COMPARING APPLES AND ORANGES IN TRADEMARK LAW: CHALLENGING THE INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF PLAIN PACKAGING OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS

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ABSTRACT

Plain packaging, a new tobacco control tool being considered by a growing number of countries, mandates the removal of all attractive and promotional aspects of tobacco product packages. As a result of plain packaging, the only authorized feature remaining on a tobacco package is the brand name, displayed in a standardized font, size, color, and location on the package. At issue is the meaning of “use” of trademarks on plain packaging, and whether plain packaging amounts to the creation of an invalid encumbrance. The tobacco industry and other regulated sectors (including wine, fast-food, and pharmaceuticals) also believe that plain packaging jeopardizes trademark rights and contravenes certain Constitutional provisions. In particular, they argue that governments do, and are, in fact, capable of “acquiring,” property, or that governments could be construed as “taking” property on unjust terms, contrary to Constitutional guarantees. The tobacco industry’s efforts to fight plain packaging in the courts have, however, proven futile thus far—particularly in Australia.

This article, after introducing the reader to the dawn and rationale of plain packaging from a quasi-legal and marketing perspective, examines the compatibility of normative arguments for plain packaging within the international framework for trademark protection (as preserved in the TRIPS Agreement). It then looks at the way in which these arguments and that framework have shaped the constitutional validity of plain packaging of tobacco products in the United States and Australia.

In drawing on these jurisdictions that, alongside the European Union, incorporate rather aggressive tobacco control legislation, this paper highlights the nuanced geographic and legal contexts that complicate global regulatory control, which play an important role in advancing global public health in the face of trade-related objections. Finally, this paper proposes methods for dealing with current legal challenges to global tobacco control regulations and suggests that there are strong arguments to deny private entities that seek to establish a successful case by purporting to invalidate plain packaging legislation.

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INTRODUCTION

Once upon a time, a packet of cigarettes came with a glitzy logo, rich foil sleeves, and romantic language describing the pleasures within. But ever since it was scientifically proven that smoking harms your health, legislators around the world have tried to curb cigarette marketing on the grounds of public health. 1 Tobacco manufacturers, on the contrary, try to undermine this activity.

The newest trend in tobacco control policy is a concept known as “plain packaging,” a mandatory standardized package with a certain appearance containing large health warnings. 2 The use of items such as trademarks and logos is not allowed. 3 Canada was the first country to try to introduce plain packaging in 1994; that effort failed primarily due to concerns regarding the trademark rights of the tobacco manufacturers—not to mention violations of international obligations. 4

* © Sarah A. Hinchliffe 2013. Harvard University (Visiting Scholar, Harvard Law School); Boston University (Visiting Scholar, School of Law); University of Melbourne (Fellow and Specialist (Teaching), Department of Accounting); Barrister and Solicitor of the High Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of Victoria. For their insightful comments, the author thanks academic members of the Harvard Law School, including Professor Michael Stein and Professor William Alford; academic members of the Boston University School of Law, including Professor Michael Meurer; academic members of the William S. Boyd School of Law, including Professor Mary LaFrance, and Professor Marketa Trimble; and Professor Mark Davison whose insight and opinions are acknowledged in this article.

1 See Michael Siegel et al., Preemption in Tobacco Control, Review of an Emerging Public Health Problem, 278 JAMA 858, 858 (1997) (documenting the “effort to reduce morbidity and mortality caused by tobacco products”); Jonathan Nadel et al., Disparities in Global Tobacco Harm Reduction, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2120, 2120 (2005) (comparing the “rigorous tobacco control measures” in the United States with varying efforts by different Asian countries); Lawrence O. Gostin, Global Regulatory Strategies for Tobacco Control, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2057, 2057 (2007) (commenting on regulatory efforts to curb tobacco use in North America and Western Europe).

2 Look What They’ve Done to my Brands: Cigarette-Makers Will Weather the Spread of Plain Packaging Laws, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2012, available at http://www.economist.com/news/business/21566682-cigarette-makers-will-weather-spread-plain-packaging-laws-look-what-theyve-done-my/print. It is to be noted that tobacco control comprises numerous facets. In this regard, “plain packaging” is to be distinguished from requirements (albeit statutory) to place certain health warnings on tobacco products. While both may raise issues of commercial freedoms imposed on tobacco companies, the former (and indeed the focus in this article) may be described as imposing a narrower restriction.

3 Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) s 20 (Austl.) [hereinafter TPPA 2011].

4 PHYSICIANS FOR SMOKE-FREE CAN., THE PLOT AGAINST PLAIN PACKAGING 2, 35–37 (2008), available at http://www.smoke-free.ca/pdf_1/plotagainplainpackaging-apr1%27.pdf. At present, there have been numerous complaints submitted to the World Trade Organization concerning the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act. See WTO Dispute Settlement Summary, Australia—Certain
The plain packaging efforts in Australia is more successful. Much to the dismay of tobacco manufacturers and related entities, cigarette packaging in Australia is not pretty: brand names must be printed in a uniform font on a dull, olive-brown background, with large, graphic images of gangrenous limbs and diseased internal organs. The High Court of Australia recently upheld the Plain Packaging Act, creating a globally significant legal precedent that supports plain packaging from a constitutional law perspective and that recognizes the nature of intellectual property rights.

While most doctrinal contributions on the subject of tobacco plain packaging have focused on the complex interplay between tobacco control and trade and the linkage between tobacco control and investment treaty guarantees, there has been little written on the intersection of public rights and private property rights under Constitutional mandates and international treaties.

This article considers the approaches to plain packaging legislation in two distinct, but relatively active jurisdictions with respect to health policy, Australia

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and the United States. It seeks to clarify the prevalence of conceded arguments that adequately challenge the normative, constitutional, and legal validity of legislation introducing plain packaging laws. Part I introduces normative themes, including the prevalence of property-rights’ recognition and an economic rights perspective with respect to trademark law. It is argued that this, in turn, precipitates legal arguments both in support of and against plain packaging of tobacco products. Part II then outlines the state of international law, including the quashing of imposts under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the Paris Convention. In so outlining, this paper emphasizes the need for governments and policy makers to understand the meaning, context, and scope of “use,” particularly in the context of trademark law, prior to drafting legislation that purports to limit, place, displace, or create certain statutory obligations on manufacturers and retailers with respect to plain packaging. Part III analyzes the premise and validity, both from a legal and normative perspective, of plain packaging laws as purporting to fall within constitutional mandates and within the scope of international law and obligations outlined in Part II. Additionally, this portion of the paper identifies the rift between domestic, i.e., constitutional mandates, and international obligations that have impacted, and no doubt will continue to impact, the successful implementation of plain packaging legislation. Australia and the United States, alongside Canada and the European Union, have been active, particularly within the last decade, in seeking to introduce tobacco control measures and demonstrate this fissure nicely.

Despite their international obligations, governments still maintain a certain level of discretion, albeit as signatories to or members of international obligations or Agreements, such as those outlined in Part II, in their ability to “modify,” “impede,” or, to a degree, “create” certain “rights,” obligations, or both, in legislation. However, such discretion is cabined by certain constitutional rights and requirements, as well as core objectives of a particular legal regime. In relation to the latter, the trademark regime encompasses a property-right dichotomy between private-rights, i.e., the registrant is the “owner” of a trademark, and public-rights, i.e., the trademark belongs to a broader class of persons or society in general. If normative factors in an intellectual property context are viewed widely, then it would be easier for governments to present a successful case, at least in part, for plain packaging legislation. Finally, Part IV outlines some recommendations for policy change, both on an international and domestic level, that seek to put to rest discrepancies forming the basis of a challenge to plain packaging legislation.

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10 See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1627 n.136 (2007) (noting that the interpretation of “use” is important to understand the meaning of “acquisition” of a trademark by a government).
The findings in this paper have significant bearing for policy makers from an international and domestic perspective, for marketing strategies, and for future legislative reform.

I. PLAIN PACKAGING IN A NORMATIVE CONTEXT

“Plain packaging,” also referred to as “generic packaging,” has been described as a novel tobacco control policy tool. It requires the detachment or exclusion of trademarks, graphics, and logos from tobacco packaging, e.g., cigarette packs, other than the brand name itself, which is displayed with simple unadorned text, i.e., standard font size, color, and location on the package.

The packaging does not contain color, other than a dull olive-brown, and includes only the content and consumer information, such as toxic constituents and health warnings, required by law. In essence, plain packaging aims at standardizing the appearance of all cigarette boxes in order to decrease their appeal, especially to adolescents, thus reducing the prevalence and up-take of smoking.

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11 See generally Becky Freeman et al., The Case for the Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products TOBACCO CONTROL 17 (2007), available at http://escholarship.org/item/4rz0m70k ("Plain packaging legislation remains an important but curiously under-explored part of comprehensive tobacco control legislation designed to eliminate all forms of tobacco advertising and promotion.").


While there is merit in the advancement of health policy and legal reform with respect to tobacco products, there exists an array of legal issues surrounding the legal validity of plain packaging, including whether:

- Plain packaging legislation violates certain constitutional rights in Australia and the United States; and
- Governments should be able to acquire certain intellectual property rights.

Prior to the legal analysis of “use” of proprietary rights, something this article suggests is relatively settled—particularly as outlined in Articles 6, 8, and 20 of the TRIPS Agreement and the validity of constitutional rights arguments raised by tobacco companies regarding a “disposition,” “taking,” or “acquisition” of property rights—there are some broader normative matters to consider, such as:

- That justification for trademark protection now incorporates public interest regulation, but the degree to which this is invoked may vary; and
- Whether these factors have diminished or could, from a property-rights analysis, diminish trademark protection generally.

Viewed together, the considerations set forth above firmly engrain the validity of plain packaging legislation in the jurisdictions under consideration in this article, Australia and the United States, and could extend to other jurisdictions, such as Canada and the European Union. Going forward, therefore, there may be little scope for tobacco companies to successfully challenge such legislation, whether that be based on TRIPS, obligations under the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), or constitutional considerations.

To understand the breadth of legal issues at both an international level, i.e., WTO and the TRIPS, and domestic level, i.e., acquisition and use of proprietary rights in the context of intellectual property law, constitutional law, consumer protection law, and health law level, the importance of central, normative themes concerning marketing, property rights, and economics rights analysis must first be noted.

Memorandum/Text [hereinafter TPPB Memorandum] (explaining that the Plain Packaging Act aims to reduce the attractiveness and appeal of tobacco products to consumers and young people).

