverse extraterritorial application of foreign trademark law compared to an extraterritorial application of U.S. trademark law established in Steel v. Bulova Watch Co. In deciding whether a foreign trademark law or the Lanham Act applies to a given case, the following elements may be considered: (1) substantial effects of the U.S. domain name registrant's conduct on foreign commerce or the foreign trademark owner's rights; (2) the domain name holder's trademark rights under U.S. trademark law; (3) in some cases, the citizenship of the domain name holder, etc., along with other factors. In addition, some significant U.S. values, such as free speech, should also be considered. In a sense, such an approach requires a "reverse-Steele test." Admittedly, however, the most problematic question may arise in cases where the conduct of U.S. (or, in some cases, foreign) registrants has effects on both U.S. and foreign consumers simultaneously.

This approach also may prevent conflicts between U.S. and foreign judgments effectively. As in Hawes, there may be parallel suits in U.S. and foreign courts. As long as U.S. courts strictly adhere to the current position, conflicts with foreign judgments seem unavoidable. These conflicts occur mainly because foreign trademark owners who are unable to invoke U.S. trademark rights always end up losing cases in U.S. courts under the current interpretation. And the fact that all gTLDs are under the control of the U.S. results in the dominance of U.S. judgments. It is needless to say that those results are extremely unacceptable in this era of global economy. Moreover, the current interpretation of U.S. courts may also be inconsistent with the general principles of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

It should be noted that this new approach has far fewer effects on the traditional and fundamental doctrine of territoriality in the context of international trademark law than does the district court's approach in Barcelona.com, where the district court ruled that foreign trademark owners may bring claims premised on the violation of foreign trademarks under § 1125(d) because the statute's coverage is not limited to violations of U.S. trademarks. Indeed, the doctrine of territoriality is not unique in the United States. Rather, this doctrine is common in the context of international trademark law. As described above, I do not ar-

descriptive geographical designation that refers only to the City of Barcelona. See also Spanish Trademark law of 1988, Art. 11(1)(c) (forbidding registration of marks consisting exclusively of 'geographical origin')." Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 629 (4th Cir. 2003).

122. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).


124. Id. at 373-77.
gue that foreign trademark owners should be allowed to seek protection pursuant to foreign trademark laws in U.S. courts.

With regard to the ruling in *International Bancorp*, above all, it appears to be an anomaly in traditional U.S. trademark law jurisprudence, although I am quite respectful of the *International Bancorp* court's effort to reach a just and fair conclusion. Surely, a foreign trademark owner may counterclaim in a § 1114(2)(D)(v) claim, asserting that his or her mark is protected in the United States because it is used in U.S. commerce. Nonetheless, it is still doubtful that the interpretation of "use in commerce" in *International Bancorp* will prevail in other courts. Furthermore, *International Bancorp* can be said to be also based on the theory that all § 1114(2)(D)(v) claims require the application of the Lanham Act. Therefore, *International Bancorp* cannot be a solution in disputes involving foreign trademark owners who do not have U.S. trademarks at all.

In sum, what I argue is that § 1114(2)(D)(v) should not act as a safe haven for trademark infringers against foreign trademark owners and should not function as an absolute bar to foreign trademark owners who have no U.S. trademark rights. In other words, the applicability of foreign law in reverse domain name hijacking claims should not be completely denied, even though the standards of when and how to apply foreign law in the Internet context have still not been sufficiently established and those cases in which foreign law should be applied may not be very common. The dogma of unilateral application of U.S. trademark law should be overcome at least in reverse domain name hijacking claims.

3. *Forum Non Conveniens*

From the perspective of courts, another possible way to solve the problem of reverse domain name hijacking claims involving foreign factors is the dismissal of a claim on the basis of *forum non conveniens*.125

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125. In *Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp.*, the court noted:

The Fourth Circuit has recently called the territoriality principle into question. . . . The dissent warned that the decision "threatens to wreak havoc over this country's trademark law" because potential trademark registrants "would be forced to scour the globe to determine when and where American citizens had purchased goods and services from foreign subjects to determine whether there were trademarks involved that might be used against them in a priority contest or in an infringement action in the United States." [International Bancorp, LLC v. Societe Des Bains De Mer et du Cercle Des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2003) (cert. denied)], at 388 (Motz, J., dissenting). This Court concurs with McCarthy, 29:4 (2003), who "agrees with the result, but disagrees with the legal analysis." Rather than decide the case on the meaning of "use in commerce," McCarthy argues, "the case should have been analyzed as an application of the 'famous marks' doctrine."


Although most reverse domain name hijacking claims involve UDRP proceedings and thus U.S. courts dealing with the claims have personal jurisdiction over defendants by their consent to jurisdiction, the fact that the court has personal jurisdiction is not a bar to the application of the doctrine. The doctrine of *forum non conveniens*, by definition, applies only if a court has jurisdiction. If the court lacks personal or subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction, not on the ground of *forum non conveniens*. It should be noted that a complainant’s consent to jurisdiction at the time of filing a UDRP proceeding pursuant to the UDRP Rules is “permissive, rather than mandatory, because it does not specify that the court determined pursuant to the UDRP Rules will have exclusive jurisdiction.”  

Thus, the holding in *M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.* that the (mandatory) forum-selection clause should be enforced does not apply to the forum choice pursuant to the UDRP Rules.  