15 See infra Parts III.A & III.C.
16 See infra Parts III.A & III.B.
17 Lawrence O. Gostin, A Theory and Definition of Public Health Law, in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 6 (2d ed. 2008). “Public health law is the study of the legal powers and duties of the state . . . to ensure the conditions for people to be healthy . . . and of the limitations on the power of the state to constrain the autonomy . . . proprietary, and other legally protected interests of individuals.” Id. at 4.
A. Normative Themes in the Trademark Regime

It may be a common belief that tobacco companies, or trademark registrants generally, have an exclusive entitlement to such proprietary rights. This is not entirely true, depending, of course, on the way this statement is viewed.

Broadly speaking, a business enterprise has two basic functions: marketing and innovation. These functions guide the underlying desire of an enterprise to make a fiscal profit in the process of supplying to customers. Intellectual property plays a role in both of these functions, and trademarks specifically are of primary importance in the marketing process. Every product in the market faces competing products at various marginal rates of substitution. Most economic markets are based at least on an implicit right to differentiate a product and to promote a brand name. If this were not the case, then all markets would become perfectly competitive, and all companies and products would become standardized. With such standardization, consumers would not have the opportunity to make product or market price choices. From an economic perspective, there would be reduced incentive for innovation, enhancement, research, and development.

There is no doubt that meeting or exceeding customers’ expectations is a challenging task, especially when tastes and preferences continuously evolve in a competitive marketplace, with many similar products catering to the same needs. Only businesses rising to these challenges can expect to develop and retain a loyal clientele. Enterprises achieve this loyalty mostly through a distinctive trade name and one or more trademarks. Strong brands and successful branding, for example, through distinct imagery, identification, and reputation, may be validated through contributions to market share, sales, enhanced goodwill, profit margins, loyalty, and market awareness.

The tobacco industry is deeply entrenched; individual enterprises have invested heavily in product differentiation, primarily through marketing pursuits. In recent times, the wrath of governments’ regulatory discretion in the context of tobacco has had some far-reaching consequences for tobacco enterprises. For example, many jurisdictions now require that health warnings and safety and information standards be affixed to tobacco products. For each of these jurisdictions, the goal is to improve

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19 See infra notes Error! Bookmark not defined. & Error! Bookmark not defined. (defining “economic rights” and “economic perspectives”).

20 The Role of Trademarks in Marketing, WIPO MAG., Feb. 2002, at 10 [hereinafter WIPO MAG. 2002]. Broadly speaking, “distinctiveness” means that the sign is capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from the goods or services of another undertaking. See TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 15 (identifying “distinctiveness” as a requirement for trademark protection).


22 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 104550 (West 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1502 (West 1977); Federal Regulation of Tobacco: A Summary, TOBACCO CONT. LEGAL CONSORTIUM, July 2009, at 5.
public health by discouraging people from taking up smoking, encouraging people to give up smoking, discouraging people from relapsing if they have given up smoking, and reducing people’s exposure to smoke from tobacco products.\(^{23}\)

When it comes to “plain packaging,” government and policy motivations are likewise clear; this extreme measure is justified by appealing to consumer protection and the advancement of health.\(^{24}\) It is not necessarily a question of impacting excise or taxes, because the fiscal implications remain unchanged; instead, it may be weighted in favor of health policy and concerns.\(^{25}\) When a State adopts a law or regulation that diminishes a trademark’s value, the trademark holder bears the burden to show that the regulation has the effect of causing consumers to switch to competing goods or services.\(^{26}\)

This burden corresponds to one of the purposes of trademark law, allowing firms to distinguish their products from other firms’ products.\(^{27}\) Unlike copyright and patent law, which are justified in substantial part by the perceived value of securing reasonable and limited incentives for creators and inventors,\(^{28}\) trademark law offers

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\(^{23}\) See Explanatory Memorandum, *Competition and Consumer Act 2010* (Cth) 4 (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2011L02766/Explanatory%20Statement/Text [hereinafter *CCA Memorandum*]; *TPPB Memorandum*, supra note 14. While there are a number of methods that have been introduced to control tobacco advertising, this article focuses on the legal responses to plain packaging of tobacco products.

\(^{24}\) See generally Oliver R. Mitchell, *Unfair Competition*, 10 *Harv. L. Rev.* 275, 275 (1896). Whilst beyond the scope of this article, legislative and policy measures can be seen to have shifted the ownership of health concerns to the private sphere of tobacco companies. See generally Walter J. Jones & Gerard A. Silvestri, *The Master Settlement Agreement and Its Impact on Tobacco Use 10 Years Later*, 137 *Chest* 692, 692 (2010) (discussing the Master Settlement Agreement in 1998 in which mass litigation was dropped on the proviso that tobacco companies agreed to pay billions of dollars over a 25 year period towards the costs of healthcare for smoking related diseases).

\(^{25}\) Thus we can note several normative aspects in health policy developments in this example, namely that there was a growing societal recognition of harm, that action against tobacco companies was incrementally acceptable, that cigarette packets and the contents of the messages on them were seen as important by the tobacco companies and, perhaps most significantly, that when the arguments were shifted from the companies versus individuals to the companies versus society in the form of the government, the legal argument was won. See Valentina S. Vadi, *Global Health Governance at a Crossroads: Trademark Protection v. Tobacco Control in International Investment Law*, 48 *St. John’s Int’l. L. J.* 93, 94–95 (2012); *CCA Memorandum*, supra note 23; *TPPB Memorandum*, supra note 14.


\(^{27}\) Bloch & McEwen, supra note 26, at 227.

\(^{28}\) U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8 cl. 8. In the United States, at least, patent and copyright rights derive from the “Progress Clause” of the Constitution, and exist to create incentives for “promot[ing] Progress.” *Id.* Trademark law, on the other hand, falls under the “Commerce Clause” of the Constitution and is really about protecting consumers from confusion and harm (such as believing a
incentives for businesses to invest in the quality and uniqueness of their goods and to denote quality through combinations of words, colors, signs, shapes, and other distinguishing marks.\textsuperscript{29} Like other intellectual property rights, however, trademarks embody an intrinsic dichotomy between private and public interests. In the case of trademarks, the purported social goal, or “public interest,” is the reduction of consumers’ information costs.\textsuperscript{30} These interests often go hand in hand, i.e. high quality products build the producer’s reputation and reduce the difficulty of consumers’ choices. But in some contexts, these goals diverge. In fact, the object of trademark protection presents a dichotomy between property rights and other external values such as free speech, competition, and public health.\textsuperscript{31}

Trademark law protects distinguishing symbols, images, and logos because consumers benefit from having an inexpensive way to inform themselves about the source of goods and services.\textsuperscript{32} When manufacturers successfully associate their products with desirable qualities and prices in the minds of consumers, they reduce
consumers’ costs of deciding which types or brands of products to purchase in the
future.\textsuperscript{33} The basic motivation of trademark law is to protect an entity’s mutually
beneficial relationship with the consumer by prohibiting one economic competitor’s
encroachment on investments in product distinction made by another.\textsuperscript{34} As one
scholar said:

[An] authority would be able to rebut a trademark holder’s initial showing
by proving the regulation’s informational benefit to consumers. These
burdens correspond to both the origin of trademark as a state-granted
privilege and the state’s power to inform and protect consumers. A
trademark holder may, however, be able to show that a proposed regulation
should be prohibited because it is unjustifiably discriminatory, and the
state may be able to show that for some product categories, such as
digestible goods, it is under no obligation to pay compensation. The close
relationship between the latter form of goods and human health entitles the
state to partially or wholly prohibit the use of a trademark.

[Certain] normative implications surround the regulation of trademarks.
Some scholars and advocates argue that the state should enjoy wide
flexibility to regulate, restrict, or prohibit trademarks when their
underlying or suggested messages may mislead consumers, especially with
regard to product risks. These arguments arise from the state’s essential
role of ensuring fundamental constitutional or human rights in health,
safety, and information. In contrast, trademark holders, which invest vast
sums of money to create an independent value in the minds of consumers,
argue that their entire investment deserves protection for the benefit of
both firms and consumers.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{33} See, e.g., FRANCIS H. UPTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS 16 (W.C. Little
1860). Foreshadowing contemporary economic justifications of trademark protection, Upton noted
that a trademark is:

the means, and in many instances, the only means, by which [manufacturers] are
enabled to inspire and retain public confidence in the quality and integrity of the
things made and sold—and thereby secure for them a permanent and reliable
demand—which is the life of manufacturing and mercantile operations. And it is
also . . . the only means, by which the public is protected against the frauds and
impositions of the crafty and designing.

\textsuperscript{34} See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE, TRADEMARK LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 7 (2007), available at
http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/papers/EJWP0207.pdf.

\textsuperscript{35} Halabi, supra note 26, at 333–34. See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley,
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 783 (describing
concerns about the effect of particular rights on consumers and competitors, and on the
competitiveness of the marketplace as a whole, as the “core values of trademark law”). See also
ECON. 265, 265–66 (1987) (“Our overall conclusion is that trademark law . . . can best be explained
on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic efficiency.”). Posner, then, might view...
This is not to say that trademark law should solely be used to protect consumers; this was not its traditional intention.\textsuperscript{36} “Instead, trademark law, like all unfair competition law, [seeks] to protect producers from illegitimate diversions of their trade by competitors.”\textsuperscript{37} Revisiting trademark principles in the context of plain packaging is important because this new regulatory technique calls into question much of the dominant account of modern trademark law in a manner contemplated by the framers of the TRIPS Agreement.\textsuperscript{38} “Specifically, reading traditional trademark decisions in their proper historical and philosophical context shows that trademark law was never focused primarily on consumer interests.”\textsuperscript{39} In recent times in particular, the position taken by Australia—not to mention the WTO—with respect to tobacco plain packaging laws, appears to seek an alignment between the recognition of property rights in trademarks and traditional trademark law in order to improve the quality of information in the marketplace.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{36} McKenna, \textit{supra} note 30, at 1844.

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Id.} at 1841; accord Mitchell, \textit{supra} note 24, at 275.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2} (2001) at ¶¶ 4–5 [hereinafter TRIPS Declaration]. It states:

\begin{quote}
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health . . . . In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose . . . . In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles.
\end{quote}

\textit{Id.; see also WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Jan. 1, 1995, ¶ 6} [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. The agreement states that,

\begin{quote}
[under WTO rules,] no country should be prevented from taking measures . . . .for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, or . . . .of the environment . . . . at the levels it considers appropriate, subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with the provisions of [the WTO] Agreement.
\end{quote}

\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{39} McKenna, \textit{supra} note 30, at 1841.

\textsuperscript{40} See CCA Memorandum, \textit{supra} note 23.
This article snips the normative strength of criticisms of modern trademark law, which focus on the law’s deviation from its supposed foundational, and primary, purpose of improving the quality of information in the marketplace. This is particularly apparent with respect to legislation and statutory provisions discussed in this article. It should be noted that while modern trademark law deserves sustained scrutiny, any criticisms leveled against it should fairly convene modern policy goals. Further, such criticisms should not draw their normative force by contrasting modern doctrines with “traditional” principles that did not actually exist.

After introducing the genesis and rationale of plain packaging, the focus of this article will shift to the legal status of this tobacco control tool under the international system for trademark protection as enshrined in the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris Convention, as well as under domestic laws.

II. INTERNATIONAL SPHERE

A number of politicians and commentators seek to justify the expulsion of plain packaging legislation based on a number of Articles in the Paris Convention and TRIPS Agreement, including Articles 2, 6, 7, 8, 15, 17, and 20. As will be explained, however, these concerns should be put to rest.

In one recent report, Professor Daniel Gervais of Vanderbilt University Law School states that regulatory measures mandating plain packaging of tobacco products, i.e., cigarettes, could be contrary to the TRIPS Agreement. Gervais repeatedly emphasizes that he is not addressing normative questions or any specific government measure, although he does mention the Australian and certain other proposals. Id. at 8–11. Gervais repeatedly emphasizes that he is not addressing normative questions or any specific government measure, although he does mention the Australian and certain other proposals. Id. at 5; see also BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO AUSTRALIA, SUBMISSION ON THE TOBACCO PLAIN PACKAGING BILL 8–9 (2011).
concludes that “[t]o the extent that the WTO Member [such as Australia] cannot satisfy the burden of showing that . . . plain packaging . . . will achieve its legitimate public policy objectives, the measure can be expected to be found incompatible with TRIPS.”

In another report, Lalive expresses the opinion that plain packaging is “in clear breach . . . of WTO members’ international obligation to protect valid intellectual property rights.” These views are, however, not entirely accurate.

Because recent scholarship has comprehensively analyzed these reports, this paper does not seek to dissect them into their various constituents; instead it aims to highlight two key issues that may challenge the validity of plain packaging legislation:

- Whether the Paris Convention or the TRIPS Agreement confers on trademark owners a right to use their trademarks; and
- What the meaning and scope is of the phrase “encumbered by special requirements” as it appears in Article 20 of TRIPS.

This paper does not, however, discuss the “in the course of trade” language of Article 20 because tobacco sales and provision may fall outside of the course of trade. Advocates seeking to utilize this provision, either alone or in combination, should reconsider that thought.

A. Trademark “Use”

As a starting point, members of the WTO and parties to the Paris Convention are obliged, pursuant to TRIPS Article 2.1, to comply with the Paris Convention as a matter of international law with respect to other Paris Convention parties. Such parties and members are also obliged to comply with the Paris Convention provisions incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement. Article 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that “[i]n respect of Parts II, III and IV of [the TRIPS Agreement], [WTO] Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention (1967).”

TRIPS Article 2.2 continues that “[n]othing in Parts I to IV of [the TRIPS Agreement] shall derogate from existing obligations that Members may have to each other under the Paris Convention” or certain other treaties. It should be noted that neither the Paris Convention nor the TRIPS Agreement directly confers on

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Both Gervais and Lalive argue that Article 20 is breached, which may be somewhat more arguable, but remains an erroneous path. See Lalive Report, infra note 46, at 2.

47 See infra Parts III.B & III.C.
48 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 2.1.
49 Id. art. 2.1.
50 Id. art. 2.2.
trademark owners a right to use their trademarks. Instead, the right may be described as “implied,” particularly due to (1) the absence of an express right to use a trademark in the Paris Convention; (2) the presence of strict obligations to register some trademarks in some circumstances; and (3) the alleged futility of requiring registration without also requiring use. The obligation flows from Article 6 quinquies (A), which reads:

(1) Every trademark duly registered in the country of origin shall be accepted for filing and protected as is in the other countries of the Union, subject to the reservations indicated in this Article.

Article 6 quinquies (B) of the Paris Convention, a provision which is incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement pursuant to TRIPS Article 2.1, provides:

Trademarks covered by this Article may be neither denied registration nor invalidated except in the following cases:

(i) when they are of such a nature as to infringe rights acquired by third parties in the country where protection is claimed;

(ii) when they are devoid of any distinctive character, or consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, place of origin, of the goods, or the time of production, or have become customary in the current language or in the bona fide and established practices of the trade of the country where protection is claimed;

(iii) when they are contrary to morality or public order and, in particular, of such a nature as to deceive the public.

Generally speaking, a tobacco trademark would not fall under the first or second paragraphs of Article 6 quinquies (B). The third paragraph could be utilized to restrict certain deceptive trademarks, including use of the words “light” or “mild” in connection with cigarettes in a manner that is likely to deceive the consumer into believing that those cigarettes are healthier than any others.

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51 LALIVE REPORT, supra note 46, at 7.
52 See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 8 art. 16 (conferring on mark holders a right to prevent third parties from using a registered trademark, but not a right to use the trademark). The exceptions to the right conferred by Article 16 are irrelevant, and need not be discussed in this paper.
53 Paris Convention, supra note 9, art. 6 quinquies (A).
54 Id. art. 6 quinquies (B).
55 See id.; LALIVE REPORT, supra note 46, at 5.
56 See GERVAIS REPORT, supra note 44, at 20 (“This Article . . . concerns the mark, not the product . . . so [it] could not provide a justification for restricting tobacco trademarks generally.”) (emphasis in original).
Nor is Article 6 \textit{quinquies} (B) directed towards the use of trademarks,\footnote{Mark Davison, \textit{The Legitimacy of Plain Packaging Under International Intellectual Property Law: Why There is no Right to Use a Trademark Under Either the Paris Convention or the TRIPS Agreement}, in \textit{PUBLIC HEALTH AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF CIGARETTES: LEGAL ISSUES} (Edward Elgar 2012) (manuscript at 10), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2009115. He states that: While numerous countries have a right to use a trademark incorporated into their domestic legislation, the difference between that right and a right implied into an international treaty is that the former can be varied, modified, qualified and eliminated at the legislative will of the government. For example, the Australian legislation states that a trademark owner has the right to use their trademark, but nobody seriously quibbles with the proposition that legislation banning the use of tobacco advertising and, therefore, the use of tobacco trademarks in such advertising is a permitted derogation from that right. . . . No such approach can be taken if Australia has an international obligation under the Paris Convention to provide a right of use. \textit{Id.} at 7. Davison also agrees with Gervais that the exception for Article 17 is inapplicable. \textit{Id.} at 10.} but rather towards their registration and validity.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 10.} This is the right saved by Article 24.5, which provides that certain measures “shall not prejudice . . . the right to use a trademark.”\footnote{\textit{Invalidation} refers to the cancellation of a trademark following registration. \textit{Compare LALIVE REPORT, supra note 46, at 5 (maintaining that plain packaging entails a violation of Article 6 \textit{quinquies} (B)), with GERVAILS REPORT, supra note 44, at 22 (explaining that such a violation is likely to arise “if plain packaging measures were to lead to a denial of registration of trademarks because they are associated with tobacco products”).} Importantly, plain packaging does not prevent the registration of new trademarks or require the invalidation of any registered trademarks.\footnote{\textit{TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 24.5.}} So, while Article 6 \textit{quinquies} (B) may not provide a justification for plain packaging, it does not preclude plain packaging.\footnote{\textit{TPPA 2011, supra note 3, s 29. Indeed, the Australian legislation explicitly prevents the Registrar of Trade Marks from refusing to register or revoking the registration of a trademark on the grounds that plain packaging requirements prevent the mark from being used or from distinguishing the relevant product. \textit{Id.} ss 28(2)–(3).} 

At the same time, there is a noteworthy conflict between Article 6(1), which provides that the conditions for filing and registration of trademarks are a matter for the domestic legislation of each country of the Union,\footnote{\textit{Paris Convention, supra note 9, art. 6.}} and Article 6 \textit{quinquies}, which requires acceptance for filing and protection in some circumstances.\footnote{\textit{Id.} art. 6 \textit{quinquies}.} This conflict between the provisions in the Paris Convention has been the subject of formal adjudication at the WTO. Notably, “the Paris Convention regime, which is directed exclusively at the issue of registration and not use, is [quite] liberal in terms of the grounds upon which registration may be denied.”\footnote{Davison, \textit{supra} note 57, at 6 (emphasis added).} Viewed another way, the registration requirements of the Paris Convention are relatively loose.\footnote{See \textit{id.}}
“Consequently, the oblique but constant references to either a right to use *that flows from* registration or a right to use *in order to obtain* registration lose much of their force because the obligation to register” may be quite limited.\(^{66}\) In turn, this could mean that establishing a breach of the Convention where use is decoupled from registration is relatively difficult to determine.\(^{67}\) Further, one might argue that because “there is considerable scope under the Paris Convention to refuse registration, there is necessarily an even greater scope to refuse usage.”\(^{68}\) As noted by commentators, it is clear that the “spirit” of the Paris Convention varies between Member Nations.\(^{69}\) The grounds upon which these countries may refuse registration, let alone *prevent the use* of trademarks whether registered or not, vary accordingly.\(^{70}\)

The boundaries of exceptions to the right of use are thus unclear.\(^{71}\) In particular, is there merely a right to *some* use of the trademark in certain circumstances? If so, would plain packaging legislation satisfy this through authorizing the use of trademarks in a context other than retail? It is important to note that there are no express exceptions in the Paris Convention to a right to use a trademark, as Davison recognizes, probably because there is no need to create exceptions to a non-existent right.\(^{72}\) “There are some references to exceptions to the rights of trademark owners in Article 17 of the TRIPS Agreement and to justifiable limits on the use of trademarks in particular circumstances in Article 20[,”]\(^{73}\) a full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper.  “In any event, Article 17 is an exception to a right [conferred by Article 16] to prevent third parties from using one’s trademark, not an exception to a right to use a trademark.”\(^{74}\) Primarily, for that reason, it remains irrelevant.\(^{75}\)

While numerous countries have a right to use a trademark incorporated into their domestic legislation, the difference between that right and a right implied into

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\(^{66}\) Id. (emphasis added).

\(^{67}\) Id.; see also, e.g., TPPA 2011, *supra* note 3, s 28 (indicating that this Bill does not prevent registration of any trademarks for tobacco products). Section 28 specifically provides that the absence of an intention on the part of a trademark applicant to use the trademark because of the legislation does not disqualify that applicant from obtaining registration. Id. This is considerably looser than has been claimed by tobacco advocates.