*Forum non conveniens* is a discretionary doctrine that allows a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction if the court determines that there is a more appropriate court to adjudicate the case. The issue of *forum non conveniens* usually comes before the court on a motion by the defendant to dismiss. *Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert* and *Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno* established a formulation of the *forum non conveniens* doctrine and provided a list of factors for courts to consider in exercising their sound discretion. The defendant moving to dismiss, must show that: (1) there is an adequate alternative forum; and (2) relevant public and private factors are in favor of dismissal. The private interest factors include the ease of access to sources of proof; availability of witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if it would be needed; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. Public interest factors include “the administrative difficulties flowing from congestion; the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home; the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law that must govern the action; the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of foreign law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.”

127. Id. (citing N. Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 1995) (“To be mandatory, a clause must contain language that clearly designates a forum as the exclusive one.”)).
129. See McNeil, 33 Fed. Appx. at 324.
132. Piper, 454 U.S. at 241, n.6 (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508).
133. Id. (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 509) (internal quotation omitted).
“At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine whether there exists an alternative forum.” If the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the first step in forum non conveniens analysis will not be satisfied. However, since most domain name hijacking claims involve UDRP proceedings and the registrar of the disputed domain name will not implement the decision of an administrative panel until the claim filed by the registrant is finally resolved, the adequate alternative forum requirement will be met without difficulty as long as the forum proposed by the defendant allows a declaratory judgment and the defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the alternative forum.

Thus, in circumstances where both parties to a reverse domain name hijacking claim are foreign, and U.S. jurisdiction is only based on the defendant’s consent to jurisdiction of a court at the location of a registrar pursuant to the UDRP, and consequently foreign trademark law issues are raised, more often than not the dismissal of the case on the basis of forum non conveniens will be appropriate. "A permissive [i.e., not exclusive] choice of forum does not constitute a concession that the forum selected is convenient, and does not require the party moving to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens to make a heightened showing of inconvenience." Furthermore, “the possibility of an unfavorable change in law should never be a relevant consideration in a forum non conveniens inquiry.” Indeed, a foreign registrant who has no contacts with United States might intentionally have registered his or her domain name with a U.S. registrar only in the hope that the lack of a for-

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134. Id. at 254 n.22.
135. Id. at 254.
136. According to the UDRP, [the registrar] will not implement the Administrative Panel's decision, and [the registrar] will take no further action, until [the registrar] receive[s] (i) evidence satisfactory to [the registrar] of a resolution between the parties; (ii) evidence satisfactory to [the registrar] that [the registrant's] lawsuit has been dismissed or withdrawn; or (iii) a copy of an order from such court dismissing [the registrant's] lawsuit or ordering that [the registrant] do(es) not have the right to continue to use [the] domain name.
137. The defendant moving for forum non conveniens dismissal will probably select a forum where the defendant's trademark is protectable under the forum's law as an adequate alternative forum.
139. Piper, 454 U.S. at 254.
eign trademark owner's U.S. trademark rights would warrant protection of the domain name under the reverse domain name provision of the ACPA despite the domain name's apparent infringement on foreign trademark rights. Such an absurd result, however, is exactly what U.S. courts should avoid. In those cases, the real question is whether the foreign domain name registrant infringes on the foreign trademark owner's rights under applicable foreign law. In this regard, dismissal of the case under the forum non conveniens doctrine may be a possible solution in circumstances where only foreign trademark law issues between foreign parties are involved and a trial of the case in U.S. courts is not appropriate in light of relevant private and public factors.

On the other hand, considering that plaintiff's choice of forum is given great deference in U.S. courts when the chosen forum is the home of the plaintiff, a U.S. court will be reluctant to dismiss a reverse domain name hijacking claim brought by a U.S. registrant against a foreign trademark owner under the forum non conveniens doctrine. In this regard, the doctrine of forum non conveniens also cannot be an alternative to the application of foreign trademark law in reverse domain name hijacking claims.

V. CONCLUSION

In rem jurisdiction in the ACPA regarding foreign registrants is almost futile except in very limited cases, as most cases in U.S. courts can find in personam jurisdiction by examining minimum contacts between the foreign defendants and the forum more carefully. Moreover, these in rem jurisdiction provisions are inconsistent even with other provisions of the ACPA itself. Despite possible—sometimes actual—conflicts with foreign countries, the ACPA has been applied and executed effectively in the present circumstance in which all gTLDs are under U.S. control.

While subjecting to U.S. law and U.S. courts all alleged foreign infringers on the U.S. trademark rights, the ACPA fails to give the same amount of protection to foreign trademark rights infringed by U.S. registrants in U.S. courts. The ACPA might even frustrate execution of the foreign judgments decided in favor of foreign trademark owners for the sake of U.S. registrants.

From a practical point of view, this problem cannot be resolved appropriately by foreign courts due to the ultimate control of gTLDs by the United States. Even though the ACPA might have intended to protect U.S. trademark owners via in rem jurisdiction and the unilateral application of the Lanham Act, ironically enough, the ACPA would bring

140. See Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947) (“In any balancing of conveniences, a real showing of convenience by a plaintiff who has sued in his home forum will normally outweigh the inconvenience the defendant may have shown.”).
about a fundamental challenge to, and precipitate rethinking of, the traditional unilateral U.S. trademark law jurisprudence in the international trademark law context.