\(^{68}\) See Davison, *supra* note 57, at 6. Member Nations specifically rejected a proposal to include a right to use a trademark at the 1956 Lisbon Conference and, to this day, there is still no express right to use in the Paris Convention. *Id.* at 4.

\(^{69}\) *Id.* at 6.

\(^{70}\) (“The ‘spirit’ of the Paris Convention is quite clearly to be very deferential... to the right of Member Nations to prevent the use of trademarks, whether registered or not.”); see also TRIPS, *supra* note 8, art. 15.4 (regarding the registration of trademarks and reproducing Article 7 of the Paris Convention).

\(^{71}\) See Davison, *supra* note 57, at 7.

\(^{72}\) *Id.* if there was an implied right to use a trademark, in the absent of express exceptions to this right, they too would either simply not exist or would have to be implied. *Id.* This would require that defining the right to use becomes the critical factor, including the full nature and scope of that right. *Id.*

\(^{73}\) *Id.* at 8.

\(^{74}\) Davison, *supra* note 57, at 8. (“However, impliedly importing provisions from the much later TRIPS Agreement is hardly a means of interpreting the Paris Convention.”).

\(^{75}\) *Id.* at 8, 10 (“Some tobacco advocates insist that plain packaging legislation does not come within those exceptions[,] which tend[s] to obfuscate the point that it does not matter.”).
an international treaty is that the former can be varied, modified, qualified, and eliminated at the legislative will of the government. At the same time, the relationship between the right to use under Article 6 quinquies and the obligation to register a trademark in some circumstances, coupled with preventing the denial of registration under Article 7 because of the nature of the goods, creates its own difficulties. While WTO members, for example, may ban certain products, the combination of these Articles may endorse the prohibition of banning certain products, e.g., alcohol, fireworks, tobacco.

If, however, the use of a trademark is prohibited, then what is the underlying rationale or purpose to register a trademark? There exist at least two premises recognized by Davison. First, manufacturers may still seek to preserve the registration of a trademark to facilitate their place in an international trade environment. Second, where governments are indecisive about plain packaging legislation in the pursuit of policy objectives that prevent usage in a manner that is “contrary to . . . national interest[s],” Article 5 of the Paris Convention, dealing with cancellation for non-use, may be invoked by trademark registrants to preserve their rights. The aforementioned position, in particular, is complemented nicely by Article 19.1, which recognizes its focus on preventing cancellation of registration on the basis of non-use.

Article 19.1 indicates that (i) the TRIPS Agreement itself does not require use to maintain registration, rather, this is left to domestic regulatory systems, and (ii) even if a Member conditions the maintenance of registration on use, the Member must accept government requirements as valid reasons justifying non-use.

The only significant argument under TRIPS with respect to plain packaging of cigarettes concerns a rather intricate provision, Article 20. One poignant aspect of this Article is its ability to interact with a number of other articles, including Article 8, which relates to public health considerations. This is particularly helpful in
elucidating the interplay between private-rights and public-rights previously raised. An argument may be made, in this respect, that such interactions support wide discretionary powers of governments to introduce plain packing legislation, as long as health policy and constitutional mandates are permitting.

Viewed in isolation, however, it would appear that restrictions on the manner in which certain trademarks, i.e., word marks, can appear on tobacco packaging would fall within the meaning of Article 20, particularly the phrase “encumb[rence] by special requirements.” Notably, while domestic legislation governing plain packaging would permit word trademarks to be used, the manner, as noted by Davison, in which they may be used could amount to the creation of an “encumbrance,” which would constitute an implied right to use a trademark. The implication of a right to use a trademark under Article 20 necessarily flows from defining an encumbrance as including a total prohibition on use. If a total prohibition on use of trademark is an encumbrance within the meaning of Article 20, then the prohibition of the sale of goods for which trademarks currently exist comes within its operation. Therefore, the prohibition on the sale of the goods would have to be justified. The meaning of “encumbered by special requirements” for the purposes of Article 20 of TRIPS does not include a partial or total prohibition on the use of a trademark. This interpretation is consistent with, and required by, a view that there is no implied right to use a trademark conferred by Article 20. It is also

85 See Davison, supra note 57, at 9.
86 See id. Davison states:

Trademark usage is but one of multiple factors that governments consider in making policy decisions. It is difficult to accept that governments would compromise their ability to protect public health and to pursue other valid policy objectives via the oblique and imprecise means of conferring an implied right to use trademarks without so much as a suggestion as to how to limit that right or how to create exceptions to it. Id.

87 See id. at 10–11. A trademark may also be “a non-word trademark, which includes artistic works such as logos, figurative or stylised marks, shape marks and colour marks. The use of these non-word trademarks is prohibited by the plain packaging legislation at the retail level, as only word trademarks may be used on tobacco packaging.” Id. at 11.
88 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 20. Note, however, that a primary objective of Article 20 is “to prevent governments requiring trademark owners to take positive action that would diminish the distinctiveness of their own trademarks.” Davison, supra note 57, at 13. This is not the same as the ability of governments to confer a right to use trademarks. Id.
89 Davison, supra note 57, at 15–16; see also GERVAIS REPORT, supra note 44, at 12.
90 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 20; see also Davison, supra note 57, at 11 (“[T]he four examples of special requirements given by Article 20 generate an ejusdem generis in which ‘special requirements’ constituting the encumbrance are requirements relating to actual use, not partial or total prohibition of use.”).
91 See Davison, supra note 57, at 11–12.
92 Id. at 12. (stating that the need for justification “is only strengthened by Article 7 of the Paris Convention, which is incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by TRIPS Articles 2 and 15(4)”).
93 Davison, supra note 57, at 12.
consistent with, and an integral part of, the matrix of trademark protection provided by the Paris Convention and TRIPS.94

B. Peripheral Factors—Triumphant or Treacherous?

Advocates and scholars contesting trademark holders’ claims may seek to focus on human rights, public health, and even textual reasons to justify expansive public-interest regulations.95 In the context of tobacco control, scholars and advocates invoke the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control96 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights97 to justify strong laws limiting the use of tobacco trademarks.98 According to scholars, because human rights are inviolable, a trademark holder’s property interest is necessarily subordinate in the case of a conflict.99 In this sense, if a prohibition concerning the use of property can be justified as reasonably necessary to the performance by a State of its recognized obligations to protect the public health, safety, morals, or welfare, then it would normally seem that there has been no “taking” of property.100 This view is well in-line with the objectives of TRIPS Article 8.

Further, Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement state that there should be a balance struck between private profit and social welfare.101 The Committee on

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94 Id. at 16. Davison says:

In other words, Articles 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21 of TRIPS combine perfectly with the Paris Convention to maintain the registrability of inherently distinctive trademarks, if there is a prohibition on their use. Simultaneously, they avoid all the difficulties necessarily involved with implying a right of use of such trademarks, and they protect the distinctiveness of trademarks from any positive actions by third parties or government-mandated actions of trademark owners that might affect that distinctiveness.


The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has emphasized “[t]he end which intellectual property protection should serve is the objective of human well-being, to which international human rights instruments give legal expression.”102 This paper is sensitive to the fact that trademarks, when seen in the light of human rights concerns, discloses the “paradox of property”—that is, the paradox of governments striving for equilibrium between private and public interests.103

From a private-rights perspective, this view may be subject to criticism, as there exists little predictability when balancing investment claims with international human rights instruments. On the one hand, expectations of a private entity, or investor, should be tempered by knowledge that a State’s various treaty obligations, including human rights and/or public-health provisions, will be construed in a manner to ensure efficiency of the legal system.104 However, as already outlined, the language of multilateral and human-rights treaties and Conventions tend to impose few concrete obligations. For example, as illustrated in the past by the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, a tension exists within this agreement between the protection of intellectual property rights and the public interest.105 Depending on the interplay between, and the interpretation of, Articles in the TRIPS and the Paris Convention, and assuming that the drafting of provisions in plain packaging legislation is not in breach of international obligations, the validity of plain packaging legislation can be endorsed.

The divergence in the approaches of courts and legislatures in Australia and United States in their attempts to balance these objectives, however, is apparent in part IV of this paper. As will be discussed, the key lies in courts’ recognition of the “instrumental” nature or character of intellectual property rights and statutory purpose, which begs the question of whether, in protecting property rights, a balance between private-right and public-right can be struck.

It is argued that the character, broadly speaking, of such rights, and of the conditions informing their creation, may be relevant to identifying whether and in what circumstances restriction or regulation of their enjoyment by a statute amounts to acquisition, in the case of Australia, or taking of property, in the United States pursuant to their Constitutions.

For now, at least, the relative unpredictability of arbitration and judicial decisions on the appropriate extent of regulation without compensation, in the

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103 Vadi, supra note 25, at 122; see also Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 349, 360–61 (1999).

104 ECOSOC, supra note 102, ¶ 4.

105 TRIPS Declaration, supra note 38, ¶ 4 (expressing that the Doha Declaration affirms that “the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health.”). In this regard, the Doha Declaration enshrines the principles the WHO has publicly advocated and advanced over the years, namely the re-affirmation of the right of WTO Members to make full use of the safeguard provisions of the TRIPS Agreement in order to protect public health and enhance access to medicines for poor countries.
context of plain packaging, suggests that scholars, judges, and regulators need to consider the appropriate way to compensate trademark holders. Informative debates fail to give adequate guidance.

III. DOMESTIC SPHERE

As outlined, there are a number of arguments challenging the validity of plain packaging legislation at an international level. However, the extent to which these arguments may succeed remains unseen. The international framework is a complex web of Treaties, Agreements, and Conventions, which allow some discretion for States to interpret international principles and implement them in domestic law. This section draws a comparison between the relevant Constitutional provisions in Australia and the United States that may be invoked to support or deny plain packaging legislation. As discussed previously, the normative focus remains on a property-rights perspective.

Presently, Australia is the only jurisdiction that has passed and implemented plain packaging legislation. The discussion in this section, therefore, will be focused primarily on legal and Constitutional challenges of comparative jurisdictions that have considered, or are considering, substantially similar legislative provisions.

A. Social “Harms” and Policy “Norms”

In 2012, Australia became the first nation to successfully introduce statutory mandates governing plain packaging of cigarettes. As already described, this means that all tobacco products are sold in “plain olive packets” that contain no promotional or branding messages from the producer. While at first glance one might see this as a radical step, such action is entirely consistent with long-standing international initiatives and protocols.

In 2005, for example, the World Health Organization adopted a framework convention on the distribution or sale of tobacco products. This protocol, which was ultimately signed by 168 nations, was the first treaty negotiated by the international organization to attract support to reaffirm the universal human right accessing the highest standards of health. Its adoption is described as a “paradigm shift in developing a regulatory strategy to address addictive substances.”

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106 See TPPA 2011, supra note 3, at s 2–3.
107 TPPA 2011, supra note 3.
108 Id. s 19(2)(ii).
109 WHO Convention, supra note 96; see also C. Callard et al., Transforming the Tobacco Market: Why the Supply of Cigarettes Should be Transferred from For-Profit Corporations to Non-Profit Enterprises With a Public Health Mandate, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 278, 278 (2005).
111 Christopher Man-Kit Leung et. al., Fighting Tobacco Smoking—A Difficult but Not Impossible Battle, 6 INT'L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 69, 73 (2009).
addresses demand as well as supply reduction.\textsuperscript{112} Importantly, the framework document and subsequent protocols were a response to an increasingly perceived need to combat the “globalization of the tobacco epidemic.”\textsuperscript{113} This “epidemic” is enabled through business strategies that have effects across borders, including trade liberalization.\textsuperscript{114} In other words, tobacco companies have been able to take advantage of economic forces that are designed to enhance and assist in development and economic growth.\textsuperscript{115} Accordingly, the WHO produced a number of “core demand” provisions, which are within two broad categories: price and tax measures, not addressed in this paper; and non-price measures to promote reduction.\textsuperscript{116} These non-price measures include: protection from tobacco smoke; regulation of the contents of tobacco products; regulation of tobacco product disclosures; packaging and labeling of tobacco products; education, communication, and training, as well as enhanced public awareness, advertising, promotion, and sponsorship; and demand reduction measures concerning tobacco dependence and cessation.\textsuperscript{117}

As noted, the treaty has 168 signatories, including the European Union, and therefore it is one of the most “widely embraced” treaties in the history of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{118} Though signatories’ obligations are subject to their interpretations and wills to take action, the obligation is clear.\textsuperscript{119} Furthermore, if we take the above noted provisions as a whole, they clearly justify any action that may result in a reduction in health problems. This is because a signatory places itself under an obligation to take action regarding packaging and labeling in order to meet the requirements of international obligations, as well as to promote public awareness of the dangers of tobacco. Thus, when tobacco companies, such as British American Tobacco Australasia Limited (“BAT”) and JT International SA (“JTI”), challenged the Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011, the WHO Convention only strengthened the position of the government.

Despite arguments to the contrary,\textsuperscript{120} it is fair to say that governments that are active in regulating tobacco distribution—including, but not limited to, Australia, the United States, Canada, and the European Union—have greater responsibilities to their citizens than merely upholding the rights of particular groups. For example, there is an understanding of a duty to ensure that citizens are not harmed, i.e., misled, which has a place in complementary legislation, including legislation governing consumer protection.\textsuperscript{121}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[112] \textit{Id.}
\item[114] \textit{Id.; Leung et. al., supra note 111, at 71.}
\item[115] Leung et. al., supra note 111, at 71.
\item[116] \textit{2011 WHO REPORT, supra note 113, at 12–13.}
\item[117] \textit{Id.}
\item[118] Leung et. al., supra note 111, at 73.
\item[119] It should be noted that the United States, whilst having signed the Convention, has not ratified it. \textit{Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHO, http://www.who.int/fctc/signatories_parties/en/index.html} (last updated June 25, 2013).
\item[120] See Callard et. al., supra note 109, at 278.
\item[121] See \textit{Competition and Consumer Act 2010} (Cth) sch 2 (Austl.) (formerly the \textit{Trade Practices Act 1974} (Cth) s 51ADG governing “false or misleading information”); The Federal Trade
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
B. The Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth)

The Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) ("TPPA") imposes significant restrictions upon the color, shape, and finish of retail packaging for tobacco products. It is an object of the TPPA to give effect to the obligations that Australia has as a party to the WTO Convention. The Act thereby relies upon the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with respect to external affairs.

The TPPA is superimposed upon pre-existing regulatory requirements for health warnings, safety, and information standards applied to tobacco products and their packaging. Its stated objectives include the improvement of public health by "discouraging people from taking up smoking," "encouraging people to give up smoking," "discouraging people who have given up smoking . . . from relapsing," and "reducing people's exposure to smoke from tobacco products." It prohibits the use of trademarks on such packaging, other than those permitted by the TPPA, which allows the use of a "brand, business or company name for the tobacco product[]."

Importantly, Part 3 of Chapter 1 of the TPPA, entitled "Constitutional provisions," provides for the Act’s additional operation in reliance upon corporations’ power, the trade and commerce power, and the Territories’ power.

Section 15(1) provides for the non-application of the TPPA to the extent, if any, "that its operation would result in an acquisition of property from a person otherwise than on just terms." Section 15(2) provides that if, leaving aside section 15, the TPPA “would result in such an acquisition of property because it would prevent the use of a trade mark or other sign on or in relation to the retail packaging of tobacco products . . . the trade mark or sign may be used.” It was the validity of that subsection, amongst others, that was at issue.

Substantive requirements for the physical features, colors, and finishes of retail packaging are imposed by sections 18 and 19 of the TPPA and by the Tobacco Plain Packaging Regulations 2011 (Cth) ("the TPP Regulations") made under that Act. Embellishments on cigarette packs and cartons are proscribed. Packs and cartons are to be rectangular, have only a matte finish, and bear on their surfaces the color prescribed by the TPP Regulations. Absent regulation, the color of the package must be a drab dark brown. The TPP Regulations says that "brand, business or company name . . ."
company name, or any variant name, for tobacco products that appears on the retail packaging . . . must comply with" the TPP Regulations.134 They must not obscure any "relevant legislative requirement" or "appear more than once on any of the . . . front, top and bottom outer surfaces of the pack."135

The use of trademarks on retail packaging of tobacco products is prohibited other than as permitted by section 20(3), which provides:

The following may appear on the retail packaging of tobacco products:

(a) the brand, business or company name for the tobacco products, and any variant name for the tobacco products;

(b) the relevant legislative requirements;

(c) any other trade mark or mark permitted by the regulations.136

Section 26 imposes a similar conditional prohibition on the use of trademarks on tobacco products.137 The term "relevant legislative requirement" in section 20(3)(b) includes a health warning required by the Trade Practices (Consumer Product Information Standards) (Tobacco) Regulations 2004 (Cth) ("the TPCPI Regulations"), or a safety or information standard made or declared under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) ("the CCA").138 Chapter 3 of the TPPA creates offences and provides for civil penalties.139

The relevant prescriptive provisions of TPPA sections 18 to 27 are declared by section 27A to have "[n]o legal effect other than to specify requirements, and provide for regulations specifying requirements, for the purposes of the definition of tobacco product requirement."140

Notably, "tobacco product requirement" is a defined term that means a requirement specified in Part 2 of Chapter 2 or in the TPP Regulations made under that Part.141 The registrability of trademarks and designs, whose use is subject to constraints imposed by the TPPA and the TPP Regulations, is not to be prejudiced by those constraints.142 Consistent with the requirements under the TRIPS Agreement and Paris Convention already discussed, neither the TPPA nor the TPP Regulations deprive a trademark of registrability for non-use or for "the use of the trade mark in relation to tobacco products . . . [to be] contrary to law."143 In this respect, neither the TPPA, nor the circumstance that a person cannot "us[e] a trade mark on or in relation to the retail packaging of tobacco products, or on tobacco products," is a

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134 Id. s 21.
135 Id.
136 Id. s 20.
137 Id. s 26.
138 Id. s 20(3).
139 Id. ch 3.
140 Id. s 27(a) (emphasis in original).
141 Id. s 4.
142 Id. ss 28–29.
143 Id. s 28.
circumstance “mak[ing] it reasonable or appropriate” to refuse or revoke registration of the trademark, to revoke acceptance of an application for registration, or “to register the trade mark subject to conditions or limitations.” There does, however, exist a less intricate provision in section 29 of the Designs Act 2003 (Cth), a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper.

C. The Australian Tobacco Plain Packaging Case—Withstanding Constitutional Mandates in Australia and the United States

In two proceedings heard before the High Court of Australia in April of last year, plaintiff tobacco companies JT International SA (“JTI”) and members of the British America Tobacco Group (“BAT”) argued that, “subject to a reading down provision, the TPP Act effected an acquisition of their intellectual property rights and goodwill on other than just terms, contrary to s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution.”

A majority of the Court found that the legislation was constitutionally valid because an acquisition of statutory intellectual property on “unjust terms,” within the meaning of section 51(xxxi), must “involve the accrual of a benefit of a proprietary character.” On August 15, 2012, the High Court “made orders reflecting the rejection of the plaintiffs’ contentions, by majority, on the basis that there had been no acquisition of the plaintiffs’ property within the meaning of s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution.” The property, which was said to be the subject of acquisition under the TPPA, comprised a mixture of statutory and associated, or derivative, non-statutory rights, which are outlined below.

The Court said: “Section 51(xxxi) confers upon the Commonwealth Parliament the power to make laws with respect to: ‘[t]he acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has

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144 Id.
145 Designs Act 2003 (Cth) s 29 (Austl.). The provision reads as follows:

Disputes between applicants
(1) This section applies if a dispute arises between 2 or more persons in relation to whether, or in what manner, a design application should proceed.
(2) The Registrar may, on a request made in accordance with the regulations by any of the persons, make any determinations the Registrar thinks fit for either or both of the following purposes:
(a) enabling the application to specify which of those persons is an entitled person in relation to a design disclosed in the application;
(b) regulating the manner in which the application is to proceed.
(3) A person mentioned in subsection (1) or (2) must be:
(a) the applicant; or
(b) a person who asserts that the person is an entitled person in relation to a design disclosed in the application.

147 Id. ¶ 44.
148 Id. ¶ 3.
In its analysis of whether there had been an acquisition of all or any of the plaintiffs’ asserted property rights, the Court turned its attention to the source and nature of the property rights and the consequences of the restrictions imposed by the TPPA upon their use or enjoyment.

Traditionally, the term “property” as used in section 51(xxxi), has been construed broadly in Australia. The High Court acknowledged that the broad construction of “property” and “acquisition” discussed were constructed in light of comments by Judge Dixon in *Bank of New South Wales v The Commonwealth.* The Court emphasized that “[s]ection 51(xxxi) was said to extend to ‘innominate and anomalous interests’ and to include ‘the assumption and indefinite continuance of exclusive possession and control for the purpose of the Commonwealth of any subject of property.’”

It encompassed property rights created by statute, although it is accepted that the terms of such statutes and the nature of the property rights created require examination to determine whether and to what extent that property attracts the protection of section 51(xxxi). The rights given by successive Commonwealth statutes to holders of registered trademarks have always been property of, what the statute calls, the registered proprietor. Such rights, it has been noted, are “the exclusive rights: (a) to use the trade mark; and (b) to authori[ze] other persons to use the trade mark; in relation to the goods and/or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered.”

In the context of trademarks, the “exclusive right” to use a mark under section 20(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act 2005 (Cth) may be described as a negative right—

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149 Id. ¶ 29 (emphasis added).
150 Id. at ¶¶ 35, 43-44.
151 Trademarks Act 1995 (Cth) s 20 (Austl.).
154 It is incorrect to assert that “property” has no existence apart from statute. See Attorney-General (NT) v Chaffey (2007) 231 CLR 651, 664 ¶ 23 (Austl.); Commonwealth v WMC Res. Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 1, 70 ¶ 15 (Austl.). This should not imply, however, that the extinguishment or restriction of a statutory exclusive right, without more, would constitute an acquisition for the purpose of section 51(xxxi). Also, it should be borne in mind, that the property in a statutory trademark is not permanent. JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 31 (Austl.). This is a position consistent within the meaning of Articles 6, 7, 8 and 20 of the TRIPS Agreement, and the very premise of the trademark regime. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 6–8, 20.
155 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 20 (Austl.) (emphasis added); see also Trade Marks Act 1905 (Cth) ss 49(3), 58–60 (Austl.).
that is, a right that excludes others from using that mark. Notably, “trademarks do not offer their owners positive rights to actually use the sign, but just a *jus excludendi alios*, that is, a negative right to prevent third parties from using the asset in question.”

Regarding plain packaging, there may be some merit to the argument that this form of packaging does not encroach on trademarks, “as no positive right to use trade marks is offered by TRIPS to trade mark holders.”

Notwithstanding this statement, the High Court cautioned against approaching issues arising under section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution on the premise that registration under the Trade Marks Act 2005 (Cth), for example, conferred “some unconstrained right to exploit those items of intellectual property or an immunity from the operation of regulatory laws.”

This point is important in discussing the interpretation of trademark “use” and distinguishing “acquisition” from “taking.” In other words, considering the interplay between negative and positive rights as to the identification, nature, and scope of property rights is an essential first step in determining whether there has been an acquisition, deprivation, or “taking” in breach of constitutional mandates.

With respect to the “nature” of property rights, the High Court alluded to an important distinction between Australia and other countries, including the United States. There is no doubt that intellectual property laws create property rights, but the scope of these rights may be dependent upon whether the rights are recognized as being “instrumental” in character, a recognition which differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. An understanding of the scope of this “instrumental in character” language is, therefore, central to understanding the relevance of constitutional mandates for the purposes of determining the constitutional validity of plain packaging legislation.

That is not to say that from the perspective of Australia, such rights are inherently susceptible to variation on account of their instrumental character, nor

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156 Vadi, *supra* note 25, at 122. On the other hand, a positive right may be to obtain registration on the satisfaction of certain conditions and may be described as ancillary to the negative right.

157 *Id.* (emphasis added). TRIPS, *supra* note 8 art. 16(1) states:

> The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right to prevent all third parties not having the owner’s consent from using in the course of trade identical or similar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion. In case of the use of an identical sign for identical goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed. The rights described above shall not prejudice any existing prior rights, nor shall they affect the possibility of Members making rights available on the basis of use.

*Id.*


160 *Id.* ¶¶ 112–117.


that they fail to fall within the ambit of section 51(xxxi).\textsuperscript{163} Rather, there are, and always have been, “purposive elements” reflecting public policy considerations that influence the statutory creation of intellectual property rights.\textsuperscript{164} It is therefore accepted that “the protection given to property rights varies with the nature of the right.”\textsuperscript{165}

An understanding of the “nature” of a property right in the context of section 51(xxxi) may be derived from its “source.” This source provides a greater contextual understanding of the role of “purposive elements” in defining the character of the particular right, and the protection to be afforded under the Constitution—a point that was not intricately analyzed in the present case.\textsuperscript{166} This is unlike the position in the United States, where such purposive elements in determining the scope of property are subordinate to the relative requirements of, for example, the First and Fifth Amendments.\textsuperscript{167}

It is acknowledged that the “source” of section 51(xxxi) is found in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,\textsuperscript{168} which qualifies the power of the United States to expropriate property by requiring that it should be done “on payment of fair compensation.”\textsuperscript{169} But Australia and the United States differ in their recognition of the nature, or “character,” of such interests.\textsuperscript{170} This, in turn, has the effect of influencing the application of certain Constitutional mandates, discussed below.

In relation to statutory purpose, the High Court noted that:

[R]eflected in the character of such rights and in the conditions informing their creation, may be relevant to the question whether and in what circumstances restriction or regulation of their enjoyment by a law of the Commonwealth amounts to acquisition of property for the purposes of s 51(xxxi).\textsuperscript{171}

An “important distinction[]” exists regarding a taking of property and its acquisition.\textsuperscript{172} “Taking” involves a deprivation of property seen from the perspective of its owner, whereas “acquisition” involves receipt of something seen from the

\textsuperscript{163} Id.

\textsuperscript{164} For example, the public policy dimensions of trade mark legislation and the contending interests which such dimensions accommodate were referred to in Campomar Sociedad, Limitada v Nike Int’l Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 45, 65–68 (Austl.). The observation in that case that Australian trademarks law has “manifested from time to time a varying accommodation of commercial and the consuming public’s interests” has application with varying degrees of intensity to other intellectual property rights created by statute. Id.

\textsuperscript{165} Id.

\textsuperscript{166} JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 29 (Austl.).

\textsuperscript{167} Id. ¶ 117.

\textsuperscript{168} Id. ¶ 111.

\textsuperscript{169} Id. (citing Andrews v Howell (1941) 65 CLR 255, 282 (Austl.)); see also Grace Bros. Prop. Ltd v Commonwealth (1946) 72 CLR 269, 290 (Austl.) (noting that the phrase “on just terms” was “of course, reminiscent of the Fifth Amendment”).

\textsuperscript{170} JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 112 (Austl.).

\textsuperscript{171} Id. ¶ 30.

\textsuperscript{172} Id. ¶ 112.
perspective of the acquirer,\textsuperscript{173} which is not composed of a mere extinguishment of rights. The High Court has alluded to this distinction, observing that:

The emphasis in s 51(xxxi) is not on a “taking” of private property but on the \emph{acquisition} of property for purposes of the Commonwealth. To bring the constitutional provision into play it is not enough that legislation adversely affects or terminates a pre-existing right that an owner enjoys in relation to his property; there must be an acquisition whereby the Commonwealth or another acquires an interest in property, however slight or insubstantial it may be.\textsuperscript{174}

In other words, section 51(xxxi) speaks of “acquisition” for any “purpose” where there is federal legislative power.\textsuperscript{175} The Fifth Amendment, on the other hand, “which also applies to the States by the medium of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee against the deprivation of property without due process of law,\textsuperscript{176} is expressed in the form of a negative, appears with the due process clause, and speaks of private property being ‘taken’ for ‘public use.’”\textsuperscript{177} “Public use” has been interpreted to include use that is for “the public good,” “the public necessity,” or “the public utility.”\textsuperscript{178}

Yet, decisions in the United States accept that the “takings” clause may be utilized in lieu of an “acquisition,” as referred to in Australia. This is a demanding premise, which tobacco advocates may have to use to challenge plain packing legislation in the United States.\textsuperscript{179} On the other hand, advocates may seek to exploit the implicit “fairness and justice” standard in the Fifth Amendment, further examined below, which directs that private property should not be “taken” in the absence of just compensation.\textsuperscript{180} Reference to “fairness and justice,” in this sense, “require[s] that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{173} Georgiadis v Australian & Overseas Telecomms. Corp. (1994) 179 CLR 297, 304–05.
\item \textsuperscript{174} JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 118 (Austl.) (emphasis in original).
\item \textsuperscript{175} See Trade Practices Comm’n v Tooth & Co. Ltd (1979) 142 CLR 397, 408 (Austl.) (stating that “not every compulsory divesting of property is an acquisition within s. 51(xxxi).”).
\item \textsuperscript{176} Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980) (holding, prior to the introduction of the Fourteenth Amendment that the Fifth Amendment was a constraint solely upon the Government of the United States).
\item \textsuperscript{177} JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 113 (Austl.). The public use requirement assumes an inherent or implied legislative power to take private property for public use.
\item \textsuperscript{178} See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480–89 (2005) (ruling that the federal judiciary should not make an independent judgment as to whether a taking of private property is for a “public use,” and stating that the question is whether the government authority—Federal, State or local—can make a rational argument that the taking resulted in a “public benefit”).
\item \textsuperscript{179} See Trade Practices Comm’n v Tooth & Co. Ltd (1979) 142 CLR 397, 413–15 (Austl.) (discussing how a doctrine permitting “regulation”, which does not amount to a “taking,” moderates the boundaries of the Fifth Amendment); JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 115 (Austl.) (citing Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (“[R]egulation amounting to a “taking” if the regulatory actions in question are “functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.”).)
\item \textsuperscript{180} Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
\end{itemize}
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons."\(^{181}\)

In the United States, Congress might effectively “take” a trademark “by partially or totally prohibiting its use or by requiring additional product information (including warnings)” in order to serve a public purpose.\(^{182}\) As Professor Samuel Foster Halabi points out, this would limit the trademark holder to compensation for “the narrow interest in distinguishing its product from others.”\(^{183}\)

In the event the United States seeks to introduce plain packaging legislation, and on the assumption that a “taking of property” for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment could be established, there may exist sufficient scope to argue that the “purposive elements” of “justice and fairness” may not ever truly justify economic injuries.\(^{184}\) A similar line of reasoning was expounded by Judge Brennan in the *Tasmanian Dam’s* case:

> [In Australia, if] this Court were to construe s. 51(xxxi) so that its limitation applies to laws which regulate or restrict use and enjoyment of proprietary rights but which do not provide for the acquisition of such rights, it would be necessary to identify a touchstone for applying the limitation to some regulatory laws and not to others.\(^{185}\)

According to the statement of Chief Judge Mason in that case:

> To bring the Constitutional provision into play it is not enough that legislation adversely affects or terminates a pre-existing right that an owner enjoys in relation to his property; there must be an acquisition whereby the Commonwealth or another acquires an interest in property, however slight or insubstantial it may be.\(^{186}\)

Applying this standard to the TPPA, it is clear that the Act does not cause the Commonwealth or anyone else to acquire any benefit of a proprietary character in tobacco companies’ property rights. The High Court adopted this reasoning in *JT International*, noting that “the negative character of the plaintiffs’ property rights


\(^{182}\) Halabi, *supra* note 26, at 356–57.

\(^{183}\) *Id.* at 357. For an in-depth analysis of the condemnation process, see *id*.

\(^{184}\) An intricate examination of the balance between “justice and fairness” and economic rights is reserved for a future paper by the author. *See* Joseph W. Singer, *The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations*, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 329 (2006) (arguing that “[p]art of what it means to be a member of society, to be an owner among owners, is to be part of a real or imagined social contract that limits liberty to enlarge liberty, that limits property to secure property”).

\(^{185}\) Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) HCA 21, ¶ 92 per Brennan, J (Austl.).

\(^{186}\) *Id.* ¶ 68 per Mason, J.
leaves something of a logical gap between the restrictions on their enjoyment and the accrual of any benefit to the Commonwealth or any other person.”

Further, the Court stated:

The fact that the restrictions and prohibitions imposed by the TPP Act create the “space” for the application of Commonwealth regulatory requirements as to the textual and graphical content of tobacco product packages does not constitute such an accrual. Rather, it reflects a serious judgment that the public purposes to be advanced and the public benefits to be derived from the regulatory scheme outweigh those public purposes and public benefits which underpin the statutory intellectual property rights and the common law rights enjoyed by the plaintiffs. The scheme does that without effecting an acquisition.

This understanding of the general law has influenced the interpretation of section 51(xxxi). Also important is the High Court’s recognition that, at common law, “the property interest associated with a trade mark is derived from the goodwill of the business which used it.”

In his discussion about goodwill coming within the bounds of “proprietary rights,” Judge Gummow expressed caution in defining property too widely, saying that:

[S] 51(xxxi) gives protection against acquisition of property without just terms but “not to the general commercial and economic position occupied by traders” and that to treat this commercial and economic position as if it had a distinct proprietary character would be to repeat what in *Truax v Corrigan* Holmes J identified in a similar context as the fallacy of “delusive exactness.”

“Delusive exactness,” Judge Holmes commented, “is a source of fallacy throughout the law.” He observed in this regard that:

[By calling a business “property” you make it seem like land, and lead up to the conclusion that a statute cannot substantially cut down the advantages of ownership existing before the statute was passed.

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188 Id. ¶ 43.
189 Id. ¶ 110.
192 Id. ¶ 47.
An established business no doubt may have pecuniary value . . . [b]ut you cannot give it definiteness of contour by calling it a thing.193

At first glance, this may seem to be a conservative position. But, there is great merit attached to this observation as, from a normative perspective, Judge Holmes rightly endorses preventing the blur of the boundaries of economic interests at the expense of diluting property interests.194 This passage also provides context for the distinction the Court made between constitutional mandates in Australia and the United States, which were already discussed.

There is great importance in understanding the distinction between an “acquisition” of a non-right and a “taking” of property in the context of its correlation with establishing an “encumbrance” for the purpose of TRIPS Article 20.195 Even then, only “the use of a trademark for the purposes of Article 20” is relevant for the purposes of assessing the legality of an “encumbrance by special requirements.”196 Yet, there are many grounds on which to argue that plain packaging legislation exists outside of the course of trade. As Professor Davison points out, the majority of the value of plain packaging regulation likely comes from conduct outside the point-of-sale context—for example, smokers’ social interactions.197 Further, the benefits, i.e., improvements in public health, sought by such regulation likewise occur outside the course of trade.198 And to the extent that plain packaging regulation may be classified as “outside the course of trade” for the purpose of an Article 20 analysis, WTO Members would have a broad license to enact those regulations.199 The High Court’s decision not to characterize the TPPA as a “law of ‘trade regulation,’” placing it outside the application of section 51(xxxi), albeit in the context of acquisition of property, implicitly supports this view.200 Additionally, as Professors Voon and Mitchell argue, an interpretation of Article 20 that takes account of the policy role of public health objectives delineated in Articles 7 and 8 justifies a public health-directed regulation like plain packaging.201

193 Id.
194 Courts mention more frequently than commentators the additional goal of protecting producers’ goodwill, though they too generally describe that goal in market efficiency terms. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (stating that trademark law “reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions, [and] . . . helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product”); 4 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, M C C A R T H Y O N TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:3 (4th ed. 2012); Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Laredo, Tex. v. Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Austin, Tex., 909 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The idea is that trademarks are ‘distinguishing’ features which lower consumer search costs and encourage higher quality production by discouraging free-riders.”).
195 See Davison, supra note 57, at 11.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 21.
198 Id.
199 Id.
D. Normative Analysis and Constitutional Mandates in the United States—A Nail in the Coffin for Plain Packaging Legislation?

In the United States, restrictions on tobacco advertising and labeling would likely be invalidated on grounds that they violate the First Amendment’s command that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”202 Though, such invalidation would not come without fisticuffs. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the First Amendment’s speech protections extend to commercial speech203 including tobacco advertising, which could extend to plain packaging, i.e., a “taking” or “encumbrance.”

The Supreme Court construes the First Amendment to extend protections to some commercial speech,204 while permitting government regulation of commercial speech in proportion to the interests advanced. An understanding of the scope of the “interests” of the public to be recognized is, no doubt, a determining factor. A few things should be said, in this regard.

First, courts in the United States have generally become more antagonistic to commercial speech restrictions over time.205 And some speech simply remains unprotected under the First Amendment.206 For example, some seemingly core speech-rights reap no protection under the First Amendment, including obscene speech,207 defamation,208 and inciting words.209 However, the First Amendment does protect the related sexually oriented depictions, false and erroneous political and religious statements, and “misguided, or even hurtful” speech.210 In a commercial context, false, deceptive, and misleading commercial speech is not protected by the First Amendment.211 But like other commercial speech, “potentially misleading

204 Thompson v. Western States Med Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 377 (2002) (holding unanimously that “purely commercial advertising” enjoyed no First Amendment protection, and emphasizing that “regulating speech must be a last—not first—resort”); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2666–67 (2011) (subjecting a regulatory program that affected commercial speech to First Amendment scrutiny and importing content and speaker-based concerns into the commercial speech context).
206 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218 (2011) (discussing particular words under certain circumstances, such as fighting words, are simply unprotected).
207 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (discussing “the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression,” such as obscenity).
commercial speech is protected to an intermediate degree.”212 If the concept of “commercial speech” is broad enough to encompass certain trademarks, and such trademarks, word or non-word, have the effect of misleading a consumer in the form of confusion (i) as to source or (ii) as to function because of the presence or absence of advertising the health benefits of tobacco, then plain packaging legislation would be unlikely to fall within the ambit of First Amendment protection.213

Second, the government’s protection of commercial speech requires it to permit factual disclosures for the benefit of the consuming public.214 It is well settled that the government has an interest in insuring that commercial transactions are conducted transparently and that consumers have broad access to truthful information when making purchasing decisions.215

Accordingly, under Supreme Court precedent, the constitutionality of commercial disclosure requirements turns on whether they “directly advance[] the governmental interest asserted . . . [and are] not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”216 The Court has held on two occasions that the government’s interest in preventing consumer deception is capable of supporting disclosure requirements under this standard.217

Third, just like trademark law, the principal purpose of such disclosures is to decrease consumers’ information costs.218 Plain packaging falls squarely within the scope of an information-providing function. In light of this judicial approval, the federal government has put in place myriad regulatory disclosure requirements in order to improve access to truthful information and to protect consumers from economic and physical harm.219 Plain packaging, through a suppression of certain


213 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 494 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[A]ny description of commercial speech that is intended to identify the category of speech entitled to less First Amendment protection should relate to the reasons for permitting broader regulation: namely, commercial speech’s potential to mislead.”).

214 Rubin, 514 U.S. at 486.


218 See Pomeranz, supra note 212, at 404–05 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651) (“[T]he extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides, [so commercial actors’] constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal.”) (emphasis omitted).

219 Rubin, 514 U.S. 476, 492 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994), which requires a registration statement before selling securities) (“In the commercial context . . . government . . . often requires affirmative disclosures that the speaker might not make voluntarily.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994) (mandating on cigarette packs a “Surgeon General’s Warning” label); see also Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 116 (“Innumerable federal and state regulatory programs require the disclosure of product and other commercial information . . . To hold that the Vermont statute, [requiring disclosures for mercury-containing products] is insufficiently related to the state’s
items that are extraneous to the product to which it relates, does inform consumers about the underlying product and is, therefore, consistent with existing disclosure requirements. Recent cases, Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States220 and Discount Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States221 (on appeal), shed further light on whether the advertising and labeling restrictions of plain packaging legislation would amount to permissible or impermissible restraints on a tobacco company’s commercial speech. These cases examined whether the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act222 (“FSPTCA”) ran afoul of the commercial speech mandate in the First Amendment.223 In order to determine whether a particular government regulation of commercial speech is constitutionally permissible, courts use a four-step analysis derived from Central Hudson.224

Notably, the public health goals for the FSPTCA are outlined at the beginning of the legislation.225 Among the findings of Congress is the following statement:

[The FSPTCA regulations] will . . . advance the Federal Government’s substantial interest in reducing the number of children and adolescents who use cigarettes and smokeless tobacco and in preventing the life-threatening health consequences associated with tobacco use.226

It also states that the FSPTCA regulations are:


222 FSPTCA, supra note 13.

223 Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 522–23.

224 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (reaffirming both that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection and that the Constitution grants a lesser degree of protection to commercial speech than to other forms of expression). The threshold question of the Central Hudson test is whether the expression falls within that protected by the First Amendment. Id. Only commercial speech that concerns lawful activity and is not misleading enjoys First Amendment protection; speech related to illegal activity or “more likely to deceive the public than to inform it” does not. Id. at 563. If commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, only a substantial government interest will justify a restriction, so the second part of the Central Hudson test asks whether the government interest asserted is “substantial.” Id. at 566. If the first two questions are answered affirmatively, a commercial speech regulation will be upheld, the Court said, if it directly advances the asserted government interest and is no more extensive than necessary to achieve that interest. Id.

225 FSPTCA, supra note 13, § 2.

226 Id. § 2(31).
Narrowly tailored to restrict those advertising and promotional practices which are most likely to be seen or heard by youth and most likely to entice them into tobacco use, while affording tobacco manufacturers and sellers ample opportunity to convey information about their products to adult consumers.227

Commercial speech rendered false or misleading by the use of photographs, illustrations, logos, color, or sound effects would receive no First Amendment protection under the first prong of Central Hudson.228 Under the second, third, and fourth prongs, however, Congress could permissibly address a substantial public health interest in restraining tobacco use by a particular group, in this case, youth tobacco use, by banning the types of color, pictorial, audio, or audio-visual tobacco advertisements to which youths were demonstrably susceptible.229 However, the effect of, for example, the blanket tombstone advertising format, which may be described as the closest analogue to plain packaging required by the FSPTCA, was far-reaching and encompassed even non-misleading color, pictorial, audio, or audio-visual tobacco advertisements and banned even those designed to appeal to adults.230 One might observe that such tombstone advertising and labeling formats required under the law would likely fail the Central Hudson test due to insufficient tailoring.231

Applying the above reasoning to plain packaging, the outcome would likely be similar. Smoking is legal, so under the first step of a Central Hudson analysis, tobacco companies’ commercial speech is protected under the First Amendment, provided that it is not false or misleading.232 The second Central Hudson step may be satisfied if the government asserts a public health interest in preventing tobacco use that the Supreme Court declared “substantial, and even compelling” in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly.233 The constitutionality of restrictions arising from plain packaging, e.g., marketing restrictions, may therefore hinge on the third and fourth Central Hudson steps: whether the restriction will alleviate real harm to a material

227 supra note 13, § 2(32). The scope of FDA authority to regulate tobacco under the FSPTCA is severely circumscribed compared to the agency’s authority to regulate other products under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, reflecting the influence of the tobacco industry on the legislation, as James O’Reilly has explained. JAMES O’REILLY, FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 29 (West, 3d ed. Supp. 2007).

228 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.

229 Id.; In re Tobacco Cases I, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 318–19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the images in the tobacco advertisement, even though they were not hand drawn, were “cartoons” under the master settlement’s definition, and thus prohibited); People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317, 327–28 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the cigarette company violated the master settlement agreement by willfully ignoring that its advertisements reached youths at the same level as that of young adults).

230 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 563 (2001) (holding that certain FDA regulations violated the narrow tailoring prong because they failed to target “particular advertising and promotion practices that appeal to youth . . . while permitting others”).

231 Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d. 509, 529 (6th Cir. 2012).

232 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.

233 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 564.
and whether Congress narrowly tailored the restriction to achieve the asserted health objective.\textsuperscript{235}

One important inquiry into plain packaging legislation is the degree to which it \textit{in fact restricts} marketing, i.e., advertising and promotional speech practices.\textsuperscript{236} This begs an inquiry into two facets—one practical and one analytical. In relation to the former, Australia can be viewed as a “test-case” in providing some indication about the scope of restriction. A determination such as this would be of primary relevance in defining an appropriate level of compensation, i.e., “just compensation,” in a claim under the Fifth Amendment.\textsuperscript{237} As stated above, however, there may be sufficient scope to argue that the “purposive elements” of “justice and fairness” may not ever truly justify economic injuries.\textsuperscript{238} In this sense, what truly amounts to “just compensation” in the context of plain packaging legislation remains moot. Further, it may be observed that invoking the Fifth Amendment may strengthen an argument seeking to establish a breach, either partially or wholly, of the First Amendment. The rationale for this boils down to the cause, or need, for “just compensation” in lieu of establishing an exception to the contrary, and, in this regard, the requisite nexus between deprivation, i.e., encumbrance over or taking, of private property and deprivation of commercial speech.\textsuperscript{239}

Such an inquiry may require an analysis of a question framed earlier in this paper: the scope of “use . . . in the course of trade” under TRIPS Article 20. This would require a legislature to carefully frame such legislation to distinguish between use or a restriction or “taking” of a mark, i.e., an encumbrance over a property right, in the course of trade, or an encumbrance affecting marketing and the underlying product in the course of trade.

Even if plain packaging legislation impacts the First Amendment rights of manufacturers and retailers to convey, and of consumers to receive, truthful information about legal products, it may do so only to the extent necessary to achieve the government’s demonstrated interest. Not even a compelling interest in preventing tobacco use to protect the public health would be able to justify tobacco advertising and labeling restrictions so broad that they nearly foreclose tobacco companies’ ability to derive benefit from marketing campaigns, if plain packaging in fact warrants this.

This view presents an argument placing a nail in the coffin for a constitutionally valid plain packaging legislation in the United States—for now at least. If Congress did consider introducing such a statute, it would be wise to undertake the requisite calculus demanded by the First Amendment.

\textsuperscript{234} \textit{Disc. Tobacco}, 674 F.3d at 535.


\textsuperscript{237} See \textit{generally supra} Part III.C.

\textsuperscript{238} Id.

\textsuperscript{239} Davison, \textit{supra} note 20, at 21.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Thus far, most doctrinal contributions on the subject of tobacco plain packaging have concentrated on the interaction between tobacco control and trade, and the nexus between tobacco control and investment treaty guarantees. Little, however, has been written on the interplay between public-right and private property right recognition under constitutional mandates and on the nexus with international treaties. This article has examined the approaches to plain packaging legislation in two distinct, but relatively active, jurisdictions with respect to the role of health policy as a public-oriented right: Australia and the United States through the medium of constitutional and international mandates. In particular, this paper has identified conceded arguments, both on normative and legal premises, to adequately challenge and reinforce the validity of certain legislation introducing plain packaging laws.

Further, this paper highlighted the interplay between constitutional provisions, normative arguments with respect to the trademark regime, and certain articles in the TRIPS Agreement. Therein, some common challenges remain at issue. For instance, inherent within the object of trademark protection is a dichotomy between property rights considerations and other external values such as free speech, competition, and public health. This dichotomy is played out in determining whether tobacco plain packaging legislation is constitutionally valid and simultaneously compliant with international obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and Paris Convention. This paper identified the normative facets of property rights in the trademark regime and suggested that the position taken by Australia, and the WTO recently, indicates a trend toward recognition of property rights in trademarks in the context of tobacco plain packaging laws. This development is consistent with the traditional purpose of trademark law—to improve the quality of information in the marketplace.

At the same time, it is submitted that future interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, Paris Convention, and constitutional provisions should proceed along a purposive approach as identified in this paper, which requires an understanding of the respective objectives and normative themes. The importance of understanding the normative perspectives of trademark rights is reflected in the normative perspective’s ability to articulate the meaning of “use” of proprietary rights for the purposes of Articles 6 quinquies, 7, 8, and 20 of the TRIPS Agreement and its ability to answer whether plain packaging legislation amounts to a “taking” or an “acquisition” of property rights contrary to Constitutional mandates. If so, it must also address whether such a “taking” or “acquisition” is justified on the basis of “just terms” or being “fair and equitable.” Again, the nature of the property, including rights, and its source, have been identified as factors for this determination. As this paper highlights, the nature of the property, i.e., right or interest, is to be construed as separate to the “good” to which that right may attach.

It is also submitted that such a purposive approach may provide a greater ability to identify the emphasis to be placed on public rights. With respect to the “nature” of property rights, the High Court alluded to an important distinction between Australia and approaches taken in other countries, including the United States. It was identified that while intellectual property laws create property rights, the scope of these rights may be dependent upon whether the rights are recognized
as being “instrumental” in character—the recognition of which differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.\(^{240}\) An understanding of the scope of being “instrumental in character,” therefore, is central to understanding the relevance of constitutional mandates for the purposes of determining the constitutional validity of plain packaging legislation.\(^ {241}\) It was identified that such rights are, in Australia at least, based on their instrumental character, inherently susceptible to variation, and therefore outside the ambit of section 51(xxxi). Rather, there are, and always have been, “purposive elements” reflecting public policy considerations that inform the statutory creation of intellectual property rights.\(^ {242}\) This is unlike the position in the United States, where such purposive elements in determining the scope of property are subordinate to the relative requirements of, for example, the underlying objectives of the First and Fifth Amendments. In the event that the United States seeks to introduce plain packaging legislation, and on the assumption that a “taking of property” for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment could be established, there may exist sufficient scope to argue that the purposive elements of “justice and fairness” may not ever truly justify economic injuries.\(^ {243}\)

Similarly, this paper identified the importance of understanding that the right’s “instrumental character” exists in the context of its correlation with establishing an “encumbrance” for the purpose of TRIPS Article 20. Even then, only “the use of a trademark in the course of trade” is relevant for the purposes of assessing the legality of an “encumbrance by special requirements” under Article 20.\(^ {244}\) Yet there are many grounds to argue that plain packing legislation exists outside the course of trade.\(^ {245}\) The High Court’s rejection to characterizing the TPPA as a “law of trade regulation,” placing it outside the application of section 51(xxxi), albeit in the context of acquisition of property, implicitly supports this view.\(^ {246}\) If this were the case, then WTO Members would have an unhindered right to encumber trademarks outside the course of trade.\(^ {247}\) In short, the encumbrances on word trademarks in the course of trade that are imposed by plain packaging legislation are relatively small, but have the effect of assisting to achieve health objectives outside the course of trade.\(^ {248}\)

Nevertheless, this paper highlighted the scope of conceded arguments that purport to challenge plain packaging under the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris Convention. It remains doubtful that plain packaging legislation could be invalidated, either wholly or partially, under international treaties.\(^ {249}\) This paper notes the importance of articulating the role of health policy, i.e., broader public-rights, when seeking to “restrict,” impede, or encumber private-rights—although it recommends that this be undertaken in the context of a purposive approach. It is


\(^{242}\) Id.


\(^{244}\) Davison, supra note 57, at 10–11.

\(^{245}\) Id. at 21.

\(^{246}\) Trade Practices Comm’n v Tooth & Co. Ltd (1979) 142 CLR 397, 428 (Austl.).

\(^{247}\) Davison, supra note 57, at 21.

\(^{248}\) Id.

\(^{249}\) Davison, supra note 57, at 2.
recognized that governments tend to maintain a certain level of discretion in their ability to “modify,” “impede,” or, to a degree, “create” certain “rights” and/or obligations in legislation. However, such discretion must be qualified against certain constitutional rights and requirements, not to mention core objectives of a particular legal regime. One point that remains unsettled, however, is whether striking a balance between private-rights and public-rights from an international perspective, to procure the “spirit” of the TRIPS and from a domestic perspective to align with Constitutional mandates, is achievable any time soon.

Governments or States seeking to introduce, challenge, or invoke the potential invalidity of plain packaging legislation should first consider the merits of the arguments identified in this paper. The arguments presented would also be relevant to legislators seeking to introduce laws governing plain packaging in other heavily regulated industries, such as the fast food and alcohol industries. It is likely that intellectual property holders within these markets will be watching developments with close interest. Whether the United States and the European Union will follow the lead of Australia within the current legislative climate is open to doubt, but this does not invalidate Australia’s action nor necessarily require that the tobacco companies could or should triumph. For now, we must conclude that establishing a case successfully challenging the validity of plain packaging on domestic and international fora could be as difficult as changing tobacco policies in the first place.